Comparative Studies of Conceptual Design and Qualification Procedures for a Mars Probe/lander.  Volume IV - Sterilization Final Report by Schafer, W. J.
VOLUME IV STERILIZATION 
CFST! PR:CE:SI S 
------
gN6631822 
~ {ACCESSION NUMi:3ERL-
o "". ' "} 1 // 
.. ¥Y7 
(THRU) 
I 
(PAGES) 
'CODE} 
f!/C-~G/ 7';/ 
(NASA CR OR TMX OR AbNUMBER) 
-:3/ 
(CAT£GiO¥) 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19660022532 2020-03-16T21:17:56+00:00Z
VOLUME I 
VOLUME II 
Book I 
Book Z 
VOLUME III 
Book I 
Book Z 
Book 3 
BOOK INDEX 
SUMMARY 
PROBE/LANDER. ENTRY FROM THE APPROACH 
TRAJECTORY 
System De sign 
Mission and System Specifications 
PROBE, ENTRY FROM ORBIT 
System Design 
Mission. System and Component Specifications 
Development Test Programs 
c,;"".¥~~, . Vo,$PBSYSTEMAND TECHNICAL ANALYSES 
~.>~.-.. - '~-.,~,,~:,i11:~.---:.._ .x ......... ~ ... ""':,., .• r;;: ...... -,f-~-"--'---. .... "--.•. -~~,,...-,-.~,-.--~---""' •. : .. ,......~-.~--~-~., .•. -'" .. ~ .. ,." .. ~""'~" ... _ ...... - ....... - .. - .. ~ 
-,.:~~,-~":-\-,-"" 
<Bi6kl 'Trajectory Analysis 
Book Z. Aeromechanics and Thermal Control 
Bo()k 3 Telecommunications, Radar Systems and Power 
Book 4 Instrumentation 
Book 5 Attitude Control and Propulsion 
Book 6 Mechanical Subsystems 
" 
1 
1 ~ \ 
1 
l 
,I 
. / 
-;., 
COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF CONCEPTUAL 
DES IGN AND QUALIFICATION PROCEDURES 
FOR A MARS PROBE/LANDER 
FINAL REPORT 
VOLUME IV - STERILIZATION 
Prepared by 
SF ACE SYSTEMS DIVISION 
AVCO CORPORATION 
Lowell. Mas sachusetts 
AVSSO-0006-6&-RR 
Contract NAS 1-5224 
11 May 1966 
Prepared for 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER 
LANGLEY STATION 
Ham.pton. Virginia 23365 
PREFACE 
The results of Mars Probe/Lander studies, conducted over a 10-month period 
for Langley Research Center, NASA, are presented in detail in this report. 
Under the original contract work statement, studies were directed toward a 
direct entry mission concept, consistent with the use of the Saturn IB-Centaur 
Launch Vehicle, wherein the landing capsule is separated from the spacecraft 
on the interplanetary approach trajectory, some 10 to 12 days before planet en-
counter. The primary objectives of this mission were atmospheric sampling by 
the probel1ander during entry and terrain and atmosphere physical composition 
measurement for a period of about 1 day after landing. 
Studies for this mission were predicated on the assumption that the atmosphere 
of Mars could be described as being within the range specified by, NASA Mars 
Model Atmospheres 1, 2, 3 and a Terminal Descent Atmosphere of the docu-
ment NASA TM-D2525. These models describe the surface pressure as being 
between 10 and 40 mb. For this surface pressure range a payload of moderate 
size can be landed on the planet's surface if the entry angle is restricted to be 
less than about 45 degrees. 
Midway during the course of the study, it was discovered by Mariner IV that 
the pressure at the surface of the planet is in the 4 to 10 mb range, a range 
much lower than previously thought to be the case. The results of the study 
were re-examined at this point. It was found that retention of the direct entry 
mission mode would require much shallower entry angles to achieve the same 
payloads previously attained at the higher entry angles of the higher surface 
. pressure model atmospheres. The achievement of shallow entry angles (on the 
order of 20 degrees), in turn, required sophisticated capsule terminal guidance, 
and a sizeable capsule propulsion system to apply a velocity correction close 
to the planet, af~er the final terminal navigation measurements. 
Faced with these facts, NASA/LRC decided that the direct entry from the 
approach trajectory mission mode should be compared with the entry from 
orbit mode under the assumption that the Saturn 5 Launch Vehicle would be 
available. Entry of the flight capsule from orbit allows the shallow angle entry 
(together with low entry velocity) necessary to permit higher values of M/ CnA, 
and hence entry weight in the attenuated atmosphere. 
It was also decided by LRC to eliminate the landing portion of the mission in 
favor of a descent payload having greater data-gathering capacity, including 
television and penetrometers. In both the direct entry and the entry from 
orbit cases, ballistic atmospheric retardation was the only retardation means 
considered as specifically required by the contract work statement. 
Four months had elapsed at the time the study ground rules were changed. 
After this point the study continued for an additional five months, during which 
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period a new design for the substantially changed conditions was evolved. For 
this design, qualification test programs for selected subsystems were studied. 
Sterilization studies were included in the program from the start and, based 
on the development of a fundamental approach to the sterilization problem, 
these efforts were expanded in the second half of the study. 
The organization of this report reflects the circumstance that two essentially 
different mission modes were studied - - the first being the entry from the 
approach trajectory mission mode and the other being the entry from orbit 
mission mode -- from which two designs were evolved. The report organiza-
tion is as follows: 
Volume I, Summary, summarizes the entire study for both mission modes. 
Volume II reports on the results of the first part of the study. This volume 
is titled Probe /Lander, Entry from the Approach Trajectory. It is divided 
into two books, Book 1 and Book 2. Book 1 is titled System Design and 
presents a discursive summary of the entry from the approach trajectory 
system as it had evolved up to the point where the mission mode was changed. 
Book 2, titled Mission and System Specifications, presents, in formal 
fashion, specifications for the system. It should be understood, however, 
that the study for this mission mode was not carried through to completion 
and many of the design selections are subject to further tradeoff analysis. 
Volume III is composed of three books which summarize the results of the 
entry from orbit studies. Books 1 and 2 are organized in the same fashion 
as the books of Volume II, except that Book 2 of Volume III presents com-
ponent specifications as well. Book 3 is titled Development Test Programs 
and presents, for selected subsystems, a discussion of technology status, 
test requirements and plans. This Book is intended to satisfy the study and 
reporting requirements concerning qualification studies, but the selected 
title is believed to describe more accurately the study emphasis desired by 
LRC. 
Volume IV presents Sterilization results. This information is presented 
, separately because of its potential utilization as a more fundamental refer-
'-~ document. 
Volume V presents, in six separate books, Subsystem and Technical 
Analyses. In order (from Book 1 to Book 6) they are: 
Trajectory Analysis 
Aeromechanics and Thermal Control 
Telecommunications, Radar Systems and Power 
Instrumentation 
Attitude Control and Propulsion 
Mechanical Subsystems 
Most of the books of Volume V are divided into separate discussions of the 
two mission modes. Table of Contents for each book clearly shows its 
organization. 
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AsseIllbly, Handling 
and Shipping Equip-
Illent (ARSE) 
Clean Room 
COIllponent 
De contaIllination 
Die-Off 
Electrostatic Factor 
GLOSSARY 
DeterIllination of the nUIllber of viable organisms on or 
in hardware eleIllents by recovery and culture methods. 
Lifting, holding and positioning fixtures and other iteIlls 
required in the assembly, transportation, and testing of 
the Flight Capsule and its OSE (in various stages of 
as seIllbly). 
An enclosed area wherein the particular matter in the air, 
as well as the temperature, humidity and pressure ofthe air 
are controlled. In a Class 100 clean room, which is the type 
considered herein, the particle count does not exceed a total 
of 100 particles per cubic foot, 0.5 microns in size and larger. 
An assembly of parts Illounted together to perform a 
design function ( a "black box"). 
The reduction of the biological burden prior to final 
sterilization by the use of dry heat or cleaning with 
ethylene oxide. 
Reduction of IllicroorganisIlls due to natural causes, 
expressed as a percentage of total population present. 
A nUIllber used to indicate the increase in burden 
accUIllulation due to the electrostatic attraction devel-
oped by plastic (non-conducting) surfaces cOIllpared 
with the accumulation on a norIllal conducting surface. 
Entry Shell A honeycoIllb structure having the surface exposed to 
entry heating, protected by a coating of ablative Illate-
rial. This structure is used to support the Suspended 
Capsule and Attitude Control and Spin-Despin systeIlls 
during vehicle entry into the planetary atIllosphere. 
Entry Vehicle That portion of the Flight Capsule containing the Entry 
Shell, Suspended Capsule, Attitude Control and Spin-
Despin Systems. 
Ethylene Oxide (ETO) The reduction of Illicrobial burden (on exposed surfaces) 
DecontaIllination through the use of an appropriate gaseous mixture, of 
which one ingredient is ethylene oxide. 
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Factory Support 
Equipment (FSE) 
Fallout 
Hepa Filters 
Flight Acceptance 
Tests 
Flight Capsule 
(Probe) 
Flight Capsule to 
Flight Spacecraft 
Adapter 
Internal Burden 
Laminar Flow 
Clean-Room 
Launch Window 
GLOSSARY (Cont'd) 
Buildings that house test areas and chambers, manu-
facturing and assembly equipments, and storage areas, 
as well as engineering and administrative personnel. 
Equipment required to fabricate, assembly and check-
out the Flight Capsule and its support equipment in the 
plant. 
The settling of microorganisms on a surface, expressed 
in various units, such as organisms per square inch 
per day or per square foot per hour. 
High efficiency particulate air filter characterized by 
having particle efficiencies better than 99. 97 percent 
for 0.3 micron particles as determined by MIL-STD-282, 
Dioctyl Phthalate tests. 
Tests designed to ascertain that an item of hardware 
meets specific environments and conditions which con-
firm that the unit is flightworthy. 
A vehicle containing an instrumented entry vehicle 
mounted in a pres surized sterilization canister having 
provisions for attachment to a spacecraft. 
Mechanical mounting provision of Flight Capsule and/or 
its sterilization canister to the spacecraft. 
Viable organisms confined within the material making 
up a part. 
An enclosed area in which the entire body of air moves 
with uniform velocity along parallel flow lines, with a 
minimum of eddies, and with the incoming air contam-
ination controlled by use of H filters. 
The duration of time each Earth day, when space ve-
hicle launch is practical to achieve desired planetary 
vehicle transfer orbit orientation and characteristics 
depending on mission objectives and launch-vehicle 
constraints. 
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Microbial Burden, 
Biological Burden or 
Burden 
Module (or 
Subassembly) 
Occluded Burden 
Operational Support 
Equipm.ent (OSE) 
Particle Size 
Planetary Vehicle 
. Quality Assurance 
Separated Vehicle 
Space System 
Space Vehicle 
GLOSSARY (Cont'd) 
The quantity of m.icroorganism.s of all types on or in 
equipment. 
Collection of com.ponents into a discrete assembly, 
such as the payload assem.bly, or a significant part of 
it, or the complete sterilization canister. 
The viable organisms trapped between mating surfaces, 
or otherwise contained, so that they are not accessible 
to surface cleaning techniques. 
Equipment and facilities required to support assem.bly, 
checkout, acceptance testing, sterilization and ser-
vicing of subsystem.s or a com.plete Flight Capsule. 
The apparent m.aximum. linear dim.ension or diameter 
of the particle. 
The Planetary Vehicle (PV) is defined as the com.posite 
Flight Spacecraft and Flight Capsule integrally attached 
and operated up to separation in the vicinity of the se-
lected planet . 
Includes the plans, activities and as sociated controls 
v.:hich contribute to the ultim.ate quality of the system. 
hardware and parts throughout the design, procurem.ent, 
m.anufacturing, packaging, storage, shipping, and field 
operations. 
That portion of the Flight Capsule rem.aining after 
separation from. Sterilization Canister, containing the 
Entry Vehicle and propulsion system. 
A system consisting of launch vehicle, spacecraft, 
ground support equipment, and test hardware, used in 
launching, operating, and maintaining a space vehicle 
in space. 
The Space Vehicle (SV) is the com.bined Launch Vehicle 
and Planetary Vehicle or Vehicles which physically 
leave the launch pad in the conduct of the m.ission. 
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Sterility 
Sterilization 
Sterilization 
Canister 
Subassembly 
Surface Burden 
Suspended Capsule 
System 
Systems Integration 
Van der Waals 
Forces 
GLOSSARY (Concl'd) 
The absence of viable organisms. 
The killing of microorganisms on and in a Flight 
Capsule (through the use of dry heat, unless specifically 
stated otherwise). 
A pressurized container which encapsulates the Entry 
Vehicle to maintain biological isolation. 
See Module. 
Viable organisms existing on the exterior, or exposed 
surface of a part. 
That portion of the Entry Vehicle which when separated 
from the Entry Shell lands or impacts on the Planet 
surface. It contains a descent retardation (parachute) 
system, an impact attenutation system (in the case of 
a soft-landed capsule),and the required acquisition and 
transmis sion systems to complete the functions of the 
Capsule System mis sion. 
One of the principal functioning entities comprising the 
project hardware, and the related operational services 
within a project or flight mis sion. 
The process by which the systems of a project (for 
example, the launch vehicle, the spacecraft, and its 
supporting ground equipment and operational procedures) 
are made compatible in order to achieve the purpose of 
the project or the given flight mission. 
The relatively weak forces operative between neutral 
atoms or molecules, arising from the interaction of 
dipole s or stray electric fields. 
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1. 0 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMAR Y 
1. 1 BASIC SPACECRAFT STERILIZATION PHILOSOPHY 
The basic requirement for spacecraft sterilization has been outlined by Dr. 
Horner E. Newell, Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications, 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:':' 
"Space exploration has posed the likelihood of the transfer of living forms 
between pla.."lets. An unsterile planetary-landing capsule with an array of 
scientific instruments could contaminate our experiments for the detection of 
extraterrestrial life and thus confuse this scientific issue. Further analysis 
of the problem shows that the advent of terrestrial life, particularly micro-
organisms, to a previously barren but hospitable planet or to one that has a 
slowly evolving form of primitive life could result in the growth of the im-
plant with consequences that might affect the total character of the planet being 
explored. The sterilization of unmanned planetary-landing spacecraft will 
protect future scientific investigations of the planets and aid in the determina-
tion of the infective potential of any extraterrestrial life to the Earth's eco-
logy." 
Based on the anticipated duration of this planetary quarantine and the estimated 
number of landings in this time period, the policy has been established that 
the probability of anyone lander depositing a viable organism on the planetary 
surface be less than 0.0001. The general approach to the implementation of 
this policy was outlined by Dr. Newell in the same statement: 
• 
11 Flight trials by both the United States and the Soviet Union have verified theo-
retical and ground-based data that microorganisms would survive exposure to 
deep space conditions. Spacecraft cannot be sterilized by low temperatures, 
vacuum, ultraviolet light, or solar radiation. The two sterilants that will kill 
organisms on surfaces as well as in the interior of solids are dry heat and 
ionizing radiation. Although each of these agents are equally damaging to 
spacecraft parts, dry heat is inexpensive and easier to handle than ionizing 
radiation. " 
tiThe spacecraft sterilization program is based on four major steps: 
1. Development of spacecraft materials, piece parts, components, and 
subassemblies that will yield a total landing capsule capable of tolerating 
dry heat sterilization at a cycle (i. e .• at a temperature] between 105 
and 160°C • 
In a statement before the Subcommittee on Space Sc ience and Applications. of the House of Representatives. February. 
1966. 
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2. Control of biological loading limits during capsule assembly so that 
not more than 10 8 microorganisms will be present on the capsule before 
terminal sterilization. 
3. Encapsulation of the landing capsule in a biocanister to be followed 
by terminal sterilization in an inert atmosphere at 1350 C for 22 hours 
[or at 125° C for 53 hours] or any other specified cycle between 105 and 
160°C [which reduces the biological burden by a factor of 1012]. 
4. Protection of the sterilized capsule during launch operations and the 
prevention of recontamination during ejection of the flight capsule from 
the spacecraft bus or orbiter. 
"The first priority in this sterilization development program is the develop-
ment of heat-tolerant materials and parts that will not vary, in resistance to 
heat, from mission to mission. Many present off-the-shelf items used in 
spacecraft manufacture cannot tolerate the dry heat treatments required for 
sterilization. In general, however, component quality and reliability are being 
upgraded so that they will withstand dry heat sterilization. 
"The control of the number and species of microorganisms on or in the space-
craft during assembly must be accomplished if a nondestructive sterilization 
cycle is to be effective, for the larger the initial population the longer the heat 
must be applied to reduce the population to zero. A systems analysis of the 
problem shows that many of the techniques used by aerospace engineers to 
increase the reliability of sterilized flight hardware also reduce or destroy 
the microbial contamination in or on that hardware. The biologist is now in-
. vestigating the extent of this microbial destruction so that the need for elaborate 
facilities for control of microbial contamination can be held to a minimum. It 
will still be necessary to control the number of microorganisms in the final 
assembly environment immediately prior to terminal dry heat sterilization. 
"The type of final assembly environment that will meet biological specifications 
is called a downward laminar flow clean room. Because the number of micro-
organisms in these clean rooms can be limited, the fully assembled space-
craft will contain fewer microorganisms that can be killed by the terminal 
heat sterilization cycle. 
"The heating cycle will be accomplished in an oven containing an inert gas 
[dry nitrogen]. If the size of the spacecraft prevents the penetration of the 
heat into the center of the load [or if certain instruments cannot withstand heat 
sterilization and must be sterilized by another technique], it may be necessary 
to heat large portions of the spacecraft in an oven equipped with tunnel suits. 
Mter the oven cools, technicians can enter the suits at the end of the tunnel 
and perform final assembly operations before enclosing the spacecraft in its 
canister. 
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"A hermetically sealed canister will protect the sterile spacecraft from re-
contamination during the period before launch and its exit through the atmos-
phere. After reaching outer space the canister would be opened by explosive 
devices, the landing capsule would be propelled outward, and the canister 
would be deflected from the planetary trajectory. " 
1. 2 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STERILIZATION REQUIREMENT 
The implementation of such a program for a complex spacecraft poses a num-
ber of problems in the areas of engineering, biology, manufacturing/assembly, 
and program n1anagement'~. Some of the more significant of these are dis-
cuss ed below. 
1. 2. 1 Parts Qualification 
Very few of the types of parts required to assemble a landing capsule have 
been qualified to the required sterilization environment(s), -dry heat of 
the specified levels and durations and, where applicable, decontamination 
with ethylene oxide. A parts qualification program is now in progress 
under the sponsorship of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory to qualify the re-
quired parts and components and, in some instances where present parts 
cannot withstand these environments, develop parts which can be qualified. 
This work will ultimately lead to a Qualified Parts List for landing cap-
sule applications. 
1. 2. 2 Subsystem Testing 
In addition to parts and components, subsystems comprised of these 
elements have to be qualified eventually to the sterilization environment. 
Long before that, however, prototypical subsystems will have to be tested 
under simulated sterilization conditions to identify any adverse interac-
tions of the individual constituents under these environments. In a 
mechanical system, for instance, thermo-structural interaction may occur 
in an assembly which would not exist in the individual parts; similarly, 
outgassing in one part, which may not degrade the performance of that 
part, may damage another part if the released gas is corrosive. These 
tests should cover not only the subsystems of the capsule itself, but also 
the sterilization canister, which is subjected to the same sterilization 
prQcess. This work will result in a backlog of experience which may 
serve as the basis of a set of design guidelines and criteria for sterilizable 
subs ystems . 
Many of these problems have been treated in some depth in the NASA National Conference on Spacecraft Sterilization 
Technology at the California Institute of Technology, November 16/18, 1965, proceedings of which are to be published 
shortly. 
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1. 2. 3 Heat Sterilization Techniques 
Although the basic burden-reduction rates at various temperatures have 
been established, certain areas, such as the kill rate of certain resistant 
organisms, may require further work. Additionally, in the engineering 
area, techniques have to be developed for subjecting the components in 
the interior of a capsule to the required cycle without subjecting the 
exterior to excessively high temperatures for excessively long periods of 
time. This may require the use of internal heaters and the development 
of design guidelines for the incorporation of the required degree of thermal 
control during the sterilization process. Alternatively, it may require 
the further development of tunnel-suit and other sterile-assembly techni-
ques. 
1. 2. 4 Surface Sterilization Techniques 
The basic principles of surface sterilization with ethylene oxide have been 
established, but detailed process specifications have yet to be written in 
some areas to insure that the process results in the required degree of 
decontamination with minimum risk to the parts undergoing the process 
and the personnel performing it. 
1. 2. 5 Assay Techniques 
Much work has been done on various ass ay techniques suitable for the 
verification of the kinds of decontamination and sterilization under con-
sideration here. Essentially, this work permits the selection of the most 
appropriate techniques. Additional work, however, will have to be done 
on the selected techniques to facilitate their reliable use in the relatively 
large number of routine assays that will have to be used in a spacecraft 
sterilization program. 
1. 2. 6 Burden Deposition and Die-Off Rates 
Two factors which must be known in setting up a spacecraft-sterilization-
control program are the burden deposition and the die-off rate. The bur-
den deposition depends on the area of a given part, the fall-out rate and 
the degree of retention of particles on the surface of the part; the latter is 
governed by electrostatic effects, which presently are not too well estab-
lished. Some work has been done on the rate of die-off of organisms de-
posited on a surface, but additional work is required in this area. 
1. 2. 7 Manufacturing and Assembly Techniques 
A great deal of work has been done, is now in process, and remains to be 
done on the various techniques of manufacturing and assembling an 
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ultimately sterile spacecraft. This includes work on sterile assembly 
techniques which may not be required in the initial assembly, but which 
might be indispensable in some instances for the repair, replacement, 
or rework of parts found to be defective in a post-sterilization checkout, 
and which also might be required for the insertion of separately sterilized 
instruments into the capsule after the latter has been sterilized, if it turns 
out to be necessary to use this concept. 
1. 2. 8 Recontamination 
Recontamination of parts "\vhich are decontaminated during the manufacture / 
assembly process can take place in subsequent stages of assembly, and 
is then subject to the burden-deposition and die-off factors discussed pre-
viously. However, an additional possibility of recontamination exists after 
the capsule is released from the sterilization container upon approach to 
the planet. The areas of concern here are the impingement on the capsule 
of parts of the separation system or of the gases used for the attitude con-
trol or retropropulsion of the flight spacecraft. 
1.2.9 Checkout and Calibration Techniques 
Techniques have to be devised for checking out the several subsystems of 
the capsule during the assembly process, prior to launching, and in-flight, 
without interfering with the decontamination and sterilization process. 
Factors relevant to sterilization, such as internal temperatures and pres-
sures, will have to be monitored as part of the check-out process. An 
especially complex problem is the calibration of the several scientific 
instruments included in the payload after the capsule has been inserted in 
a sterilization canister and sterilized. Any sensors built into the capsule 
must, of course, be qualified to the sterilization environments. 
1. 2. 10 Tradeoff Analyses 
In many areas of the design, the manufacturing process, the decontamina-
tion/ sterilization process, and the flight-qualification and acceptance 
processes, there are alternative means of achieving a given objective. 
These alternatives have to be evaluated on the basis of considerations of 
size, weight, reliability, risk, and economics and before these factors 
cap. be traded off against each other, the required information must be 
available to make such an analysis meaningful. 
1. 2. 11 Sterilization Control 
To be sure that the sterilization requirements are met, a sterilization-
control program must be instituted. Such a program consists basically of 
an apportionment of the biological burden to the various parts and 
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subsystems, conduct of the required ass ays, and monitoring of the final 
sterilization process as well as any parameters (such as the fall-out rate 
during the manufacturing/ assembly process) which affect the pre -steriliza-
tion burden. These primary activities are supported by others, such as 
participation of sterilization-control personnel in design reviews (for com-
pliance with Qualified Parts List and with the established design criteria 
and guidelines), and documentation of the findings. Such a program leads 
ultimately to a certification of the spacecraft as sterile within the estab-
lished requirements. 
1. 3 AREAS OF EMPHASIS IN STUDY 
The sterilization investigations conducted as part of the study of conceptual de-
signs and qualification procedures for a Mars probe/lander, have addressed 
themselves primarily to the definition of a plan for an integrated sterilization 
control and management program (see Figure 1). The results of these studies 
are described in this volume. The remaining sterilization efforts have been 
in the nature of support to the design studies and show up in the results dis-
cussed in the other volumes, but will not be discussed any further in this vol-
ume (except for the material presented in Appendix A). 
The basic objective of a sterilization program is to assure sterility (as defined 
herein) with minimum impact on system reliability and performance, and on 
program schedule and cost. Such a program has much in common with a re-
liability program and a quality-assurance program. Many of the lessons 
learned from these programs can be applied to sterilization. For instance, 
most of the progress in reliability engineering has corne not from a better 
. understanding of the physical causes and mechanisms of failure, but from 
learning to live without this knowledge by relying on: 
1. qualification programs for high-reliability parts 
2. good design practice 
3. extensive test programs 
4. thorough quality-control programs 
5. program-management techniques which effectively tie these activities 
together (through quick-reaction failure -reporting / analysis / control sys-
terns, etc.) and which, while being based on the existing state of the art 
in relevent areas at any given time, provide for incorporation of new know-
ledge as it is generated. 
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Figure 1 CONSIDERATIONS IN SELECTION OF STERILIZATION PLAN 
Similarly, a sterilization program can be set up in a directly analogous fashion, 
despite the fact that present knowledge is deficient in many of the areas dis-
cussed in the preceding section; it has to be based on existing knowledge (some 
of which is summarized herein) while providing for modification in the light of 
subsequently generated new knowledge. 
The basic considerations in defining such a plan are outlined in Section 2. O. The 
design and manufacturing/assembly factors relevant to sterilization control are 
discussed in paragraph 2. 1 and 2.2, respectively; the basic elements of burden 
control are defined in paragraph 2.3; sterilization and the maintenance of steril-
ity subsequent to sterilization are discussed in paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5. 
The techniques o(performingbiological burden estimates are presented in Sec-
tion 3. O. The sources of contamination and decontamination are discussed in 
paragraph 3.1. Techniques for performing burden estimates are outlined in 
paragraph 3.2, and some of the complications of the assay requirement on bur-
den estimates are indicated in paragraph 3.3. Estimates of the burden at vari-
ous stages of assembly ofthe probe designed for entry from orbit (EFO) and the probe/ 
lander designed for entry from approach trajectory (EF AT) are presented in para-
graphs 3. 4 and 3.5 respectively. Also discussed in these sections are the implica-
tions of changes in various system andprogram parameters (i. e. ,techniques of hand-
ling, decontamination and assembly) on the burden, and the sensitivity of the results to 
the assumptions made concerning some ofthese parameters (e. g. , die-off rates). 
The problems involved in burden monitoring are discussed in Section 4. O. The 
types and number of assays required are described in paragraphs 4. 1 and 4.2; 
the general monitoring problems are outlined in paragraph 4.3; and the documen-
tation aspects of the problem are discussed briefly in paragraph 4.4. 
The sterilization-control problems during and after terminal sterilization are 
outlined in Sections 5.0 and 6. o. Techniques of heat application are described 
in paragraph 5. I, and verification of kill effectiveness is discussed in paragraph 
5.2 Sterility maintenance during the pre -launch, launch/cruise, and vehicle-
deployment phases is discussed in paragraphs 6. I, 6.2, and 6.3 respectively, 
and approaches to sterilization monitoring are outlined in paragraph 6.4. 
An outline of training problems brought about by the sterilization requirement 
is given in Section 7. O. 
The specific implementation plans for the two systems are presented 
in Sections 8.0 and 9.0, respectively. They spell out the activities that have 
to be undertaken and the time, manpower, and facilities needed to comply with 
the sterilization requirement, and reflect the general considerations presented 
in the remainder of this volume. 
In support of the conceptual design studies, a brief survey was made of the ef-
fects of dry-heat sterilization on capsule materials and components. The re-
sults of the survey are summarized in Appendix A of this volume. Appendix B 
contains some additional information relevant to burden estimates. 
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1. 4 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1.4.1 Basic Burden Factors 
The biological burden on a spacecraft prior to sterilization can be consid-
ered to consist of two parts, the initial internal burden of the constituent 
materials and parts, and the burden added or subtracted by the handling, 
assetnbly and decontatnination processes. 
The range of internal burdens of representative capsule parts and tnaterials 
is given in Table 1. In general, they range frotn essentially 0 to 100,000 
tnicroorganistns, depending on the particular tnanufacturing process in-
volved and the nature of the acceptance-test procedures etnployed. Thus, 
tnetallic structural cotnponents and heat shield eletnents, for instance, 
experience such high tetnperatures for prolonged periods of titne during 
their tnanufacturing processes that they are internally sterile. Sitnilarly, 
sotne high-reliability electronic cotnponents, such as transistors, are 
burned in and stabilized for long periods of titne at tetnperatures higher 
than those encountered in the internal sterilization cycle and, as a result, 
are essentially sterile internally. On the other hand, sotne parts, such as 
transfortners, are nortnally tnanufactured under conditions which result 
in very high biological loadings. 
The contatninating and decontatninating factors associated with the handling, 
assembly/checkout flight-acceptance test and decontatnination processes 
are shown in Table II. 
Experitnents have shown that tnicrobial fallout in existing aerospace 
assetnbly and test facilities is on the order of 30 to 50 organisms/in2 /day 
depending on the nutnber of workers present and the degree of worker 
activity. The high values shown in Table II for nortnal fallout are extretnes 
that may be present in low-quality facilities, with poor environmental 
controls and with a great deal of particle generation by tnachining and 
grinding processes. Other tests in bio-clean facilities (high-efficiency 
filtered, verticallatninar-down-flow clean-rootns, per Federal Specifi-
cation 209, Class 100) provide an itnprovetnent over nortnal fallout condi-
tions of at Ie ast two order s of tnagnitude. 
The burden attributable to handling depends on the nutnber of individual 
hand contacts; in a bio-clean room, if proper clothes and gloves are worn, 
it will be nearly zero, but a conservative value two orders of magnitude be-
low that for nortnal conditions is assumed in burden estimate calculations. 
The burden on plastic surfaces may be magnified manyfold above that of 
normal fallout if they are electrostatically charged. Accurate values for 
this factor are not available, and estitnates vary widely. Experitnents 
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TABLE I 
PART AND MATERIAL 
INTERNAL BURDEN RANGES 
Estimated Internal 
Type Burden Range 
Balsa wood 1 -10/ in. 3 
Battery cell 0 
Capacitor 10-1000 
Coaxial cable 0-100/ft. 
Connector 100-10000 
Crystal 0-10 
Diode 0 
Duplexer 0 
Evacuation bellows 0 
Explosive 1000/gm 
Explosive trains O-ZOO/ft. 
Fiberglass 0 
Foam l/ml 
G-M tube 0 
Inductor 1000-10,000 
Magnetic core 0 
Magnetron 0-10 
Metal 0 
Nylon, Dacron 0 
Optical system 10-100 
PbS detector 0 
Photomultube 0 
Relay 100-1000 
Resistor 0-10 
Silicone int'd circuit 0-10 
Silicone oil l/ml 
Silicone rubbe r 0 
Teflon insulation 0 
Thermal control 0 
Transforme r 10,000-100,000 
Transistor 0 
TWT 0 
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TABLER 
BIOLOGICAL BURDEN CONTAMINATION AND 
DECONTAMINATION FACTORS 
Contaznination Factors 
Fallout on surfaces 
Norznal facilities 
Bio-clean facilities 
Handling 
Nortnal facilities 
Bio-clean facilities 
Electrostatic factor 
Decontaznination Factors 
ETO effectiveness 
Flight acceptance heat test effect 
Die -off 
Norznal facilities 
Bio-clean facilities 
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Consensus Value 
32 - 128 org/in. 2 /day 
0.32 - 1. 28 org/in. 2 /day 
1900 org/in. 2 of contacted 
surface 
19 org/in. 2 of contacted 
surface 
1 - 10 
Consensus Value 
4D (10-4 ) 
12D (10- 12) 
30 - 99 percent 
30 - 99 percent 
under artificially severe conditions have reported results as high as 13, 
but 5 appears to be a conservative value under realistic conditions. 
The effectiveness of ETO as a surface decontamination process has been 
substantiated by experiment. However, ETO cleaning will not reach and 
decontaminate occluded capsule surfaces nor the interiors of sealed com-
ponents. The decision of whether or not to seal a component against ETO 
penetration involves a tradeoff between the relative burden contributions 
and effects on system reliability. 
Flight acceptance tests are conducted on each item of hardware that is to 
go into a flight version of the flight capsule in order to eliminate potentially 
defective components and to confirm that the unit is flightworthy. These 
tests involve exposure to environments at least as severe as those which 
are to be encountered in the mission, and are generally conducted in the 
order in which the environments are actually experienced in the flight. 
For a planetary landing capsule, these tests should include heat-cycle 
tests and ETO-exposure tests at the beginning of the flight-acceptance 
cycle. 
Exposure to sterilization temperature conditions should be first in the 
flight-acceptance sequence, and the heat cycle should be equal to or higher 
than the terminal sterilization cycle. This will obviously result in sterile 
or near-sterile component interiors, and if the components are sealed, 
the interiors will remain in the sterile or near-sterile condition through-
out the remainder of assembly. To minimize reliability and performance 
degradation, the flight-acceptance and the terminal-sterilization heat 
cycles (specifically, the temperature and duration of each) should be op-
timized simultaneously. This optimization is as important to sterility 
maintenance as it is to performance, as it will also reduce post-sterili-
zation repair requirements and, consequently, recontamination risk. 
Flight acceptance tests should also be performed for susceptibility to ETO 
exposure; these tests could be conducted after the flight acceptance tests 
for the heating environment. if it is desired to eliminate early those ele-
ments failing the heat testing. thereby reducing the number of elements 
requiring subsequent testing. 
Biological organisms on or in aerospace components (i. e., under non-
nutritive conditions) tend to die off gradually from natural causes. The 
extent of die -off depends on the time and the rate, and the latter depends 
somewhat on the nature of the surface as well as the temperature and 
humidity of the environment, i. e., the season and geographical location. 
The die-off rate is typically in the order of 1 percent a day, which is 
equivalent to about 30 percent a month and 99 percent over the period of 
a year. 
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1. 4. 2 Burden EstiInates 
The physical characteristics which are of significance to pre sterilization 
burden loadings are summarized in Table III for the two capsules designed 
in this study for the entry-from-orbit (EFO) and entry-from-approach-
trajectory (EF AT) cases, with their different requirements and constraints. 
Also included in this table, for comparison, is a small capsule in the 100-
pound class (the Ames Atmospheric Probe concept). 
With the large number of parts and the wide variety of contamination 
and decontamination factors, it is convenient to perform a burden 
analysis by means of a simple computer program of the type shown 
schematically in Figure 2. Five types of inputs are used to define the 
system and assembly/ sterilization program, as indicated in Table IV. 
The program is designed to cycle completely for each assembly process, 
during which new parts may be added, or two or more assemblies may 
be put together without the addition of new parts. The number of parts 
are specified by the system, and the number of handling operations are 
determined by the assembly process. 
A biological burden analysis for the EF AT case was performed early 
in the study (before the aforementioned computer program was available) 
and the results are summarized in Table V. In this analysis it was 
assumed that all operations, with the exception of the assembly of the 
suspended capsule, would be conducted under conventional aerospace 
environmental conditions. The suspended capsule was considered to 
be assembled in a Class 100 vertical downward-laminar-flow clean-
room, with a biological fallout reduction effectiveness of 90 percent. 
Viable organisms on exposed surfaces are destroyed upon application 
of ETO just prior to terminal sterilization, leaving only the burden 
internal to parts and occluded within components and on mated surfaces 
to be killed during the terminal heating process. 
A review of these results indicates that the bulk of the total burden accumu-
lation is caused by fallout on the parachute. 1£ the parachute is decontami-
nated by ETO before it is packaged within a container, its contribution to 
burden can be reduced significantly, resulting in a total Probe/Lander load-
ing of 27 x 106 . The reduction in burden attributable to utilizin~ a clean-
room during payload assembly was estimated to be only 10 x 10 • indicating 
that if it had not been used. the total count would still be manageable although 
it would exceed the required limit by about 5 percent. 
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COMPUTER: 
1. Internal Burden 
2. Process - Added Burden 
3. Die-Off of (21 Only 
4. Distribution of (21 Among; 
Surface Areas 
Occ! uded Areas 
Mated Areas 
160135P 
Physical Characteristics and Process Data 
Contamination and Decontamination Data Assay 
Characteristics Data 
Burdens on Parts/Components as Received, 
Prior to Assembly Functions 
Burden Buildup During Assembly of Electrical 
Components, Which are Then Sealed 
Burden Added During Each Stage of 
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Assembly Process 
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Figure 2 COMPUTER PROGRAM SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM 
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\J1 
I 
Weight 
Diameter 
Components 
Electronic parts 
Magnetic cores 
Volume: (In. 3) 
Heat shield 
Impact attenuator 
Propellant 
Plastic 
(sterilization container. 
foam padding) 
Surface area: (In. 2) 
Occluded 
Component interiors 
Electronic 
Other 
Mated 
Exposed 
Parachute 
---- ----- -------
e • 
TABLE m 
PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CAPSULES 
Probe (Entry Probel Lander (Entry 100-Pound Class I 
From Orbit) From Approach Trajectory) (Ames) Capsule 
3, 000 pounds 2, 500 pounds 107 pounds 
.. 
IS feet IS feet 30.5 inches 
140 165 60 
15,000 33,000 1,500 
8 x 105 30 x 10 5 f> x 10:3 
20, 000 16, 500 84 
15, 000 (4 Penetrometers) 168, 000 
---
12,000 1,260 :~o 
18, 000 22, 000 1,500 
~-.-
479, 000 505, 000 24, 000 
420, 000 430, 000 20, 000 
110,000 112. 000 19. 000 
310, 000 318, 000 1,000 
59, 000 75, 000 4, 000 
260, 000 325, 000 15, 000 
2, 660, 000 2, 440, 000 
---
e 
..... 
0' 
( I) 
Part/Component 
Inputs 
Level 
Control point 
Part number 
Facility code 
Pe rcent plastic 
Initial surface 
area 
Initial occluded 
area 
Initial volume 
Assembly mated 
area 
No. personal 
contacts 
Area contacted 
ETO "D" value 
Heat "D" value 
Assay technique 
(2) 
Electronic Part 
Input/Part 
Level 
Control point 
Part number 
Facility code 
Part area 
No. parts 
Internal burden 
Percent plastic 
TABLE IV 
COMPUTER PROGRAM INPUTS 
(3) (4) (5) 
Constants for Given Run Assay General Inputs 
Requirements 
Subroutines: No. of assay types Table of assay 
Black box Upper burden limit types and 
Assay Confidence level code accuracies 
Die- off As say accuracy for Table of "t" 
ETO use subassemblies Distribution values 
Heat application Confidence level for different 
Die-Off rate required confidence levels 
Heat subroutine: 
Growth rate 
Death rate 
ETO subroutine: 
Growth rate 
Death rate 
Initial burden levels 
Metal. surface 
Metal. occluded 
Plastic. surface 
Plastic. occluded 
Plastic. internal 
Electrostatic factor 
Personnel contamination rate 
Fallout rate 
Duration exposed factor 
Master facility code 
--
e 
TABLE V 
INITIAL BURDEN ESTIMATE PROBE/LANDER, EFAT 
(number of viable orga.'lisms x 10-3) 
Surface Internal 
Burden Burden 
Entry Vehic1e 8225 7426 
Entry shell 6, 161 771 
Suspended capsule 1,036 6.655 
External payload 147 2,042 
Science 1 1,571 
Propulsion A. C. 16 459 
Parachute 3 0 
Other ---- 12 
Impact attenuation 76 1,617 
Flotation ---- 69 
Landed payload 168 2,927 
Science 34 301 
Communication 2 2,250 
Sequencing and data 1 89 
handling 
Other 
-- -- 289 
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Occluded 
Burden 
94,723 
5185 
89,538 
86, 273 
289 
193 
85,823 
18 
246 
286 
2,738 
390 
414 
1,381 
848 
Although this analysis was preliminary in nature and prepared for the cap-
sule designed for the Probe/Lander case, it indicated several trends which 
are generally valid and which influence the development of the sterilization 
plans for both capsules. They are: 
1. The total burden c an be maintained within the required limits. 
2. The parachute, under normal conditions, is a major burden 
contributor and deserves special handling; if it is pre -cleaned, 
decontaminated by a surface agent, and sealed in a container prior 
to assembly, the capsule loading is reduced significantly. 
3. The principal source of remalmng organisms which must be 
destroyed during terminal processing is on occluded surfaces 
encapsulated while mating components during system assembly, 
rather than within basic parts. The packaging design should, 
therefore, allow cleaning by ETO. 
4. Assembly operations conducted in clean rooms reduce the 
system burden substantially, but may not be necessary, because 
there are more effective burden-limiting techniques. 
As part of an effective sterilization-control plan, the burden must be 
defined at every step of the assembly/test process. Such an analysis 
has been performed for the Probe case using the aforementioned com-
puter program, based on the internal contamination values for piece 
parts and materials indicated in Table I, and on the premise that all 
manufacturing, assembly and test operations are carried out in 
conventional facilities with an average continuous fallout rate of 32 
organisms per square inch per day. The burden accumulation on the 
surfaces of plastic parts is assumed to be five times this value due to 
the electrostatic effects, and it was assumed that 90 percent of the 
population dies off due to natural causes during the time taken for the 
manufacturing cycle. 
Under these conditions, the burden on and within the equipment at various 
stages of the process is shown in Figure 3. At the completion of the manu-
facture of components, it is 778 million organisms. At this stage, major 
items, such as the parachute assembly, are subjected to ETO cleaning be-
fore encapsulation within their containers. Also, all cOlnponents are subjected 
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to a thermal soak at least as severe as the thermal-sterilization soak which 
is part of the flight-acceptance process. Similarly, all parts are 
subjected to an ETO-exposure flight-acceptance test. As indicated 
previously, whether electronic components are left unsealed and 
subsequently cleaned with ETO inside and out, or whether they are 
sealed and cleaned on the external surface only, has to be resolved in 
each individual instance; generally, the flight acceptance sequence is 
sufficient to reduce all internal burdens of electronic components to 
an acceptable level. 
The next step consists of the assembly of the three major electronic 
subsystems (modules). This assembly and check-out process takes 
place under conventional environmental conditions and results in a 
load of 16 million organisms. Prior to sealing, the modules are 
exposed to ETO, thereby reducing the burden to about 4 million orga-
nisllls, assuming a burden reduction of 4D for this process, which is 
conservative. If the flight-acceptance-test process is delayed until 
after the subassemblies are complete, the heat exposure of the test 
would reduce the burden essentially to zero even without the ETO cleaning 
process indicated in the preceding paragraph. The decision as to whether 
to perform the flight acceptance test before or after completing the sub-
assemblies has to be made on the basis of an evaluation of the risk of 
success against schedule, logistics, and cost, and depends heavily on 
the detail de sign as well. 
The final and major viable organism buildup occurs during the assembly 
of the modules and structures to form a complete capsule and during its 
encapsulation in the sterilization container. This burden, 170 million 
organisms, is reduced to 30 million organisms by flushing the system 
with ethylene oxide. The remaining organisms are, for the most part, on 
the surfaces of llloduies which are mated during the final assembly process 
and cannot be reached by the ETO. (Quite clearly, this burden 'M) uld be 
lower if the design is changed to reduce these mated surfaces. However, it is 
quite low and well within the prescribed kill tolerance of the terminal heat 
sterilization cycle.) The probability of an organism surviving after 
application of the specified 12D terminal heating process is then 0.3 x 10- 4 , 
which is les s than the specified value of 1 x I 0 -4. 
If all operations, from the inception of component assembly to final assem-
bly, were conducteq. in clean rooms, the biological loading would obviously 
be much lower. This condition is represented by the dashed line of Figure 
3. Operating under such conditions would also tend to result in higher 
system reliability, but the cost of such an operation would be much higher. 
Inasllluch as this approach is not necessary to the control of burden, it has 
not been selected in the reference plan. 
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1.4.3 Burden Sensitivity 
A brief analysis has been performed to determine the sensitivity of the 
burden to some of the contamination/decontamination parameters, as well 
as to variations in the sterilization plan. The results for the variations in 
the contamination factors are shown in Table VI. The two most important 
factors are fallout, where an increase from 32 to 128 organisms per 
square inch per day increases the burden by 60 percent, and natural die-
off, where an increase from 30 to 99 percent die off reduces the burden 
80 percent. On the other hand, the system can increase in complexity 
(in terms of number of piece parts) by a factor of 10 with only a 40 per-
cent increase in the burden, which is of the same order as an increase in 
the electrostatic factor from one (no electrostatic effect) to 10. In Section 
3.0 of this volume many possible variations are discussed, and a series 
of nomograms are presented which summarize the results of the analysis. 
A typical one is shown in Figure 4; tolerable limits are shown for the 
contamination factors of Concern which yield an acceptable pre sterilization 
burden; and for the sake of comparison, the conservative values used in 
the preceding section are shown as well. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
TABLE VI 
BURDEN SENSITIVITY TO CONTAMINATING 
FACTOR VARIATIONS 
Parameter Variation range 
Inte rnal burden ± Orde r of magnitude 
Fallout 32 to 128 org/in. 2/day 
Electrostatic factor 1 to 10 
Die-off 30 to 99 percent 
Percent 
Variation of 
Tntal Burden 
38.5 
59.5 
33.3 
80 
Conditions: Each parameter varied holding others constant 
no FA heat test, ETO or Clean-Room 
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A number of alternative sterilization plans have been analyzed in addition 
to the reference plan, one of these being indicated by the dashed lines in 
Figure 3. It may be of interest, that in the extreme case of no controls 
and no flight acceptance heat soaks, the total presterilization loading 
would be 960 million for the design and conditions discussed in the pre-
ceding section, rather than 30 million. 
1.4.4 Assay Requirements 
Once the permissible burden on each part of the flight capsule at each 
stage of the assemblyltest process has been established, it is essential 
to verify during the program that these burdens are not exceeded. The 
basic tool for this verification is the biological assay, which consists 
essentially of two parts: the recovery of the sample and the determina-
tion of the number of viable organisms in the sample. 
Recovery of organisms from the interior of a part can be done in a num-
ber of ways, each suited for certain applications, but all destructive in 
nature. Methods would include disassembly, fracturing, sawing, crush-
ing, grinding, and others. For exterior surfaces, a number of non-
destructive sample-collection methods are available. These include 
swabbing, impression techniques, agitation, rinse methods, immersion 
and ultrasonic release. 
After a sample has been collected, the basic technique for determining 
the number of vital organisms is culturing in various media. A direct 
count is generally impractical for the applications of interest here. 
With these recovery techniques it is never possible to recover all the 
viable organisms, and with culture techniques not all the viable organisms 
will reproduce in a given medium. These factors limit the accuracy of 
assay techniques. The currently accepted recovery rates are shown in 
Table VII, and conservative accuracies based on these recovery rates 
are shown in Table VIII. 
The number of assays required to furnish a given degree of assurance 
that the burden on a given part is not greater than a given control (speci-
fied) value depends on the control value, the assayed value, the desired 
degree of assurance, and the accuracy of the assays. An estimate of this 
number can be made by conventional statistical techniques (e. g., using 
the Student's "t" distribution). The aforementioned computer program 
contains a subroutine which performs the required simple calculation. 
Some typical results are shown in Figure 5 for a control burden limit of 
108 , a desired degree of assurance of 0.9999, and for several assay 
accuracies, bracketing the range indicated in Table VIII. 
With the better accuracies, two or three assays are required to establish 
that the burden is no more than 10 times that assayed, and about 8 are 
required to demonistrate that is no more than twice that assayed. With the 
poorer accuracies, many more assayed are required or; conversely, with 
a reasonable number of assayed (say 10) one can only establish that the 
burden is no more than 2.5 to 10 times that assayed. 
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TABLE VII 
REPORTED ASSAY RECOVERIES 
Surface Burden Precision Recoveries Reference (percent) 
Swabs Poor 52 to 90 Angelotti, '58(4) 
Rinse or spray rinse Fair 80 Buchbinder, 
'47(3) 
Angelotti, '58 (4) 
Agitation Fair 80 Wilmot Castle Co. * 
Immersion with ultrasonics Excellent 90 to 99 Wilmot Castle Co.':' 
Rodac Good 41 Angelotti, '64 (5) 
Internal burden 
Size reduction techniques Very poor 1 Reed, '65(6} 
Filtration (for assay of liquids) Excellent 99 to 100 Wilmot CastleCo.(l 
*Based on UnpublIshed Data 
Assays of the interior and exterior of the parts and subassemblies must 
be performed initially to verify the estimated burden, and the burden 
values must then be monitored continuously to preclude the possibility of 
deterioration of the processes used. In addition, measurements are also 
required of the basic contamination/decontamination factors (fallout, die 
off, etc.) in the assembly process, again to verify the estimated values 
initially and then to monitor them in order to catch any deterioration of 
the process. 
1.4. 5 Terminal Sterilization 
In the final step in the assembly process, the flight capsule with its 
biological burden controlled to less than 108 , is inserted into the ster-
ilization canister. (The permissible value of 108 includes the burden on 
the interior surface of the canister, which may therefore have to be de-
contaminated by cleaning with ETO). This assembly is then subjected to 
dry heat applied externally by a forced-convection oven (see Figure 6). 
If heat is applied only externally, the rise time for a system of this size 
is about 60 hours. This long period of time is undesirable because it may 
degrade the system reliability somewhat without any appreciable 
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TABLE VIII 
OVERALL ASSAY ACCURACIES 
(percent) 
Swab 60 
Rinse 20 
Agitation 20 
Immersion 15 
Rodac 75 
Filtration 10 
Internal factor of 5 
Black boxes 33* 
Subassembly. general 75(factor of 1.75)** 
* Mixture of Swab. immersion and internal (fracturing. drilling. 
etc. ) 
** Mixture of Rodac. some swab 
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improvement in the sterilization process. External-temperature over-
shoot provides little improvement in this situation, in that the relaxation 
in the temperature cycle experienced by components in the interior of the 
capsule is bought at the expense of a more severe cycle for components on 
the exterior of the capsule and on the sterilization canister. Forced con-
vection of inert gases in the interior of the capsule can speed up the heating-
up process considerably, but at the expense of complicating the system by 
the introduction of active mechanical devices (the blowers) which add to the 
weight of the system and must themselves be sterilizable and highly reli-
able. Internal heaters, however, can decrease the heat-up time by an 
order of magnitude with little additional weight and complexity, and are 
therefore recommended at this time. 
In principle, the capsule can be sterilized in the form of several major 
subassemblies, which furnish relatively better exposure of the interior 
parts to externally applied heat, and these subassemblies can then be 
assembled into the complete capsule/ canister assembly under sterile con-
ditions (i. e., within the oven, using tunnel suits). At present this concept 
appears less attractive than the aforementioned one, because of lack of 
engineering experience in this type of facility. For reasons of post-sterili-
zation repair and insertion of heat-sensitive components, it may be 
necessary to develop this capability, but even so, it will probably be best 
to utilize it sparingly and to perform the basic assembly process under 
unsterile (although possibly bio-clean) conditions. 
After the dwell at maximum temperature, the cool-down also takes about 
60 hours to reach ambient conditions for the most highly insulated elements, 
although the external capsule surface reaches ambient conditions in only a 
few hours. Although this period of time could be shortened by external-
temperature under-shoot and/or internal convection of cold gases, these 
steps are probably not worth while. 
Thermocouples are installed within the capsule to verify heat application. 
In order to get a true picture of the temperatures throughout the interior 
with a reasonable number of thermocouples, they must be located at all 
critical points. The selection of these points requires a very detailed 
knowledge of the heat paths and other thermal-control characteristics of the 
capsule. This information can be generated in the very extensive thermal-
control test program which will have to be conducted on the capsule. 
The kill effectiveness of the cycle may be verified by means of sterility in-
dicators in the form of known organism populations which are exposed to 
the heat cycle in the same oven as the capsule. These indicators can be 
designed to have the same insulation characteristics as remote capsule 
interiors. Non-insulated indicators furnish an indication of the basic kill-
effectivity of the cycle. By using indicators with a range of population 
size s, one can obtain a quantitative meas ure of the probability of caps ule 
sterility. 
-28-
1.4.6 Post-Sterilization Maintenance 
Subsequent to terminal sterilization and prior to launch, the capsule 
experiences extensive testing and integration with other systems. (See 
Figure 7). Sterility during these phases can be verified only indirectly. 
by measuring any leakage of a pressurized inert gas stored within the 
system; traces of helium can be detected and helium may be the proper 
gas to use. However, this does not guarantee sterility if a large leak 
develops, because evidence indicates that organisms can flow "up stream" 
if the hole is large enough. Other protection can be provided by storing 
the capsulel container system in a handling container filled with ETO. 
Repairs, or at least adjustments, may be required for a complex system 
during the time from terminal sterilization to launch. This requires 
either technique (design features. equipments, facilities and procedures) 
for such repairs under sterile conditions or the capability on the part of 
the capsule of tolerating additional sterilization heat cycles. which rep-
resents a severe penalty for some components. A combination of these 
approaches. with a limited repair capability and a limited capacity for 
additional heat cycles may be the best choice. 
Little is known about the pos sible recontamination risk that may be en-
countered by the capsule during and after canister-lid opening prior to 
orbit injection; this area therefore requires some additional investigation. 
The risk can be minimized by use of the appropriate design techniques, 
possibly at the expense of complexities in the system. A similar problem 
area is the meteoroid bumper. if one is used on the outside of the steri-
lization canister; by making such a bumper of metal, which is internally 
sterile, rather than fiberglass, the possibility of contaminating the capsule 
as a result of puncture of the bumper is greatly reduced. 
1.4.7 Recommended Additional Studies 
A great deal of work remains to be done in virtually all areas of the 
spacecraft sterilization problem (see paragraph 1.2). The following are 
a few items which suggest themselves as a result of the investigations 
carried out under this study. 
In the areas of basic contamination factors, the most significant out-
standing question appears to be that of electrostatic effects on the surface 
accumulation and retention of biological burdens, which appears to have 
a fairly significant effect on the total burden. Additionally, it may be 
worth while to investigate the pOSSibility of reducing the internal burden 
of some of the relatively "dirty" parts, such as transformers and the 
material used in parachutes. Lastly, the existing information on fallout 
in bio-clean facilities is based on studies of relatively small clean-rooms, 
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in the order of 20 x 20 feet, and it would be useful to establish by a survey 
of existing facilities and extrapolation of the results what the fallout 
might be in similar facilities scaled up considerably and used for the 
typical assembly and test operations of a spacecraft. 
The accuracy of assays has a significant bearing on the number of assays 
required and is at present not too well established. Perhaps the present-
day assay concepts are characteristically incapable of furnishing results 
with much better accuracies than the ones quoted herein. This s~ould be 
investigated, and if it is determined that there are no inherent limiting 
factors, attetnpts should be made to improve the accuracy of these 
techniques. 
As a result of the sotnewhat conflicting requirements of sterility and 
reliability, heat-cycle optimization is an area which should be investigated 
thoroughly. The two most promising areas are: 
1. Joint optimization of the flight-acceptance and thermal-sterili-
zation heat soaks. 
2. Effective utilization of the heat-up and cool-down periods, parti-
cularly in the thermal-sterilization heat soak, which requires a 
definition of the die-off rates at temperatures below that of the 
basic soak cycle. 
Post-sterilization repair represents a major problem. The tentative 
Voyager operational plan calls for field-sparing at the capsule level, 
in order to allow gross substitution if failures occur. With the enormous 
investment involved in such a program, with the severe launch-window 
constraints, and because of the degree of complexity of the system, sound 
logistic planning should allow for capsule repairs or at least adjustments. 
Repeating the sterilization cycle to repaired capsules (several times, if 
necessary) may degrade the reliability of the system severely. Therefore, 
efforts to incorporate design features and to provide a sterile facility in 
which repairs can be undertaken could well make the difference between 
mission sUCcess and failure. 
Another major problem area is post-sterilization calibration of scientific 
instruments. In some instances, sterilizable calibration devices can be 
built into the capsule; in other areas it may be necessary to accept partial 
or indirect results of pre sterilization calibrations. 
Perhaps the main problem area associated with post-sterilization ~ 
contamination is the possibility of impingement of contaminated particles 
from the separation system or the exhaust products of the attitude-control 
and propulsion systems of the flight spacecraft on the sterile capsule. The 
likelihood of this occurence can be established with ground-test programs, 
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and if such a likelihood exists, design studies can be perforITled to ITllnl-
ITlize it. Additionally, it ITlay be worth while to develop a ITleans for 
establishing whether or not an iITlpingeITlent takes place before (by a 
ITleteoroid), during and after canister opening. 
The type of burden- sensitivity analysis described herein forITls a useful 
tool for guiding future work in ITlany aspects of the sterilization probleITl, 
by highlighting areas where the greatest gains are potentially available as 
a result of additional work. Therefore, it would be useful to expand 
the present results by further studies of the effects of variations in the 
several contaITlination and decontaITlination factors, handling concepts, 
ETO decontaITlination effectiveness, fallout in the asseITlbly area, etc. 
Also, it would be possible to establish the significance of ITlated areas, 
the iITlplications of conducting the flight-acceptance heat soak later rather 
than earlier in the asseITlbly sequence, etc. Lastly, it would be useful to 
extend these results to other design concepts and to capsules designed 
for basically different (i. e., ITlore or less sophisticated) ITlission require-
ITlents and, consequently, with substantially different physical sizes and 
cOITlplexities; this would furnish an insight into the sensitivity of the basic 
conclusions reached herein to specific design features and the size / 
cOITlplexity of the systeITl. 
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2. a FACTORS GOVERNING THE SELECTION 
OF A STERILIZATION PLAN 
2. 1 GENERAL CONSIDERA TIONS 
The object of a sterilization plan is to furnish assurance that the probability of 
a probe/lander depositing a viable organis:m on the surface of a planet is no 
greater than 0.0001. Definition of such a plan requires selection of asse:mbly 
techniques, burden-control concepts, terminal- sterilization techniques (within 
the framework of the dry-heat concept), and of techniques of maintaining 
sterility afterwards, as well as a detailed description of the selected techniques, 
and an identification of facility, schedule, :manpower and funding requirements. 
The selection among the several approaches available in each area is governed 
by the following factors. 
2. 1. 1 Reliability 
The most significant impact of the sterilization requirement is in the area 
of system reliability, because extensive heating tends to damage many 
elements of a spacecraft. Prevention of this damage, i. e., maintenance of 
high reliability in the face of the sterilization requirement, then leads to 
additional impacts in other program areas (schedule and costs) in at least 
two ways. First, there is the direct requirement for the development and 
qualification of a system for a more hostile environment; second, there is 
the difficulty of correcting failures in (i. e., repairing) a flight article 
without affecting the ultimate sterility, and/or resterilizing a repaired and 
thereby contaminated spacecraft without degrading the reliability. 
2. 1. 2 Schedule 
Another area on which the sterilization has a major impact, both directly 
and (through reliability) indirectly, is the schedule. The programming of 
a planetary mission is rigidly fixed by the planetary motions, so that launch 
windows are essentially fixed for any given opportunity, some small 
flexibility being available if the available energy exceeds that associated 
with a minimum-energy trajectory for the given system weight. When 
programming a mission, therefore, launch dates must be met, and the 
sterilization plan must be compatible with this requirement; it must allow 
int"ermediate dates to be met, and must assure that a sterilized vehicle is 
available when required. 
2. 1. 3 Program Cost 
Yet another area on which the sterilization requirement has a major direct 
and indirect impact is the cost of the program. Sterilization, which is a 
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mandatory requirement. may as much as double the cost of the program 
in some instances. and therefore has a major bearing on the economic 
acceptance of the program. 
The primary elements of potential cost increases are special assembly 
facilities. hardware requirements for assay. assay and assay laboratory 
costs. the added cost of developing hardware for the more hostile environ-
ment. the cost of implementation of sterilization-monitoring procedures and 
controls, and the cost of performing the actual sterilization and decon-
tamination operations. A sterilization plan should identify these costs and 
demonstrate that the selected approach has been optimized in the light of 
cost consideration. consistent with sterility. reliability and schedule 
requirements. 
2. 1. 4 Methods and Controls 
The methods by which the presterilization burden is held to below 10 8 , fall 
into the categories of environmental control (such as the use of clean 
rooms), special handling and decontamination techniques (such as ETO 
cleaning). taking advantage of the flight-acceptance cycle. and of the 
normal die-off of organisms. In a sterilization plan. these types of 
methods must be specified in detail and their effectiveness must be identi-
fied quantitatively; also. controls must be set up to verify their effectiveness, 
while also preventing their excessive application (with adverse results on 
the system reliability. etc.). 
2. 1. 5 The Physical Nature and Characteristics of the Design 
The sterilization requirement has, of course, many far- reaching effects on 
the design. most of them associated with the reliability and post-steriliza-
tion maintenance requirements. One of the less obvious implications is 
that the design should be such as to minimize the extent of mated or 
occluded surfaces, which cannot be reached with ethylene oxide for 
contamination during the assembly process. If these areas are mini-
mized. ETO application just prior to terminal heat will be most 
effective. and the only burdens remaining will be those of mated or occluded 
surfaces.and those internal to nonmetallic parts. 
2. 1. 6 Analogy Between Sterilization Assurance and Product Assurance 
The disciplines of sterilization assurance and product assurance (reliability 
and quality assurance) have many similarities. They involve: 
1) Basic science (microbiology versus physics of failure) 
2) A body of applicable test data and other experience; including 
qualified parts lists 
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3) Statistical and probabilistic techniques for prediction. and for 
interpretation of test results 
4} Systems-analytical techniques for apportionment and for perform-
ing failure-mode/consequence analyses. and utilizing the results in 
the system-definition process 
5) A body of good design practice 
6) Program-management techniques for assurance. including: 
a) Test-program definition 
b) Methods of measurement (assay) 
c) Techniques of control. 
Sterilization is now roughly where reliability was about 10 years ago. and 
a great deal of work is now being done and planned which will furnish much 
of the information and improvements in the techniques required in Items 
(l),(2),(6) b), and others. However, most of the advances in the field of 
reliability have not come from increases in the relevant basic scientific 
knowledge. but from developments in the art of achieving reliability in the 
absence of such knowledge. based on empirical data (2) and the develop-
ment of special techniques and experience in their use (3), (4). (5). and (6). 
Most of these techniques are directly transferable to the field of steriliza-
tion (although (5) can be transferred by analogy only, that is, by codification 
and dissemination of the results of successful practice). With this approach. 
once some of the very basic problems are at least empirically resolved 
(in the next year or two). the field of sterilization should reach a degree of 
maturity sufficient for working purposes. 
It is. therefore, possible to plan a program at this time, despite the fact 
that certain decisions have to be made somewhat arbitarily for lack of 
sufficient information, recognizing that basic scientific and technical 
information brought to light subsequently may require modification to the 
program. (Improved methods of as say. for instance, may simplify some 
aspects of the problem). The sterilization program should, therefore, 
incorporate sufficient flexibility to permit the incorporation of such changes 
with minimum impact on the remainder of the program. 
2.2 METHODS OF ASS.EMBLY OF A STERILIZABLE SPACECRAFT 
There are three basically different approaches to the assembly of a sterilizable 
spacecraft. The first, sterile assembly of sterile parts. requires sterilization 
of the materials which make up the parts. Assembly of these materials into 
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parts and all subsequent asseITIbly and checkout operations are carried out 
under sterile conditions. This concept appears iITIpractical for the large 
nUITIber and types of cOITIponents likely to be used in a capsule, and it was decided 
not to consider it in the study. 
The second approach, assembly of sterile COITIponents, requires sterilization 
of parts (which have been manufactured, essentially, under norITIal aerospace 
asseITIbly conditions), which are then assembled into cOITIponents under sterile 
conditions, with subsequent assembly and checkout also under sterile conditions. 
This concept also appears relatively unattractive as a general approach, although 
it may be useful to subject SOITIe parts to a pre sterilization process, and was 
not considered further in this study. 
The third approach, asseITIbly of capsule eleITIents under controlled environ-
ITIental conditions, followed by terminal-heat sterilization, involves asseITIbly 
of parts, components, subsystems, modules, and the cOITIplete systeITI under 
conditions which range from normal non-clean conditions to bio-clean~' condi-
tions; the required level being determined by the need to hold down the occluded 
burden to permissible values (i. e., those which, together with reasonable 
internal and external burdens, result in a total presterilization burden of les s 
than 10 8 organisITIs). Following asseITIbly, the cOITIplete capsule is heat 
sterilized according to existing NASA specifications. This approach was 
identified as the most practical, provided assurance can be furnished that the 
final pre sterilization burden is less than 10 8 viable organisITIs. 
2.:5 IMPOR TANT FACTORS BEARING ON PRESTERILIZA TION BURDEN 
CONTROL 
There are three factors of major importance in burden control: 1) system 
physical characteristics, 2) contamination factors, and 3) decontamination 
factors (including heat soaks conducted as part of the flight-acceptance test 
program). 
. 
2.3.1 System Physical Characteristics 
The capsule system design has a significant effect on burden. If, for 
exaITIple, ITIated and occluded surfaces are kept to a ITIiniITIUITI, the effec-
tivenes s of ETO decontaITIination is ITIaxiITIized, and the final burden 
following an ETO cycle can be very low. If large ITIodules have to be 
sealed during asseITIbly, it is advisable to make provisions for having 
their constituent elements decontaminated prior to sealing so that occluded 
burden can be ITIiniITIized. 
In general, becaus~ of the sterilization and high-reliability 
strict discipline and controls are necessary in the design. 
paragraphs discuss some specific guidelines • 
Federal Specification 209, Class 100, Vertical Downward Laminar Flow Clean-Rooms. 
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requireITIents, 
The following 
The complex nature of the system demands the use of large quantities and 
types of electronic parts. Their contribution to biological burden can be 
reduced considerably (and the reliability enhanced) by minimizing their 
quantity and individual sizes by specifying solid- state integrated-circuit 
components which permit several elements to be packaged into one com-
pact sealed unit. Typically, at least six resistors, four transistors, or 
six diodes may be formed on the basic element, a monolithic circuit die, 
as shown in Figure 8. In the probe design for entry from orbit considered 
herein, the application of these devices allows a reduction from 80,000 
electronic piece parts, which would otherwise be required, to 15,000. 
Manufachuers presently deliver such devices guaranteed to operate for long 
durations, at a temperature of 125°C; this is well within the kill range of 
organisms, so that these parts can be heat-sterilized without damage. 
Therefore, the use of these devices facilitates the control of burden, pro-
tects the parts from continuing fallout, and makes the design less suscept-
ible to damage in the final thermal-sterilization process. 
The large amount of data that are stored and handled by the system 
requires either a large-capacity tape recorder or, as used in the designs 
treated in this report, a large-capacity solid-state memory system. 
Such a memory uses millions of magnetic cores (each a piece part), but 
they are identical, minute and made of ferrites which, due to the high 
temperature sintering process used in manufacturing them, are internally 
sterile. 
High-reliability parts are subjected to burn-in and stabilization acceptance 
tests, at temperatures and for durations which exceed the terminal-sterili-
zation heat cycle, so that they are essentially sterile internally. The 
general use of such parts, therefore, also serves to minimize the internal 
burden. 
There are several adhesively bonded mating surfaces, within the multi-
wall structure of the entry shell which, collectively, add up to several 
hundred square feet of area, all exposed in the course of construction to 
biological fallout. The fabrication operations involved are generally con-
ducted in relatively dirty environments; consequently, a high biological 
loading is occluded in the assembly. The heat shield, which forms the 
outer segment of the entry shell, is a composite of various fibers and 
resins with a relatively large volume, so that it tends to entrap large 
quantities of organisms. Therefore, in its raw, unprocessed form, the 
entry shell encapsulates a very large burden. However, the adhesives and 
resin systems used are of a thermosetting type which require application 
of heat for prolonged periods of time to cure them and form a monolithic 
assembly. The particular resin systems considered in the designs treated 
in this study require, typically, 350°F for 16 hours, which is in excess of 
the thermal sterilization cycle. 
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Figure 8 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUIT 
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The cure cycles are repeated after machining, prior to the application of 
surface coatings, in order to dehydrate the system prior to sealing. Coat-
ings are subsequently applied to the surface (to seal it and to control the 
absorptivity and emis sivity), and the entire as sembly is subjected to a 
final baking process for dimensional stabilization. Therefore, the assem-
bly is likely to be subjected to a temperature of 350 0 F for more than 48 
hours with a total kill effectivity (burden reduction) substantially greater 
than 10 12, so that the assembly winds up being essentially sterile internally. 
Other plastic components which employ thermo-setting resin systems usually 
undergo similar processes. Their use should be emphasized and the use of 
low-temperature-curing (cold-setting) resin systems should be discouraged. 
2.3.2 Contamination Factors 
Environmental contamination during the manufacturing/assembly process 
occurs as a result of the biological fallout of organisms contained in the 
atmosphere on exposed surfaces of the parts under assembly. Handling 
contamination is a function of phYSical handling (number of contacts and 
area contacted per manipulation), as well as the number of organisms de-
posited per unit area per contact. Quantitative estimates of these param-
eter s have been given in paragraph 1. 4. 1, and the manner of controlling 
these parameters as well as the implications of various degrees of control 
will be discussed in Section 3. O. 
2.3.3 The Role of Flight-Acceptance Tests in Spacecraft Decontamination 
Flight-acceptance tests are conducted on spacecraft to demonstrate flight 
worthiness and to eliminate defective items before the subassembly and 
system-integration activities. They consist of exposing the components to 
the environments anticipated in the mission profile and the tests usually 
are sequential, applied in the order in which the hardware will experience 
the environments during a mission. Heat sterilization and ethylene-oxide 
cleaning represent environments to which the hardware will be exposed 
during its life cycle (although not during its mission, properly speaking), 
so that corresponding tests must be incorporated in the test spectrum, 
along with the other environments, such as vibration, shock, etc. These 
heating and ETO-exposure acceptance tests have the most pronounced burden 
reduction effect of all processes and procedures imposed, except for the 
terminal sterilization cycle itself. 
Exposure to sterilization-temperature conditions should be first in the se-
quence, and should be equal to or higher than the specified terminal cycle. 
The implication is that the flight-acceptance cycle is applied at the compo-
nent level, which is the approach which has been taken in the studies de-
scribed in this volume. As discussed in Section 3.0, however, these tests 
could be applied at a subassembly level, with the result that kill effectivity 
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would be higher, but at the risk of incurring higher costs as a result of 
failures found later in the assembly operations. This will obviously result 
in sterile component interiors; if the components are sealed, the hardware 
will remain in the internally decontaminated (i. e., sterile) state throughout 
the assembly process. To minimize reliability and performance degrada-
tion, the flight-acceptance and the terminal-sterilization heat cycles should 
be optimized simultaneously; that is, the final heat-sterilization cycle may 
be reduced in severity if, as a result of the flight-acceptance tests, the 
total capsule burden can be demonstrated to be substantially (by one or 
more orders of magnitude) below 108 . This optimization is as important 
to sterility maintenance as it is to system reliability and performance, be-
cause it will tend to reduce post-sterilization repair requirements and thereby 
the risk of recontamination. 
ETO exposure should normally be the first environment for which toler-
ance must be established, because ETO decontamination (where used) 
precedes heat sterilization. However, in view of the acceptance heat soak, 
sealed components need have a tolerance to ETO only on their exterior 
surfaces. Therefore, designers can be given the option of either sealing 
components against ETO penetration, if this course of action will result 
in higher system reliability. or leaving them unsealed, in which case they 
must be subjected to an ETO acceptance cycle and, at a later stage in the 
assembly, to an ETO decontamination process. If ETO acceptance test-
ing is last in the sequence, it also serves as the surface decontamination 
process prior to assembly; the hardware is then exposed to this potentially 
degrading environment only once. 
2.3.4 Decontamination 
Other than certain manufacturing and test processes, which by their nature 
tend to be decontaminating (see paragraphs 2.3. land 2.3.3), decontamina-
tion can occur either naturally as a result of die-off, or artificially as a 
result of ETO cleaning or heating. The magnitude of these effects has been 
indicated in paragraph 1. 4. 1 and is discussed further in Section 3. O. 
2.4 TERMINAL-HEAT STERILIZATION CYCLE 
The present sterilization requirement calls for a terminal-heat cycle which 
results in a 12D burden reduction. The range of cycles which are considered 
acceptable for this purpose are shown in Table IX. The choice among these 
cycles is governed by considerations of reliability, etc., which are extraneous 
to sterilization. 
The l2D requirement is premised on a pre sterilization burden of 108 . If a 
capsule can be manufactured/assembled relatively easily with a demonstrably 
substantially lower burden (possibly as a result of £light-acceptance-test heat-
ing cycles at one or more levels of assembly}. it may be possible to ease the 
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TABLE IX 
ACCEPTABLE TERMINAL STERILIZATION CYCLES 
Sterilization Time 
Temperature Hours per D Hour s for 12D 
(0 C:\ 
160 0.21 3 
155 0.31 4 
150 0.46 6 
145 0.73 9 
140 1.1 14 
135 1.8 22 
130 2.8 34 
125 4.4 53 
120 7.0 84 
115 11. 0 132 
110 17.5 210 
105 28.0 336 
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terminal-sterilization requirement accordingly, say 7 hours per D value if 
the pre sterilization burden if 120 0 C is the selected temperature. It may also 
be acceptable to count some of the warm-up time required to bring the most 
insulated points of the spacecraft up to the sterilization temperature, as well 
as some of the corresponding cool-down time. 
2. 5 MAINTENANCE OF STERILITY AFTER TERMINAL-HEAT STERILIZATION 
Inasmuch as the sterility requirement calls for delivery of a sterile vehicle to 
the surface of the planet, measures must be taken to maintain sterility, once 
the capsule has been sterilized, throughout all future mission activities, 
namely prelaunch, launch, cruise, and canister -opening/ capsule deployment. 
For the prelaunch operations controls have to be specified for packaging, 
handling and storage, and for the following other prelaunch operations: cap-
sule checkout, spacecraft integration, repair or sterile insertion of special 
items (if required), and external burden reduction of the sterilization canister 
and flight spacecraft, if required. 
Similarly, for the launch and cruise phase, controls have to be defined for the 
assurance of sterility maintenance during ascent depressurization, during the 
other ascent environments, and during cruise, in which phase the system is 
subjected to solar radiation, vacuum, meteoroids, and where special attention 
has to be paid to seal integrity and canister venting. 
In the canister opening and capsule deployment phase, possible recontamina-
tion processes must be identified and safeguards against their occurrence must 
be defined. The processes to be considered are impinging gas plumes, struc-
tural loads (leading to structural failure or opening of gaps), elastic release 
of energy, electrostatic factors, electromagnetic forces, mass attraction, 
solar radiation, simple collision, solar wind and pressure, and van der Waals 
forces. 
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3.0 BIOLOGICAL BURDEN ESTIMATES 
Biological burden estimates are a key element in any sterilization plan. They 
are needed to make decisions concerning the design of the system and concern-
ing the assembly/test/sterilization approach used to manufacture it. Also, 
once the design and assembly approach have been selected, estimates of 
the burden on the various elements of the system at various stages in the 
assembly process become the means of exercising sterilization control; in 
essence, the estimated (apportioned) values become control values with which 
the assayed values are compared to assure that the presterilization burden 
(and therefore, by implication, the post-sterilization probability of contamina-
tion) does not exceed the permissible value. 
In this section, the basic factors governing the burden and the techniques of 
making burden estimates are outlined, and burden estimates are presented for 
the reference assembly approach and several variations thereof for the two de-
signs considered in this study (for the entry-from-approach trajectory (EFAT) 
and entry-from-orbit (EFO) cases). 
3. 1 BURDEN SOURCES 
• 
3. 1. 1 Initial Values 
Initial burdens are those on and inside capsule parts and components prior 
to final assembly. Since most elements will have been stored for some 
time, these values represent burdens which are the surviving population 
after the deposition of some larger number of organisms during the manu-
facture or component-assembly of these elements. Initial burdens fall, 
basically, into two categories: internal and surface burdens. The most 
significant internal-burden contributors are nonmetallic materials, which 
are used in the heat shield, rocket motor fuel, cables and parachutes, 
miscellaneous pieces of foam, etc. A somewhat smaller contribution 
sterns from electronic piece parts and other small non-metallic elements. 
These elements carry an internal burden entrapped in the material of 
which they are made. The best current information concerning the magni-
tude of internal burden values is summarized in Table X. * In each case, 
the internal burdens used are considered to be steady-state values, and 
not subject to further die-off. 
It may be noted that the burden for rocket fuel is high relative to that for other materials. This has recently been 
established by experiments which indicate that the fuels considered are not bactericidal, as had been supposed. 
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TABLE X 
PART AND MATERIAL BURDEN RANGES 
Type 
Balsa wood 
Battery cell 
Capacitor 
Coaxial cable 
Connector 
Crystal 
Diode 
Duplexer 
Evacuation bellows 
Explosive 
Explosive trains 
Fiberglass 
Foam 
G-M tube 
Inductor 
Magnetic core 
Magnetron 
Metal 
Nylon, dacron 
Optical system 
PbS detector 
Photomultube 
Relay 
Resistor 
Silicon Integ. Circuit 
Silicone oil 
Silicone rubber 
Teflon insulation 
Thermal control 
Transformer 
Transistor 
TWT 
Estimated Internal 
Burden Range 
1 to 10 lin: 
o 
10 to 1000 
o to 100lit 
100 to 10, 000 
o to 10 
o 
o 
o 
1000/gm* 
o to 200/ft. 
o 
1/ml** 
o 
1000 to 10,000 
o 
o to 10 
o 
o 
10 to 100 
o 
o 
100 to 1000 
o to 10 
o to 10 
11ml 
o 
o 
o 
10,000 to 100,000 
o 
o 
*Weight of solid fuel 0.059 1b/in3 = 26, 800 org/in3 
**Foam = 16.2 org/in3 
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The surfaces of metallic and non-metallic elements will collect viable or-
ganisms during final assembly, as a result of fallout during manufacturing 
and component assembly processes, subject to some degree of subsequent 
die-off while in storage. A somewhat conservative steady-state (post-die-
off) value for metallic surfaces is 100 organisrns/in2, equivalent to almost 
15,000 /ft2, which is twice the value expected by Portner l . Plastic surfaces 
tend to accurnulate and retain more particles as a result of electrostatic 
attraction, which may serve to increase the normal surface-burden value 
by a factor of up to 13 under certain adverse conditions. Based on present 
information, a factor of 5 (i. e., 500 particles/in2) appears to be repre-
sentative for the surface burden on parts subject to electrostatic action. 
3.1.2 Contamination Factors in the Assembly Process 
Contamination during assembly, occurs principally from two sources, 
fallout and handling. The fallout of microorganisms on a metallic surface 
is principally a function of the number of such organisms in the atmos-
phere at the time of the fallout. For normal assembly operations, a value 
of 32 organisms/in.2 /day (-200 organisms/ft2 /hr) represents ? relatively 
clean condition, and 128 organisms/i~/day (- 800/ft2 /hr) represents a 
relatively dirty area. Where clean-room conditions are considered to 
prevail, fallout is essentially zero, but a conservative estimate is 1 per-
cent of these values, i. e., 2 to 8organisms/ft2 /hr. 
There is evidence l that fallout on nonmetallic surfaces can be substantially 
larger than these values as a result of static electrical charges on the sur-
face which can attract particles, including microorganisms, as discussed 
in the preceding paragraph. 
During an assembly process, the components of the capsule are subjected 
to considerable handling, which serves to increase the burden on the sur-
faces by an amount which is a function of the number of physical contacts 
and the cleanliness of the personnel doing the manipulating (which is partly 
a function of the cleanliness of the environment). A typical electronic 
component, for example, might be handled 50 to 100 times during physical 
assembly activities and during component testing, - with each contact in-
volving an average surface area of 5 in2 . 
An estimate of burden deposited per square inch of contact was made using 
the following rationality: The minimum number of organisms, which is 
expected to be deposited per square inch by a freshly washed hand, is esti-
mated on the basis of general assay experience, to be about 100. On the 
other hand, a person with poor personal hygiene who is biologically highly 
contaminated (a situation which should occur very rarely in view of the 
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controls which will be imposed on this type of a program) could deposit as 
many as 10,000 organisms per square inch per contact. The average num-
ber deposited under normal conditions should be around 300. A somewhat 
conservative weighted average value':' is 1900 organisms / contact/in2 for 
normal (non-clean-room) conditions. Where assembly processes take 
place in a clean room, with some controls over the cleanliness and health 
of the assembly personnel, one percent of this non-clean-room value ap-
pears to be reasonable. 
3. 1. 3 Decontamination Factors in the Assembly Process 
There are three decontamination factors of importance that occur during 
assembly -- one natural (die off) and two artificial (ethylene-oxide cleaning, 
and heat soaks for flight-acceptance purposes). 
Work by Portner2 and others indicates that die-off over a period of 52 
weeks can be over 99 percent. A value of 99 percent per year translates 
into about one percent per day, or 30 percent per month (assuming ex-
ponential die-off). The major variable is therefore the length of storage, 
which may range from a month to a year, so that die-off values ranging 
from 30 to 99 percent should bracket the true situation. 
Ethylene oxide (ETO) and other chemical decontaminants can have varying 
effects on surface burden depending on concentration, temperature, humid-
ity, and duration of exposure. Burden reductions of 6D to 8D (i. e., by 
factors of 10 6 to 10 8) can readily be achieved in this manner. However, 
in order to minimize the possibility of material degradation, it is best not 
to use excessively high concentrations nor durations. For reasonable 
combinations of these factors, a conservative kill (burden-reduction) value 
is 4D, i. e., 99.99 percent. ETO is, of course, only effective on that 
burden which it contacts, and is ineffective for organisms occluded on 
mated surfaces or within materials (except, to a limited extent, if the given 
material is permeable). 
As mentioned previously, the flight-acceptance cycle includes a heat-soak 
test to certify that the element evaluated is capable of withstanding the 
terminal-heat-sterilization cycle without failure. The exposure conditions 
must be at least as severe as the terminal cycle, which is intended to effect 
a burden reduction of 12D. Thus, although the main purpose of this test 
is not decontamination, it will completely kill the entire burden on a given 
element (provided it does not exceed 10 12 organisms -- far more than 
likely to be found on any element in the capsule, including the parachute 
Obtained by the PERT averaging formula--one sixth of the most optimistic value plus two-thirds of the most likely 
value, plus one sixth of the most pessimistic value--considering 300 to be the m~st likely value. 
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and rocket motor). Therefore, any part subjected to this test will be 
sterile immediately following the cycle, and will remain internally decon-
taminated in the subsequent assembly processes if it is sealed. 
As indicated previously, it was assumed for this study that this flight-ac-
ceptance test is applied at the component level, prior to the start of final 
assembly; later in-process application of acceptance testing would destroy 
more organisms, yielding a lower total system burden, but at the expense 
of a greater scrap risk. A cost-effectiveness analysis is therefore neces-
sary to establish the best time of application. 
3. 2 TECHNIQUES OF BURDEN ESTIMATES 
In view of the many parts of many different types used in a capsule, and in view 
of the numerous trade-off studies involving biological burden that have to be 
performed to define the system and the program, a simple computer program 
is a great convenience in making burden estimates, although certainly not a 
necessity. The following discussion of the basic technique used to perform 
burden estimates will therefore be oriented to computer application, although 
it will be fairly general in nature. The specific details of the computer program 
are discussed in Appendix B. 
Figure 9 represents a simplified flow diagram of a data handling system for 
burden calculations, and indicates generally the order in which the computer 
operations are carried out. The general program technique is to identify in-
puts based on an assembly flow chart with level control-point, and part-number 
codes, thus identifying each new element to be added during assembly, and 
each subassembly in whatever state of manufacture it happens to be at the 
point when each new element is added. The program cycles this information 
through all operations for each distinct assembly process (identified on the as-
sembly flow chart) whether it involves adding an element or simply joining sub-
assemblies which have been developed up to that point. 
The first calculation establishes the magnitude of initial burden level prior to 
assembly, based on the defined part configurations and the inputed values for 
initial individual burden levels on metals and plastics, and within plastic mate-
rials (and piece parts). 
The next step in the program is the black box subroutine which calculates the 
burden in and on the electronic parts and the burden on the external and internal 
surfaces of the housing in which the electronic component is contained. If ele-
ments are electronic components, the program input information will have 
identified the types and numbers of parts which comprise the unit. In the event 
that some of these parts are plastic, the subroutine accounts for whatever elec-
trostatic factor has been applied to the run. The subroutine also takes into 
account the time estimates for component assembly. At the end of this calcula-
tion, the total burden on an electronic component is identifiable as being 
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, 
internal burden within nonmetal materials of which electronic parts may be 
made, external burden on the surface of the component, occluded burden on the 
internal surfaces of the component box, or surface burdens of the parts which 
comprise the component. 
The basic calculation performed at each assembly step consists of computing 
internal burden, process-added burden, and die-off, and the distribution of the 
surviving organisms into the appropriate categories of surface, occluded, and 
mated burden. The internal burden of any elements being added at a given as-
selUbly point which are composed partly or completely of nonmetals is calculat-
ed using the appropriate volume of non-lUetal material and the burden rate per 
unit volume. 
The calculation of process-added burden encompasses burden adhering to the 
assembly as a result of fallout from the atmosphere and of handling by the pe r-
sonnel involved in the assembly process. The value added by fallout is a func-
tion of the surface areas of the part being as sembled, the fallout rate in the 
room in which they are being assembled, the electrostatic factor (which applies 
only to non-metal exposed surfaces), and the duration of time for which any 
added elements will be exposed to the prevailing environmental conditions. 
The value added by handling is a function of the number of times that the ele-
ments are actually handled by people, the area of contact by their hands each 
tilUe a handling operation take s place, and the expected amount of biological 
contribution per square inch every time a contact is made. After this basic 
calculation has been made, that portion of the burden which is expected to be 
subject to die off is identified separately in preparation for the next step. 
The die off due to natural causes is calculated by applying the die-off rate to 
that portion of the burden which is subject to this phenomenon. 
During any assembly process where two or more elements or assemblies are 
joined together, whether it be by bolting, bonding, or any other means, some 
of the surface area on each element will become mated. Thus, for a cover in-
stalled on a container, there is a mating of portions of the cover and container 
surfaces; additionally, the cover occludes the surfaces of any elements within 
the container after it is closed. In general, after an assembly process, all 
areas which were originally surface areas of the elements before assembly 
fall into one of three categories: surface, occluded, and mated. The calcula-
tion of these areas rnakes use of the inforInation originally inputted which identi-
fied mated and occluded areas as a function of each assembly point. Once 
these values have been calculated the process-added burden (that is, after die 
off) can be apportioned among the three categories. 
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A subroutine can be activated for any particular asseInbly process, which ac-
counts for the ETO-decontaInination of surface burden by the aInount (D value) 
specified as an input. ETO will not reduce burdens present that are internal 
to nonInetals, or burdens which are encapsulated by Inating, and therefore in-
accessible to ethylene oxide, and this is taken into account in the calculation. 
A heat- soak subroutine is used to calculate the effect of heat soaks, where used, 
and serves to reduce all burden present by the specified D value, because heat 
can reach all burden contributions regardless of whether they are located on 
exposed or mated surfaces, within Inaterials, or on occluded elements. 
As an adjunct to these calculations, it is useful to calculate SOIne inforInation 
relevant to assay requirement (see Section 4.0). This can be done with a sub-
routine which identifies the number of assays of a given hardware element 
which would be required to establish the burden level of that eleInent. The 
calculation takes into account the total burden in and on the element, an assigned 
value for the upper burden limit against which this expected burden is to be 
Ineasured, the expected accuracy of the assay technique used for that particular 
type of element, and the desired degree of confidence. With this inforInation, 
the subroutine furnishes the nUInber of assays required to assure (with the re-
quired confidence) that the predicted burden on the eleInent is les s than the 
upper control limit. 
The program then recycles and goes to the next asseInbly process (except in 
the case where the assembly process calculated is the final one in a series), 
repeating the cOInplete set of calculations involving either the addition of a new 
element or the assembly of two or Inore subasseInblies which have been created 
up to that point, until the final assembly operation is. reached and the results 
are printed out. 
3. 3 IMPLICATION OF ASSAY REQUIREMENT 
One of the purposes of a burden estimate is to furnish a base line to which the 
sterilization prograIn can be controlled by perforIning assays and other monitor-
ing operations. InasInuch as all the factors contributing to burden, and there-
fore the burdens theInselves, are somewhat randoIn in nature, and inasInuch 
as all assay techniques involve a Ineasure of uncertainty, one Inust allow for 
the difference in the assayed (or best estiInate) values and the control values. 
Thus, :with a given as sayed estiInate Xe obtained froIn n tests, one can state 
with a level of confidence y that, based on an assuIned standard deviation a.in the 
burden, the true burden does not exceed an upper-limit value Xu (see paragraph 
4.2). Therefore, in perforIning burden estiInates for control purposes, it is 
necessary to make two separate calculations for the selected systeIn and asseIn-
bly/test/decontaInination program, one involving conservative estiInates to 
obtain control values, and the other using upper-liInit values defined in the 
following. 
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The calculation of the control values utilizes conservative values for the internal 
burdens and the process-induced contaIIlination and decontamination factors. 
The burden value obtained in this manner for every element of the capsule at 
every point in the process can then be used for control (go/no go) decisions. * 
A greater value (by a factor of two to five, generally, selected on the basis of 
the considerations indicated in the next paragraph) is then used as the upper-
limit value. The total presterilization burden calculated on the basis of the 
selected upper-limit values IYlUSt not exceed lOB organisms (or such lesser 
value as it may be desired to achieve prior to terIIlinal sterilization). 
The number of assays required for any element at any time can then be deter-
mined from the control value and the upper-limit value using the guide lines 
indicated in paragraph 4.2. If this number is considered excessive in any in-
stance, the upper-limit value Inust be increased. This may require a decrease 
in the upper-liIIlit values on other elements in order to maintain the total pre-
sterilization control value to the specified value (lOB or less). If such a juggling 
is irnpossible, it will be necessary to tighten up the process in some area to 
decrease the contamination (or internal burden) or increase the decontamination; 
this will lower the control values and, for the sarne upper-limit values, yield 
a lowered assay requirernent. 
It should be noted that a total pre sterilization burden based on the control values 
is then much less than the specified value (by a factor of two or rnore). Further-
rnore, a third set of burden estimates calculated on the basis of best estimates 
rather than conservative assurnptions would yield a still lower total presterili-
zation burden (again. by a factor of two, typically). Therefore, this approach 
inherently includes two elements of conservatisrn. 
3.4 BURDEN ESTIMA TE FOR THE PROBE DESIGNED FOR ENTRY FROM 
ORBIT (EFO) 
A total of 22 burden estirnates were made for the probe designed for the EFO 
case, varying the parameters to which results were considered to be sensitive. 
In this manner, the effect of the contamination and decontamination factors, on 
the burden can be established, and proper controls for a sterilization plan can 
be selected. The factors which were varied are listed in Table XI, and the 
ranges over which the factors were varied are given there as well. 
The results of fifteen of the rnore significant runs are given in Table XII. The 
final b'qrden varies from a low value of about 0.04 x 108 organisrns to an un-
realistically high value of B3 x lOB. Case 5 is considered to represent the most 
• The basic decision criterion for any test invol~s the control value Xc and the assay estimate Xe obtained by dividing the 
microbial count (or average of several counts) X , as corrected for the growth in the culturing process, by the re-
covery factor R (see paragraph 4.1.5). The test is passed if X /R ;;; X • 
a c 
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TABLE XI 
BURDEN SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS CASES 
Variations 
Internal burden 
Fallout 
Electrostatic factor 
Die-off 
E.T.O.* 
Clean-room** 
Flight acceptance 
heat*** 
Range 
± Order of magnitude 
32 to 128 org/in2 /day 
1 to 10 
30 to 99 percent 
Yes/no 
Yes/no 
Yes/no 
*Applied during subassembly to the modules 
containing electronic equipment, and at the 
end of final assembly to the entire capsule 
system after insertion into the sterilization 
canister. 
**Encompasses the entire final assembly facility, 
and also the facilities in which electronic com-
ponents are assembled. 
***Applied at the component level to all function-
ing compon.ents. 
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TABLE XII 
BURDEN SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS PROCESS VARIATIONS 
Case Internal Burden Fallout Rate Electrostatic (per part) (per in. 2/day) Factors 
1 Normal 32 5 
2 Normal 32 5 
3 Normal 32 5 
4 Normal 32 5 
5 Normal 32 5 
6 Normal 32 5 
7 -0. M. (4) 32 1 
8 +0. M. (4) 128 10 
9 Normal 128 10 
10 Normal 128 10 
11 Normal 128 10 
12 Normal 128 10 
13 Normal 128 10 
14 Normal 128 10 
15 +0. M. (4) 128 10 
-
(1) Flight Acceptance Heating of Components (12D) 
(2) Chemical Decontamination of Surface (4D) 
Die-Off 
(percent) 
90 
90 
90 
90 
90 
90 
99 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
(3) Clean-Room, Class 100 per Federal Specification 209 (2D) 
(4) Order of Magnitude Less or Greater than Normal 
F.A.(l) E. T. o. (2) 
No No 
Yes No 
No Yes 
No No 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
No No 
No Yes 
Yes No 
No No 
No No 
• 
c. R. (3) Burdenx108 
No 9.6 
No 4.7 
No 5. 2 
Yes 9.3 
No 0.27 
Yes 0.05 
Yes 0.04 
Yes 0.12 
Yes O. 12 
No 6.5 
Yes 42.5 
No 12.6 
No 47.6 
No 53.7 
No 83.0 
practical sterilization plan in light of the present understanding of the various 
factors involved. The breakdown of the results of Cases 1, 5, and 6 as a func-
tion of activities is shown in Figure 10. 
The results of these estimates have been presented in the form of nomograms 
in Figures 11 through 18. These nomograms allow the reader to vary the 
several parameter s and thus compare their importance. 
In Figure 11, for example, where the internal burden is normal and where no 
decontamination, clean-room, nor flight-acceptance tests are used, one can 
evaluate the effects of variables in the following manner: consider the condi-
tion where fallout is 128 organism/in?/day, the electrostatic factor is 10, and 
die-off is 30 percent; a line drawn through the first two of these values inter-
sects the vertical dividing line, and a line drawn from this new point through 
the percent die-off value (30 percent) defines the total biological loading, name-
ly 54 x 108 organisms. The example shown considering fallout rate to be 40, 
electrostatic factor 5, and die-off to be 90 percent, resulting in a burden of 
10 x 108, is the burden expected on the reference physical system if no controls 
of any kind were exercised. (These values do not stem from realistic condi-
tions, and the entire series of estimates was made solely for the purpose of 
evaluating the sensitivity of the final burden levels to certain variables). 
In general, Figure 11 represents the situation in which all internal burdens are 
considered normal (that is, when internal burdens of nonmetallic elements are 
considered to be as shown in Table X) and where no ETO, clean-rooms, nor 
flight-acceptance tests are used; the vehicle is therefore simply assembled 
under normal aerospace conditions, which could range from fairly good to quite 
. poor. In this no control condition, the total burden is heavily dependent on con-
tamination variables and sensitive to electrostatic factor only at higher levels 
of fallout. It is interesting to note that if die-off were 100 percent, the remain-
ing burden would still be on the order of 7 to 8 x 108 organisms. Since no ETO 
nor flight-acceptance tests have been used, all of the internal burden of non-
metallic parts and all of the initial surface and occluded burdens of components 
and other elements (as received prior to the final assembly) have remained on 
the capsule and have not been reduced in any way. The bulk of this residual 
burden is the internal burden of the rocket motor and the occluded burden of 
parachutes and cables. 
Figure, 12 represents a situation which is similar to that discussed in the pre-
ceding paragraph, except for the application of ethylene oxide as a decontamina-
tion control to module s 1 and 2 prior to their being sealed, to the main drogue 
parachutes before being packed, and to the final system after its insertion onto 
the sterilization canister. The total biological burden on the vehicle is less 
than in the preceding case, because of the application of ETO. A considerable 
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aITlount of residual burden would now exist even if die-off were 100 percent,be-
cause the burden internal to the rocket ITlotor and that occluded and internal to 
cabling is not susceptible to surface decontaITlination. The variation in total 
burden due to extreITle variations in the fallout, electrostatic factor, and die-off 
is not as great as it was previously; under these conditions the burden would 
fall between 5 and 12 x 108 organisITls, the variation being on the order of 60 to 
70 percent, compared with a factor of 5 in the previous case. 
T 
Figure 13 represents the case where the situation is iITlproved by the addition 
of asseITlbly in clean rOOITls. As in the previous case, the residual burden, 
even with 100 percent die-off, is still on the order of 5 x 108 organisITls, again, 
because the clean rOOITl has not affected the burden internal to the rocket ITlotor 
nor those organisITls internal to or occluded by cabling. In this case the iITl-
pact of clean-roOITl use has essentially been to reduce still further the per-
centage variation in total biological burden as a function of ITlaxiITluITl changes 
in fallout, electrostatic factor, and die-off to 20 to 30 percent when cOITlparing 
worst and best cases of contaITlination factors. 
If flight-acceptance heat te sts (applied at the cOITlponent level) are the only de-
contaITlinating factor, the results are as shown in Figure 14. The residual bio-
logical burden has now been reduced significantly, to about 2 x 108 organisms, 
and exists only on those elements which were not subjected to the flight-accept-
ance tests. A ground rule of this particular study was that only those COITlpO-
nents considered functional (e. g., electronic components or ITlechanical actuat-
ing devices) would be subjected to the flight acceptance cycle; therefore, the 
parachutes and other passive cOITlponents, such as sheet-ITletal structures, are 
not decontaminated by the flight-acceptance tests. Since ethylene oxide is not 
used, either, in this case, all of the initial burden on the surfaces of the ITlain 
and drogue parachutes has reITlained in the systeITl throughout final asseITlbly, 
and is principally responsible for the residual burden. In this case of no flight-
acceptance tests, no ETO cleaning, and no use of clean rOOITlS, the presterili-
zation burden is quite sensitive to variations in fallout, electrostatic factor, 
and die-off. 
In the case represented in Figure 15, use is ITlade of both ethylene oxide and 
flight-acceptance heat- soak decontaITlination, but not of clean rOOITls. The total 
biological burden can vary froITl essentially zero to as ITluch as about 5 x lOB, 
depending on variations in fallout, electrostatic factor, and percent die-off. 
For example, if the fallout is 12B organisITls/inf/day, the electrostatic factor 
is 10, and the die-off is 30 percent, then the biological burden on the capsule 
exceeds 6 x lOB organisITls; this represents the worst cOITlbination considered, 
which is actually unrealistic. Under this high fallout condition, the total burden 
is reduced from approxiITlately 6 x 108 organisITls to around 1.5 x lOB if the 
die-off is increased to an expected value of 90 percent, which represents appro-
xiITlately 6 months storage under repre sentative conditions and is considered 
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to be more realistic. If, additionally, the fallout is 40/in'/-/day, and the elec-
trostatic factor is 5 (both of which represent more reasonable values), then 
the total burden is further reduced to about 0.5 x 108 organisms. Therefore, 
under these reasonable conditions, the capsule could be as sembled in a normal 
non-clean area and still have a total burden prior to terminal-heat sterilization 
half of that permissible. 
Figure 16 repre sents the situation where all controls are applied. The re sult-
ing biological burden is quite low, the maximum being on the order of O. 1 x 108, 
although even with all these controls some residual burden remains. This 
burden is principally located on those surfaces of the capsule which have be-
come mated during assembly, thereby trapping organisms that are not accessi-
ble to the final ETO decontamination process. If ETO were used at additional 
points of assembly, this mated burden could be reduced. If it is decided not to 
reduce the l2D terminal heat sterilization cycle, final assembly operations can 
be simplified and costs reduced by backing off from these controls and exercis-
in~ only those necessary to assure a final pre sterilization burden of less than 
10 organisms. 
The implication of reducing the burden internal to nonmetallic materials and 
parts by one order of magnitude from the originally assumed values (for the no-
control case, i. e., no clean rooms, no ETO and no flight-acceptance heat 
tests) is demonstrated by the results shown in Figure 17. The principal re-
duction in burden is nearly 3 x 10 8 organisms, most of which are accounted 
for in the reduction of burden internal to the rocket motor. Otherwise these 
values are essentially the same as those shown in Figure 11. Similarly, if 
the internal burden is increased by an order of magnitude (for the same case) 
the results are as shown in Figure 18. The residual burden now increases 
by nearly 30 x 108 organisms, principally due to the increase in burden of the 
rocket motor, which is again by far the single largest contributor to the burden 
in the system. 
It should be emphasized again that the sensitivity analysis performed here, 
with the results shown in these nomograms, had as its sole purpose an under-
standing of the relative significance of changes in certain parameters. Only 
cases 1 through 6 (the results given in Figure 13) represent values expected 
for the particular approaches considered in the reference sterilization program. 
The other estimates do not necessarily reflect realistic nor expected values. 
Nonetheless, a point of major significance indicated by these results is that 
even in a complex system such as the capsule considered in this study (and even 
with the conservative contamination factors used in Cases 1 to 6), the total 
burden prior to terminal heat sterilization can be controlled and kept to a value 
less than 108 organisms very effectively without the use of clean-room facilities. 
Even so, the use of clean rooms is still highly desirable for purposes of relia-
bility and for facilitating the management of the burden, i. e., for achieving 
the burden margin implied by the assay requirement (see paragraph 3.3), etc. 
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3.5 BURDEN ESTIMATE FOR THE PROBE/LANDER DESIGNED FOR ENTRY 
FROM THE APPROACH TRAJECTORY (EFAT) 
Similar calculations were performed for the probe/lander designed for the EFAT 
case as for the probe designed for the EFO case, except that the calculations 
were performed manually, using the identical approach in all other respects, 
and using the information concerning the capsule and assembly process given in 
Appendix B. The results of these calculations are summarized in the following 
paragraphs. The burdens are presented in Table XIII. The total predicted 
burden may be seen to range from a low of 4.7 x 107 organisms to a high of 
1.84 x 108 organisms. A breakdown of the burden within the various compo-
nents of the systems is given in Figures 19 through 25. 
An estimate of the burden which would be added to the suspended payload if it 
were assembled in a non-clean area instead of a Class 100 Clean-Room is shown 
in Table XIV, the underlying assumption being that the clean-room operation 
results in a burden deposition 10 percent of that in the factory operation, which 
is probably high for the clean-room operation. 
It may be of interest to compare the results for the burden levels of the capsule 
designed for the EFAT case with those for the EFO case, despite the fact that 
the two capsules were designed not only for different entry modes but also un-
der different ground rules in other respects. The most significant design 
differences are that the system for the EFO case uses a solid instead of a 
sterile liquid propulsion system on the flight capsule, that a cone-sphere shape 
is used instead of the tension shape, that the shell is made of beryllium honey-
comb instead of fiberglass, and that the sterilization canister for the EFO case 
does not incorporate a meteoroid bumper. The effect in burden brought about 
by these differences is summarized in Table XV. The bases for these esti-
mates are as follows: 
The casing for the solid-propulsion case is 12 inches in diameter and has a 
volume of 1083 in. 3; since the casing is one half the diameter of the fuel tank 
for the liquid-propulsion system, the surface and occluded burden on the cas-
ing are one-quarter of the value on the tank. The estimated burden for the 
solid fuel, if explosive, is 10 microorganism/in. 3, so that the total internal 
burden is approximately 10,000 organisms, which is substantially lower than 
the values for propellant contamination used in the EFO case. The nozzle has 
the same burden in either case. 
In the heat-shield/ structural composite, the preliminary designs for the 
compression ring were quite different, but the circular flange for the EFO 
case will have about the same burden as the ring for the EFAT case. The 
forward and rear beryllium faces for the EFO case will have about one-twelfth 
of the burden of the combination of the surfaces of the skirt and cap of the EFA T 
case; the fiberglass has to be subjected to an additional electrostatic factor 
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TABLE XIII 
INITIAL FLIGHT CAPSULE BURDEN ESTIMATES SUMMARY 
(All Numbers Are xl 0-3) 
Internal 
Plus 
Surface Internal Occluded Occluded 
Burden Burden Burden Burden 
Flight Capsule 20748 7417 129325 136742 
Canister 13496 ---- 34571 
Adapter 27 ---- 38 
Probe Lander 8225 7417 94716 102133 
21 109 
Separated vehicle 6161 771 5185 
Suspended capsule 1036 6655 89531 
External payload 147 2042 86273 
Science 1 1571 289 
Propulsion and A. C. 16 459 193 
Descent (parachute etc. ) 3 0 85823 
Other 12 18 
Impact attenuation 76 1617 246 
Flotation 69 286 
Landed payload 168 2927 2738 
Science 34 301 390 
Communication 2 2250 414 
Sequencing and data handlil1 g 1 89 1381 
Other 
-- -
289 848 
• 
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Handling Non 
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27,000 37,000 
+1 0, 000 
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Figure 20 INITIAL FLIGHT CAPSULE BURDEN ESTIMATES- STERILIZATION CANISTER 
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Figure 21 INITIAL FLIGHT CAPSULE BURDEN ESTIMATES - EXTERNAL PAYLOAD 
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Figure 22 INITIAL FLIGHT CAPSULE BURDEN ESTIMATES - IMPACT ATTENUATOR 
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Figure 23 INITIAL FLIGHT CAPSULE BURDEN ESTIMATES· FLOTATION 
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Figure 24 INITIAL FLIGHT CAPSULE BURDEN ESTIMATES - LANDED PAYLOAD 
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Figure 25 INITIAL FLIGHT CAPSULE BURDEN ESTIMATES - SHELL ASSEMBLY 
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TABLE XIV 
ESTIMATE OF ADDED BURDEN IF SUSPENDED PAYLOAD IS 
ASSEMBLED IN A NON-CLEAN-ROOM 
(Values in thousands of viable organisITls) 
,..----
Initial Clean ROOITl Non-C. R. Net Added 
Surface Added Added Burden Burden, Non-
Burden Burden (l0 x No.2) Clean ROOITl 
(1 ) (2) (3) (l + 3) 
Canister N/A 
Adapter N/A 
Probe/Lander N/A 
Separated vehicle N/A 
Suspended capsule 3199 610 6100 9299 
External payload 
Science (B 1. 1. 5) 2 1 10 12 
Propulsion and A. C. 33 17 170 203 
(Bl. 1. 6) 
De scent (B 1. 1. 7) 12 3 30 42 
Other 161 33 * 330 491 
Irrlpact attenuation 
(Bl. 2) 143 75 750 893 
Flotation (Bl. 3) 0 0 0 0 
Landed payload 
Science (B 1. 4. 7) 6 70 700 706 
COrrlITlunication 
(B1.4.10) 4 I 10 14 
Sequence and data 
(Bl. 4. 6) 2 O. 4~' 4 6 
Other 122 71 710 832 
,~ None shown in initial estiITlate -- this estiITlate is 20% of initial burden. 
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Sub-
Total 
9299 
748 
893 
0 
1558 
3199 
I 
-.J 
0' 
e 
Change 
Solid propulsion 
Beryllium His ~tructure 
Meteroid bumper removal 
Elements 
Affected 
B1.1.6.1 
B1. 1. 6. 2 
B1. 1. 6. 3 
B1.1.6.4 
B1. 1. 6. 5 
New 
New 
B2.1. 1 
B2. 1. 2 
B2. 1. 4 
B2. 1. 5 
New 
New 
New 
AI.I 
AI.2 
AI.3 
A2.1 
A2.2 
A2.3 
TABLE XV 
BURDEN IMPACT OF DESIGN CHANGES 
(values in thousands of microorganisms) 
Element Original Burden 
Names Int. Gccl. Surf. 
Fuel tank 0 14 12 
Oxidizer tank 0 14 12 
Pressure tank 0 9 7 
Nozzle 0 3 3 
Plumbing 0 Negl. Negl. 
Casing 
Solid fuel 
Totals 0 40 34 
Fiberglass cap. 0 71 71 
Honeycomb fairing 0 I, 100 0 
Fiberglass skirt 0 1.357 1,357 
Compo ring 0 92 92 
Fwd. be face 
Steel honeycomb 
Aft Be face 
0 2,620 1,520 
Face sheet 0 1,448 1,411 
Foam 0 13,574 0 
Aft face sheet 0 1,448 1,411 
Face sheet 0 1,448 1,411 
Foam 0 13,547 0 
Aft face sheet 0 1.448 1.411 
0 32,940 5,644 
--
I' Approx. Revised Burden 
Int. Gccl. Surf. 
0 3 3 
0 4 4 
10 0 0 
10 7 7 
0 100 100 
0 0 120 
0 0 0 
0 0 120 
0 100 340 
0 240 240 
0 240 240 
0 480 480 
e 
(5 being the number used), unlike the beryllium. and half the fiberglass burden 
is on the backface, which in the case of the beryllium structure for the EFAT 
case is internal to the sandwich and sterile because of the curing operation, as 
are the internal steel honeycomb elements of the sandwich. 
The EFO case has no meteoroid bumper, so that there is neither the second 
face sheet nor the foam-sandwich separator. In addition, the corresponding 
materials are metal rather than plastic. 
Because of these factors, there is a difference in the total burden as follows: 
(values in thousands of microorganisms) 
Propulsion 
Structure 
Meteoroid bumper 
Total 
Probel Lander 
Design 
74 
4140 
38,584 
42,798 
Probe 
Design 
24 
440 
960 
1424 
Of the difference in burden, about 90 percent stems from the canister, and 
only 10 percent from the flight-capsule itself. Since only the interior of the 
canister must be sterilized (although the outside should be kept as clean as 
possible to prevent the possibility of recontamination during deployment), the 
90 percent reduction in canister burden has essentially no effect on that burden 
which must be destroyed during the terminal cycle (which is still low enough 
so that the total burden doe s not exceed 108). 
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4.0 BIOLOGICAL BURDEN CONTROL AND CERTIFICATION 
Burden certification for acceptance by NASA requires a completely documented 
history of burden accumulation and control, as related to the specific vehicle 
for which certification is being made. 
The burden associated with the capsule prior to final assembly is that on and 
within each major component as it is received at the assembly site. This 
burden has been accumulated during the manufacture and assembly of each 
component and has been reduced by die-off due to natural causes during the 
time the component has been stored awaiting further use. This initial burden 
is therefore a relatively static value for each different type of component used; 
its level being dependent on the environment condition existing at the point of 
manufacture and assembly. Specific control of these burdens is impractical for 
economic reasons, and the burden-sensitivity analysis indicates that they do 
not contribute a significant amount to the final burden. However, a general 
knowledge of these burden values is required, so that a standard burden can be 
assigned to each type of part, and to be sure that each component is capable of 
being decontaminated during the flight-acceptance heat cycle. This information 
can be obtained by performing assays of components. 
During final as sembly, burden accumulates on the vehicle as a result of fallout 
and handling by personnel within the facility. These elements must be control-
led during as sembly to the extent that the levels of burden are below those 
specified. Control of fallout is achieved by filtration and, if necessary, the use 
of special clean rooms, and control of handling burden is achieved by special 
handling procedures (the use of gloves, if necessary, for instance). The effec-
tiveness of these procedures must be established by continued monitoring of the 
environment, the procedures, and the biological burden on the various elements 
. of each flight capsule. The basic tool for this monitoring process in the bio-
logical assay. 
4.1 METHODS OF ASSAYS 
There are as yet only preliminary procedures. for the microbiological evaluation 
of spacecraft parts and materials. It is unlikely that a practical test will 
completely recover all viable microbial contamination from within spacecraft 
solids or from large surfaces; present methods for determining surface and 
internal burdens are therefore subject to restrictions in accuracy and ease of 
application. 
Internal and occluded burden determinations involve destruction of the hardware 
to be assayed or, at the very least. a significant disassembly. For this reason 
this type of assay requires additional hardware and/or schedule allowances. 
Surface-burden determinations can be performed with nondestructive assays, 
such as the swabbing of surfaces, which can be performed at any time without 
affecting hardware quantities or introducing major schedule perturbations. 
Samples used in making assays must be from operational hardware which is 
completely representative of all fabrication, assembly and handling experience, 
and must be selected at random from stores, production, or test areas. 
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. 
4. 1. 1 Hardware Breakdown Techniques 
The following are the techniques used to break down hardware'~ for assays 
of internal burden; generally, they are irreversibly destructive. 
a) Unbolting -- for disassembly of electronic component cases, 
plumbing, explosive bolt assemblies, etc. 
b) Unscrewing -- in cases where plugs or parts must be removed, 
such as a temperature-probe assembly, which may be screwed 
into its mounting. 
c) Drilling rivets for riveted assemblies. 
d) Cutting -- for sealed containers (where the container material 
may be cut away using shears, tin snips, or a saw), for wires 
(in order to separate parts which are wired together rather than 
unsoldering, or uncrimping), etc. 
e) Potting removal -- for potted elements, where it is necessary 
to remove the compound to expose surfaces and to liberate the 
compound itself. (Potting compounds may be removed chemically 
or mechanically. Chemicals must dissolve the potting compound, 
but in so doing neither kill nor promote uncontrolled growth of the 
burden. If the com.pound is removed mechanically by cutting 
and/ or pulling it out, care must be taken to get it completely 
away from the surface to be assayed). 
f) Liquid removal - - of liquid lubricants in sealed components, 
oHin transformers, etc~one potential flight capsule design con-
tains the landed payload in a liquid sphere); it may be possible to 
valve liquid off, or it may be necessary to disassemble or cut 
away'the component to get at it. 
g) Gas removal - - from gas -containing tanks; since the gas will be 
under pressure, one can attach plumbing to a suitable gas analyzer 
and valve off enough gas to obtain a representative sample. 
h) Insulation removal -- from wires and wiring harnesses, in order 
to assay the burden on the bare wire; in the case of a complicated 
harness not all the insulation would have to be stripped off, only 
a reasonable sample; it m.ight also be desirable to dissolve the 
insulation and to assay the resulting solution, which would serve 
to measure both the internal insulation burden and the wire surface 
burden • 
The hardware considered here does not include metallic or nonmetallic elements which are internally sterile as a result 
of the processes used to manufacture them. 
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• 
i) Pin removal -- for items like electrical connectors, where it 
may be necessary to remove the pins as well as disassemble the 
plug. 
j) Glass cutting -- for access to elements sealed in glass (electronic 
parts, diodes, etc.), where it will be necessary to cut or fracture 
the glass. 
k) Paint removal -- for analysis of paint itself or the underlying 
surface; the paint may be removed by dissolution or mechanical 
scraping; scraping is the best method if only a small sample of 
paint is required, but dissolution is better if the underlying sur-
face is to be assayed; care must be taken to assure that the paint 
and its internal burden is completely removed, and that the burden 
on the surface of the part is not removed. (It may be neces sary 
to perform a surface assay in two steps -- first assaying just the 
paint, then the paint and surface together, attributing the differ-
ence in burden to that which was initially on the surface of the part). 
1) Fracturing -- to perform assays of internal burden on encapsulat-
ed parts (such as resistors and capacitors) and in plastic materials 
(such as the heat-shield material, foam pads, and insulation), 
where it is necessary to expose the interior of the part or mater-
ial *. 
m) Drilling -- a common technique for exposing internal burden of 
material, creating finely broken chips which are then assayed; 
the burden recovered from the chips then has to be related to the 
total internal burden of the part, based on the relative amount of 
material drilled and the estimated percent recovery of the micro-
organisms in the drilling. 
n) Sawing -- a technique which can be used to assay either the saw-
dust or the surfaces exposed by sawing; the burden recovered by 
cutting has to be related back to the total internal burden of the 
part in either case; in the former case, the technique is similar 
to drilling, and in the latter case, it is similar to fracturing . 
The technique of fracturing can be explained by the following example: Assume that a component consisJs of some 
uniform crushable matrix, one centimeter cubed in size, that contains a uniformly dispersed burden of lOb viable spores ~:me mi.croo (i:e., 10-3. millimeter) in diameter, and th.at the exter!1al surfaces are sterile. If the component were divided 
''!t? mlcron-slz.ed partIcles .. there w<?ul~ be.lO~2 partIcles, of which 106 would .be b.acterial spore;;, so that the pr<?ba-
bIlIty of choosing one partIcle and flOdlng It viable would be 10-b. However, If this block were Instead cleaved Into 
two sections, an additional area of 2 x 108 square microns would be exposed, and it can be assumed that some number 
of spores wouldSbe exposed on the two new surf!l'ces. The chances are high that the total number of exposed particles 
would be 2 x 10 or higher, because at least 10 I-micron particles are exposed on each of the two surfaces, producing 
the .situation in which 100 (i.e., 108 x 10--6) microorganisms would probably be available for culture on that section. 
If e~the~ or both of. the. two piecc;s are then c~ltured, the resulting growth could be statistically related to the total con-
taminatIOn, thus YleldlOg an estImate of the Internal burden, namely 106 spores in this case. 
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0) Grinding -- to expose internal burden and generate smaller parti-
cles than can be obtained by either drilling or sawing, thereby 
exposing a greater area and consequently offering a larger burden 
sample for recovery. 
p) Crushing -- where parts to be assayed are small, and internal 
burden can best be exposed by crushing (conuninuting) the part 
completely. An advantage of crushing is that the burden through-
out the part is sampled, and the assay results are not influenced 
by the probability of sampling a nonrepresentative element of 
volume; a disadvantage is that for progressively fine crushing, 
more and more of the microorganisms are crushed and either 
killed or damaged, so that they are no longer viable). 
4. 1. 2 Recovery of Surface-Burden Samples 
The principal methods for collecting surface burden samples are swabs, 
impression techniques, agitation, rinse methods, inunersion, and ultra-
sonic release. 
Swabs are useful for checking large flat or curved surfaces. The size of 
the area swabbed and the methods used must be standardized for repeat-
able results. as demonstrated by the work of the Subconunittee on Food 
Utensil Sanitation, American Public Health AssociationS. Cotton swabs 
on wooden applicators give significantly higher counts than cotton swabs 
on stainless steel wire; changing the method of removing the cotton swabs 
from the wire lessens this difference. The same work indicates that the 
use of nonabsorbent or absorbent cotton also affects the results, and that 
the burden counts increase progressively with the number of strokes used in 
swabbing; the mean count with 5 strokes was about 20 percent greater, 
and with 10 strokes, 30 percent greater, than the count obtained with three 
strokes applied slowly and firmly in one direction. Reversing the direction 
between strokes increased the count 5 to 15 percent. Three times as many 
organisms were recovered using ten strokes, reversing direction between 
strokes, than with 10 single strokes in one direction. 
Impression techniques are also of value in surface burden sampling, but 
do not possess the flexibility of swabbing methods. Direct impression 
methods do not differentiate clumps of cells from single isolated organisms 
as the generators of a visible colony. The accuracy of contact methods 
can be irn.proved by utilizing a secondary contact rotation against a fresh 
agar surface in an effort to separate clumps of cells rn.echanically. All 
impression rn.ethods possess inherent limitations with respect to precision 
and accuracy. 
The direct surface agar plate method utilizes a thin essentially flat agar 
surface to remove organisms frorn. surfaces. This rn.ethod has the advantage 
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that microcolonies may be differentiated by tetrozOliUll1 staining, but has 
the disadvantage of not being standardized, and requires at present home-
made applicators for holding the agar surface. This technique was founcr4 
to detect 88.5 to 99.3 percent of the bacillus globigii spore contamination 
on nonporous surfaces. Recovery of micrococcus pyogenes variation 
aureus 209 varied over a wider range; this variation was attributed to death 
during drying. 
The Rodac plate, a plastic contact plate for detection of microorganisms on 
surfaces, is readily available commercially as a disposable item. The plate 
covers a 4 in. 2 surface and contains an agar layer with a high convex 
meniscus that may be applied to flat or contoured surfaces. Eugonagar 
was indicated as the medium of choice for determining total microbial 
populations, while selective media can be used for special studies. 
The agar syringe method, utilizes an open cylinder syringe filled with 
solidified agar medium. A layer of medium is pushed out of the cylinder 
with the plunger and held against the contaminated surface for 5 seconds; 
it is then sliced off with a sterile spatula and incubated in a petri dish. 
The pressure tape method offers potential advantages of simplicity, quan-
titative accuracy, and rapidity of performance. It has been applied with 
limited success using transparent mending tape. A concept under study at 
the Wilmot Castle Company is aimed at developing a soluble tape with a 
nontoxic soluble adhesive that would lift organisms off surfaces. 
Agitation is one of the elementary methods for removing organisms from 
the surface of small objects. The object can be placed in a stopped bottle 
of diluent or culture medium and agitated. A manual application of this 
method suffers from variation in the number of shakes and the length of 
arc for shaking. Mechanical agitation would have to be utilized for uni-
formity. The tenacity with which organisms may adhere to a surface can 
be weakened by incorporating surfactants (such as Tween 20 and 80, Sodium 
Lauryl Sulfate, or Triton X-lOO) in the liquid. Dispersing agents may 
promote separation of bacterial clumps. Agitation methods are useful as 
qualitative indications of surface sterility, and' can be made quantitative by 
coupling them with membrane filtration and subsequent incubation of the 
membrane filters on agar media. 
The rinse method is an excellent nondestructive procedure for surface 
burden determination. On advantage of this method is that it is adaptable 
to irregular surfaces and can be modified to accommodate a wide range 
of area sizes. In one technique, 100 ml of liquid is cascaded over the 
object or surface held at a 45 degree angle above a reservoir on a membrane 
filter apparatus. A spray gun can also be used for more effective dislodg-
ing and collecting of surface organisms. One device utilizes a self-con-
tained pressurized spray and liquid collection system particularly well 
-82-
-------- --
suited for large surfaces. Plane and curved surfaces can be accommodated 
with som.e equipm.ent modifications. A less elegant rinse m.ethod utilizes a 
rubber policeman to wet the surface with diluent. The surface and the 
policem.an can be flushed and the liquid incubated directly for qualitative 
sterility checks, or passed through mem.brane filters for a quantitative 
determination of the m.icrobial population on a given surface area. 
The simplest m.ethod for detecting the presence of viable contam.inants con-
sists of immersing the specim.en in a culture tube or bottle of a nutrient 
m.edium., such as trypticase soy broth. Proper controls m.ust be em.ployed 
to establish whether an inhibitor is eluted from the m.aterial being cultured. 
Ultrasonic release and dispersion, when properly utilized, is extrem.ely 
useful in burden sam.pling. Although high-frequency ultrasonic waves can 
sterilize a microbial suspension, low-frequency ultrasonic waves are used 
routinely in the Wilm.ot Castle Laboratory to disperse organism.s in sus-
pension without introducing lethal vibrations. An ultrasonic generator with 
an output of 180 watts at 21 kc has been used for this purpose. Ultrasonics 
can be used in conjunction with other culture m.ethods to disperse m.icro-
organism.s and are certainly effective for cleaning surfaces. Should a 
hydrophobic film. be present on spacecraft parts in a sterility test program., 
organism.s within the film. may not grow if the culture m.edium. does not 
include agents which disrupt such film.s. Ultrasonics would tend to in-
crease the reliability of these culture techniques. Com.m.inuted particles 
m.ay have partially exposed viable cells which do not encounter the nutrient 
environment because of thin air film.s. Ultrasonics would strip such film.s 
from. the particle, and enhance the opportunity for the cell to grow. 
It should be obvious frorrl the preceding discussion that selection of a 
particular assay technique will require careful evaluation of the nature, 
shape, size, and com.position of the item. to be assayed, and of the con-
straints and lim.itations of the various assay m.ethods. Whichever technique 
is used, the assays m.ust be conducted by trained, qualified personnel, 
within sterile isolated system. (to eliminate exterior contamination), and 
with detailed com.pliance with the specified procedures. 
4. 1. 3 Basic Assay Techniques 
Culture m.ethods are the m.ost reliable m.eans for dem.onstrating the pre-
sence of viable microorganism.s on surfaces or within solids. These 
m.ethods depend on m.ultiplication of the organism.s after a suitable incuba-
tion period, to the extent that visible colonies are form.ed on solid culture 
m.edia, or that initially clear liquid m.edia develop turhidity; they require 
culture media that favor proliferation of the cells,and appropriate incubation 
temperatures and incubation periods. 
-83-
The cultural techniques for these items (disassembled parts, components, 
etc. ) can be divided into groupings which would encourage the growth of 
aerobic bacteria, anaerobic bacteria, and fungi. The medium to be used 
for each of these techniques should be of such a composition that it produces 
significant growth for the largest variety of organisms in each grouping. 
Incubation temperature for the cultures should be room temperature, 37 to 
45 0 C. When cultures of the aerobic and anaerobic bacteria are being made, 
aliquotes should be removed and subjected to heat shock to encourage 
germination of the possible spores present in the samples. The heat-
shocked aliquotes would then be cultured in the same way as the aerobic 
and anaerobic bacterial samples. Incubation periods for the samples should 
be 24, 48 and 72 hours, at which times the cultured samples are examined 
for growth. The number of the microorganisms present in each of the items 
assayed will be made by plate count or membrane filter count techniques. 
Organisms associated with spacecraft parts and materials may have nutri-
tional or environmental requirements that differ sufficiently from the 
laboratory stock culture of that species so that growth does not occur. despite 
the fact that viable organisms are present in the culture medium. The parts 
may contain materials that are toxic to organisms present in the solid. 
Particles of comminuted (crushed or pulverized) materials inoculated into 
culture media may become dissolved sufficiently to kill or prevent the 
growth of bacteria encountering toxic solutes. 
Assay procedures for organisms exposed to elevated temperatures are 
subject to similar limitations, and are further complicated by the recovery 
problem associated with thermally injured organisms. There are no 
general solutions to these recovery problems; each species investigated 
appears to have requirements that mayor may not be similar to those of 
another organism. 
The lack of homogeneity in a microbial population introduces other problems 
in assessing the level of contamination. Liquid media assays are useful 
only for qualitative detection of viability, since significant numbers of viable 
cells may not find the particular set of growth conditions suitable for their 
development. The analogous situation occurs on solid media, since a 
colony may develop from one or more cells in a clump of cells rather 
than from a single discrete cell, unless appropriate separation and dis-
persion methods are available. 
Solvents are available that may readily dissolve nonmetallic materials. 
However, they may be toxic to bacteria on a total or selective basis; ace-
tone, for example, may dissolve certain plastics and kill vegetative cells, 
while spores would survive even extended exposure to this solvent. The 
variety of materials used in spacecraft will require a wide range of sol-
vents and a study of the activity of each solvent against a spectrum of 
mic roorganisms. 
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4. 1. 4 Assay Procedures 
Procedures for each technique are presented in Table XVI; they are 
typical and indicate SOIne of the discrete steps required; for actual ap-
plication they would be detailed further, identifying all equipInent utilized 
by serial nUIllber, etc., and spelling out in great details all necessary en-
vironInents, tiInes, and data logging requireInents. 
4. 1. 5 Assay Accuracies 
The assay accuracies vary greatly aInong the various techniques and depend 
priInarily on two factors, the inherent repeatability of the results obtained 
with a given technique, and the recovery factor associated with that tech-
nique. The recovery factors Rtexpressed as percent of organisIns recovered) 
and a qualitative judgInent concerning the accuracy are given in Table XV:u. 
based on published results3, 4, 5,6 and unpublished data obtained in the 
WilInot-Castle COInpany. 
For the purposes of the study the accuracies shown in Table XVIII were 
used. Generally they are ba sed conservatively on recovery factors which 
are 75 percent of those shown in Table XVII. For electronic components 
assays are performed by several techniques, so that the value given in 
Table XVIII is a composite of the accuracies of the several methods. For 
cases where an assay must be performed on a subassembly without the re-
quirement for disassembly, an accuracy of 75 percent has been assUIlled, 
based- on the fact that only surface assays are possible and that occluded, 
mated, and internal burdens must be estimated, thereby reducing the ac-
curacy of relating organisms recovered to the total population. The accuracy 
listed for internal assays take into account the fact that for internal assay 
techniques such as fracturing, the recovery factor, although small, can be 
corrected for relatively reliably. All accuracies listed in Table XVIII 
are, essentially, one sigma values. 
4.2 NUMBER OF ASSAYS REQUIRED 
The purpose of this section is to indicate a means of estimating the nUIllber of 
assays which must be performed on hardware of each type in order to be able to 
assign it a burden value with a given level of confidence. This determination 
requires in each instance a knowledge of: 
a) The control burden Xc is that which is predicted in the burden estimate 
for the given part at the given stage in the assembly process, using 
conservative estimates for the various burden factors (see paragraph 
3.3); the average of the assayed values Xa divided by the recovery 
factor R for the given assay technique, should be less than Xc. 
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TABLE XVI 
ASSAY PROCEDURES 
Step 1. Use one swab -. calcium alginate type, per assay. 
area. Moisten prior to use with sterile water con-
taining one percent Tween 80. 
Step 2. Ten strokes total; five strokes in one direction and 
five strokes in the opposite direction -- alternate 
directions of each stroke. Tip of swab is not to be 
lifted from surface until completion of pickup. A two 
in. 2 template may be useful in delineating the assay 
area. 
Rinse 
Step 1. Cascade sterile TGYE broth over part. 
Step 2. Collect wash broth. 
Step 3. Pipet one tnl aliquote into three separate petri dishes. 
Step 4. Pipet one ml broth into each of three petri dishes 
and overlay with 15 ml TGYE agar. 
Step 5. Incubate at 37°C for 24 hours. 
Step 3. Break off tip into 10 rol percent sodium hexametaphos- Step 6.. Count colonies with a Quebec colony counter. 
phate and allow tip to dissolve. Shake intermittently. 
Step 4. Pipet one ml into each of three petri dishes. 
Step 5. Overlay and mix aliquote with 15-17 ml tryptone glu-
cOSe yeast extract (TGYE) agar. 
Step 6. Incubate at 37°C for 24 hours. 
Step 7. Count with Quebec colony counter. 
Immersion with Ultrasonics 
Step 1. Place item into 10 ml of broth in test tube. 
Step 2. Sonicate at 21 kc for 10 minutes. 
Step 3. Pipet one ml into each of three petri dishes. 
Step .4. Overlay with nutrient agar, TGYE. 
Step 5. Incubate at 37°C for 24 hours. 
Step 6. Count colonies with a Quebec colony counter. 
Size Reduction 
Step 1. Use pliers, mortar and pestle, drill or file to reduce 
item to fine particle s. 
Step 2. Check average size by microscopic examination of 
largest dimension of a suitable sample. 
Step 3. Place particles into 10 ml broth in test tube. 
Step 4. Sonicate at 21 kc for 10 minutes. 
Step 5. Pipet one ml into each of three petri dishes. 
Step 6. Overlay with nutrient agar, TGYE. 
Step 7. Incubate at 37°C for 24 hours. 
Step 8. Count colonies with a Quebec colony counter. 
Step 1. Remove protective cover. 
Step 2. Press agar surface against area to be assayed; be 
firm and avoid rotation and sliding forces. 
Step 3. Remove plate and replace cover. 
Step 4. Incubate at 37°C for 24 hours. 
Step 5. Count colonies with a Quebec colony counter. 
Filtration 
Step 1. Pass aliquote through sterile membrane filter, 
O. 2 micron size. 
Step 2. Flush filter by passing sterile water over filter to 
remove liquid residue of sampled material. 
Step 3. Place filter. collection-side down, upon a nutrient 
agar formulated with TTC. 
Step 4. Incubate at 37"C for 24 hours. 
Step 5. Count colonies with a Quebec colony counter. 
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TABLE XVII 
ASSAY RECOVERIES 
Surface Burden Precision Recoveries Reference (percent) 
Swabs Poor 52 to 90 Angelotti, '58 
( 4) 
Rinse or spray Buchbinder. 
'47(3) 
rinse Fair 80 
Angelotti, '58 ( 4) 
Agitation Fair 80 
,~ 
Wilmot Castle Company 
, Immersion with 
00 
-J ultrasonics Excellent 90 to 99 
Wilmot Castle Company~' 
, 
Rodac Good 41 Angelotti, 
'64 (5) 
Internal burden 
Size reduction 
techniques Very poor 1 Reed, 
'65(6) 
Filtration for 
assay of liquids Excellent 99 to 100 Wilmot Castle Company,::(l) 
*Based on unpublished d~.ta 
TABLE XVIII 
OVERALL ASSAY ACCURACIES 
(percent) 
Swab 60 
Rinse 20 
Agitation 20 
Immersion 15 
Rodac 75 
Filtration 10 
Internal factor of 5 
Black boxes 33* 
Subassembly. general 75(factor of 1.75)** 
* Mixture of Swab. immersion and internal (fracturing. drilling. 
etc. ) 
** Mixture of Rodac. some swab 
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b) An asswned standard deviation a in this value; for lack of any better 
information a value of a equal to one-third the expected burden value has 
been used in this study; the expected value Xe should be less than the 
control value, as pointed out in paragraph 3.3. 
c) As assigned upper burden control limit Xu' which represents the value 
one will expect to guarantee not be exceed, and which must be larger than 
the value specified in a) 
d) The desired level of confidence y. 
The number of assays required can then be 
distribution technique, which is frequently 
test the differences between two means. * 
calculated using the Student's "t" 
used in small-sample statistics to 
It is given by the equation 
c:) 
where the values on the right side of the equation are those defined in the pre-
ceding listing, and those in the left side are the values in the standard It' table 
for the given confidence value y; see, for instance, the values listed in Table 
XIX for a confidence level of 0.9999, which are those used in the calculations 
for this study. The right side of the equation can be calculated from the 
values specified for any given case, resulting in a value for n/t2 , from which 
the value of a n can be determined using the table. The assay accuracy tends 
to increase the value of a to an equivalent value ue given, approximately, by 
where £ is the estimated range of error in the number XaIR. Inasmuch as a 
itself is obtained by an educated guess (say one-third of XaIR), any error less 
than about 20 percent of XaIR can be ignored. 
The variation of the number of assays required as a function of the expected 
burden is shown in Figure 26 for a control burden of lOB. Based on these 
arguments and for this choice of control limit, parts which assay at a burden 
of less than about 105 require only one assay, and those which are known to 
contain fewer than 104 organisms probably none. Conversely, where the 
predicted (or assayed) burden of an element is close to lOB, a very large 
number of assays or a raising of the control limit would be required • 
• There are other tests, but for the present purpose only a rough indication can be obtained, as a result of the uncer-
tainties involved, and such an indication is entirely adequate. The "t" test is, therefore, satisfactory, and no more 
sophisticated approach is warranted. 
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TABLE XIX 
V ALU ES OF 11 til FOR y = 0 • 9999 
n/t 2 n t n/t
2 
0.9870xl0- 7 21 4.493 1.040 
0.0004 x 10- 3 22 4.452 1.110 
0.0061 x 1'0- 2 23 4.415 1. 180 
. O. 0236 x 10- 1 24 4.382 1.250 
0.0534x 10- 1 25 4.352 1. 320 
0.0932 x 10- 1 26 4.324 1. 391 
0.1403 27 4.299 1.461 
0.1928 28 4.275 1. 532 
0.2492 29 4.254 1.603 
0.3084 30 4.234 1. 673 
0.3699 35 4.153 2.029 
0.4332 40 4.094 2.387 I 
0.4977 45 4.049 2.745 
0.5634 50 4.014 3.103 
0.6299 55 3.986 3.462 
0;6971 60 3.962 3.822 
0.7650 70 3.926 4.541 
0.8332 80 3.899 5.262 
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0.9708 100 3.862 6.705 
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ESTIMATE OF ASSAYED BURDEN 
Figure 26 NUMBER OF ASSAYS REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE ASSAYED 
BURDEN IS BELOW 108 ORGANISMS WITH A CONFIDENCE OF 99.99"/. 
e 
It should be noted that as a result of the uncertainties involved in this estimate 
(such as the assumed y values, the poorly defined assay accuracies, and the 
arbitrariness involved in the choice of a confidence level) the calculated num-
ber of assays need not be taken too literally and should be regarded only as a 
guide line. In general, if flight-acceptance heat soaks are used, it should be 
possible to assign control values sufficiently high as to require only one or two 
assays for every element, without penalizing the program. 
4.3 BURDEN MONITORING 
A burden measurement is of necessity downstream of the situations which re-
sulted in that burden level, so that if the level exceeds the allowable value 
much hardware may have to be scrapped, much effort may have been made in 
vain, and there may be a delay in at least part of the program. Therefore, 
it is essential to take preventative measures, and one of the most important 
of these is the constant monitoring of the process and the environment in the 
formative periods of activity and afterwards. Effective burden monitoring 
requires active monitoring of all phases of activity -- design, manufacturing, 
vendor control, etc. - - which have a potential impact on the microbial burden 
of the flight capsule, from the inception of the program virtually to its 
completion. 
The prescribed design of the flight capsule determines to a large extent how 
effective burden control will be and if, in fact, the burden can be kept within 
the allowable maximum figure. The packaging of electronics, the size of roc-
ket engines, and the type and size of parachutes, are a few of the more ob-
vious areas of design decision that have a serious impact on burden levels. 
Even the kinds and qualities of surface finish, as well as the number of recesses, 
crevices or other surface anomalies which may facilitate micorbic hiding, may 
have a significant effect on the burden associated with a system as large and 
complex as a flight capsule. Burden monitoring must therefore start by in-
fluencing the design in the early stages and must continue with design-approval 
control for all subsequent changes. Examples of possible design changes that 
would affect burden control are: I) those which would impede heat flow during 
sterilization or make it impossible to monitor sterilization temperatures at a 
critical point, 2) unsealing a previously sealed assembly, making it liable to 
increas,ed handling and fallout burdens, 3) changes in material which could 
outgas excessively through heating, resulting in contamination, etc. 
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Variations in the manufacturing/assembly/test process may also have significant 
impact on the burden levels. Manufacturing procedures must therefore be de-
veloped in conjunction with sterilization personnel, and all subsequent modifi-
cations to these procedures must be approved from the point of view of burden 
impact, and any change must be reflected in the burden allocation. This includes, 
for instance. changes in cleaning methods, finishing processes. curing and 
bonding cycles. Similarly. any change in the assembly or the test program 
(which. like the assembly process. involves handling. fall-out contamination. 
die-off, etc.) must be evaluated with its impact on the biological burden in mind; 
of particular significance are ETO-exposure and thermal-steriiization tests, as 
discussed previously. 
Vendor selection and control will be difficult for many reasons. Vendors nor-
mally considered qualified to deliver reliable hardware will be hardpressed to 
comply with the stringent requirements for controlling manufacturing and engi-
neering processes and satisfying the procedural documentation vital to successful 
execution of this program for the relatively few items they (individually) will 
furnish for use in a planetary/lander program. 
Since enforcement of clean-up procedures and standards often requires a time-
consuming educational process. and new facilities or equipment may be required. 
potential suppliers must be identified as early in the program as possible; also. 
parts and components furnished by the vendors typical of those to be used on the 
flight capsule must be assayed as early as possible. so that any problem areas 
can be identified in time to avoid constraining the program schedule. 
As the program proceeds into the hardware stage. all materials, parts and 
components being received into the assembly facility will have to be assayed 
thoroughly to determine actual burdens. It is possible, although unlikely, that 
certain types of components being supplied by specific vendors turn out to have 
an excessively large burden. In this event, either the supplier will have to be 
changed, or a specific control applicable to the particular situation at hand 
will have to be exercised. These controls may involve the introduction of new 
or better cleaning Ine thods or environments, and/or modified handling or stor-
age practices. Based on the burden-estimate studies, however, it would ap.-
pear that few, if any, vendors would have to resort to Class 100 clean-room 
environments. 
4.4 DOCUMENTATION 
The results of the assays of hardware and environ:ment, as well as the results 
of all monitoring actions (including that of the terminal-sterilization process and 
any post- sterilization actions) have to be recorded; the compilation of these 
records represents the documentation of the burden-control (and therefore, by 
implication, sterilization) process, whereby a spacecraft can ultimately be 
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certified as sterile. The specific purpose of the documentation system re-
quired for burden control is therefore to demonstrate in an orderly fashion in-
cremental-burden compliance leading up to a certifiable total burden lower 
than the pre-sterilization maximum level of 108 (or any lesser value) viable 
organisms, and to document actual successful application of the proper thermal 
sterilization cycle. 
A simple system which contains all the basic elements required for complete 
continuing burden control is based on three forms, as shown in Figures 27, 28, 
and 29. The se forms account for the burden on each component or part and 
also for the burden-contributing effect of handling and exposure. Figure 27 
records the raw assay observations, and Figure 28 documents characteristics 
of the environment where the assay and/or assembly process takes place. 
Figure 29 is a summary form which relates the specific assay being performed 
to the configuration of the element being assayed, thus permitting a direct com-
parison with a maximum allowable or as signed burden for that element. In some 
cases an assay will result in the total part burden, such as in a small part 
which only has surface burden which has been completely recovered; in others, 
where surfaces and volumes may be large, the assay measures only a portion 
of the total burden, and this value must be factored to reflect total (by the 
factor R). This assay documentation provides for aerobic, anaerobic and 
fungi organisms, which generally covers all the burden found in the flight cap-
sule. Provisions are made for replication of ten of each of a series of five 
dilutions, each diluted by an order of magnitude from the next, for each assay, 
so that the form can be used for air sampling and for surface, internal or oc-
cluded burden. 
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~~~~O~AME DAT~U~:Z~V-E-D-'-N-HO-U-S-E EXPERIMENT NUD~~iRRECEIVED FOR c~~~G~~ENTER_---'N-C-U-BATION TEMPERATURE ___ _ 
INCuBATION TIME SWAB 0 GRIND 0 SAW 0 DRILL 0 DISSOLVE 0 SECTION 0 UNWRAP 0 UNBOLT 0 
124 HRsl 148 HRS I 172 HRS I CUT 0 UNSCREW 0 SCRAPE 0 FRACTURE 0 GAS REMOVAL 0 LIQUID REMOVAL 0 OTHER TECHNIQUE 0 
AIR SAMPLE BURDEN 0 AIR SAMPLE NUMBER 
AEROBIC BACTERIA REPLICATES OF 10 ANAEROBIC BACTERIA FllNGI 
DILUTION III • b c d • f q h ; I 
DILUTION 
III 0 b c d • f q h i j 
DILUTION 
• III b c d • f q h I j 
1/10 1/10 1110 
VI02 VI02 VIQ2 
11103 1/103 1/103 
1110"1 1/104 1110"1 
TOTAL TOTAL -------~- TOTAL 
AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE 
SURFACE BURDEN 0 
AEROBIC BACTERIA ANAEROBIC BACTERIA FLING1 
DILUTION 0 b , d • f q h I j 
DILUTION 
0 b , d • f q h I j 
DILUTION 
• b 
, d • f q h I j 1/1 III III 
1110 1/10 1110 
VI02 VI02 VI02 
I/KJ3 1/103 1/103 
1/104 1/10"1 1/104 
TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL 
AVE~AGE AVERAGE AvERAGE 
INTERNAL BURDEN 
I AEROBIC BACTERIA ANAEROBIC BACTERIA FUNGI 
-D 
U1 
DILUTION 0 b c d • f q h I j DILUTION 0 b c d • f q h I j 
DILUTION 
0 b c d • f q h I III III III I 
1/10 1/10 .110 
VI02 VI02 VI02 
11103 1/103 1/103 
1/104 1/104 1/10"1 
TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL 
AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE 
OCCLUDED BURDEN 
AEROBIC BACTERIA ANAEROBIC BACTERIA FUNGI 
DILUTION III 0 b c d • f q h I j DILUTION III 0 b c d • f q h i j DILU'tION III 0 b c • • f q h I j 
1/10 1/10 1/10 
VI02 VI02 VI02 
11103 1/103 11103 
1/10"1 1/104 1/10"1 
TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE 
TOTAL AVERAGE SURFACE BURDEN 
TOTAL AvERAGE INTERNAL BURDEN 
TOTAL AVERAGE OCCLUDED BURDEN 
ENTIRE AVERAGE BURDEN 
AIR SAMPLE 
AEROBIC BACTERIA AVERAGE ____ 
ANAEROBIC BACTERIA AVERAGE ____ 
FUNGI AVERAGE _____ 
AVERAGE POPULATION OF AIR SAMPLE 
8&·0404 
Figure 27 ASSAY DATA RECORDING FORM 
e 
I 
'" C1' 
DATE AND TIME AREA LOCATION AIR SAMPLE NUMBER HOW AIR SAMPLE TAKEN 
EXPERIMENT NUMBER EXPERIMENTER 
I I I I 
TYPE OF ASSAY 
DESCRI PTION OF PART I 
COMPONENT I SUBASSEMBLY I 
OR ASSEMBLY ASSAYED. 
85-0405 
I I I 
DESCRI PTION OF AREA 
SAMPLED 
FT.3 TEMP.----------------------
RELATIVE HUMIDITY ________ _ 
AIR FLOW 
FLOORS __________ __ 
WALLS 
CEILlNG"'""S----------
ACTIVITY IN AREA AND NUMBER OF PERSONAL 
TASKS PERFORMED 
NUtv13ER OF PEOPLE 
MACHINING __________ _ 
GRINDING 
CUTTING _____________ _ 
WIRING 
ASSEMBLfNG 
SOLDERING ---------------
DRILLING 
FILING 
BOL TlNG 
WELDING 
OTHER 
Figure 28 ASSAY DATA RECORDING FORM 
e e 
r 
e 
I 
..0 
-J 
I 
TOTAL AVERAGES (FROM FIG. 11.3-8) 
1) SURFACE 
AEROBIC 
ANAEROBIC 
FUNGI 
TOTAL 
4) TOTAL SURFACE/VOLUME 
APPLICABLE 
-----
• 
5) SURFACE /VOLUME ASSAYED ___ _ 
6) PERCENT SURFACE/VOLUME 
ASSAYED (5/4) 
7) TOTAL BURDEN RECOVERED 
(1,2 OR 3) 
8) ESTIMATED TOTAL BURDEN 
(1,2 OR 3/6 
9) NOMINAL BURDEN ALLOCATED 
TO THIS PART BY BURDEN 
CONTROL SYSTEM 
10) EXCESSIVE BURDEN 
INDICATED (8-9) 
2) INTERNAL 
AEROBIC 
ANAEROBIC ----
FUNGI ___ _ 
TOTAL 
* IF POSITIVE NUMBER, INITIATE RED FLAG REPORT 
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Figure 29 SUMMARY ASSAY DATA RECORDING FORM 
3) OCCLUDED 
AEROBIC 
ANAEROBIC ----
FUNGI ___ _ 
TOTAL 
• 
5.0 TERMINAL STERILIZATION 
As indicated previously, the basic sterilization approach that has been selected 
for space vehicles is the use of dry heat 7 , supported by pre sterilization burden 
control techniques which include the use of ETO as a decontaminant*. The 
aspects of terminal sterilization which are discussed in this section are methods 
of heat application and methods of verifying kill effectiveness. 
5.1 TECHNIQUES OF HEAT APPLICATION 
One of the potential problems in the application of the terminal heat cycle is 
the length of time it takes to elevate the thermally insulated elements in the 
interior of the capsule to the required temperature. In some cases this time 
is long enough that the heat applied to the less remote elements may greatly 
exceed that required for sterilization. Figure 30 shows a thermal model of a 
typical Mars capsule in a sterilization canister. This model was used to inves-
tigate analytically the thermal response of a complete system. The temperature 
rise at a thermally remote location within the capsule is shown in Figure 31, 
curve 1. The time required for this location to reach sterilization temperature 
is approximately 120 hours. 
The application of electric heaters to thermally remote components as a means 
of reducing this time was investigated. A heat rate of 30 watts was considered 
to be applied in the payload area (node 17), in c..ddition to the external heat. 
The time constant; for this case is about 24 hours. This was still considered 
too long, and heaters were added to the center layer of the crushable material 
'(nodes 13 and 14), with 5 and 10 watt heating rates. The results are shown as 
curves 3 and 4 in Figure 31 • 
• Some other sterilization techniques which, for various reasons, are not acceptable for terminal sterilization of space-
craft are the following; some of them may in some situations be useful for spacecraft decontamination (pre-sterilization 
burden cO,ncro.l), singly. or il! combin.ation.with each other and/or with dry heat, although the only presently approved 
decontamination techmque IS cleamng wuh ETa. 
Chemical decontamination is a technique which is primarily useful for burden reduction. It can be accomplished with 
liquid, vapor, or gaseous germicides, but is applicable to surfaces only, although some subsurface burden can be 
affected depending on the penetration capabilities of the fluid and the permeability or porosity of the surface. Care 
must. be taken when applying the chemical~ to determine their corrosive effects on vehicle components, which are de-
term.ln!,!d by exposure times and concentration. In the case of vapor or gaseous decontaminants, temperature and 
humidity cont~ols are also essential to obtain controlled results. Some of the more common liquid decontaminants are 
the .hypochlorltes, formalin, caustic sodium hydroxide, and lysol(8). Some of the common vapors or gaseous decon-
taml'!a!'-ts are Ji:thylene Oxide (ETa), Formaldehyde, and Beta-propiolactone. The exposure time of a vehicle to 
germlcldal.env,ronment is selected by trading off the desired reduction of the surface burden against, primarily, the 
damage which may be done to the surface. 
A number C!f the radiative techniques can provide internal sterilization, such as X-rays and Gamma rays, but they are 
not as des,~a.bl,e from a proof-of-kill or-application point of view as is heat; neutron bombardment, for example, will 
produce artifICial activity in materials. Ultra-violet radiation can be used for surface-burden reduction. SQnk cleaning 
can ~e used for decontamination, ~ut its effect .is limited to the reduction of surface burden, and only on tliOSe elements 
phYSically small enough to be subjected to sonic cleaning. 
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Node Structural Part 
I, Z, 3 Meteoroid bumper 
4,5, 6 Foam filler 
7,8, 9 Inner faceeheet 
10 Heat ehield 
11, IZ Cruehable material outer layer 
13, 14 Cruehable material center layer 
IS, 16 Cruahable material inner layer 
17 Payload 
18 Support Cone 
SECTION A-A 
Figure 30 THERMAL MODEL OF A TYPICAL MARS CAPSULE 
-99-
...... 
o 
o 
e 
300, nv~t.l T~uJ~gATllg~ j;::-~I ___ II 
IL. 
0,", 
ILl 
a: I --=== I ;j 200 I ' f / ~:::::;:::;o;ooo t- rr7 " 
« 
a: 
ILl 
a. 
~ 
ILl 
~ 
I
I $'/1 /' I ~~ ~;i;~~;~:TlNG 
100/-~ ~30 WATT NODE 17 -+1-------+------1 
5 WATT NODE 13114 
@30 WATT NODE 17 
®
IO WATT NODE 13114 
5 40 WATT NODE 17 
10 WATT NODE 13114 
0 1 1 1 1 1 
o 4 8 12 16 20 
86-1283 
TIME, HOURS 
Figure 31 EFFECT OF INTERNAL HEATING ON TIME TO REACH 
STERILIZATION TEMPERATURE 
e e 
These additional heaters effectively reduce the time constant to a few hours. 
(The internal heaters would be thermostatically controlled, so that the elements 
of concern would not exceed the sterilization temperature at any time). 
The effect of external heating rates on temperature gradients across the container 
wall is shown for the upper wall (Node 1) in Figure 3Z; representative tempera-
ture-rise rates of I, Z, 4 and 80 F /min were used in the analysis. This informa-
tion is useful for selecting the maximum heating rates beyond which detrimental 
effects can occur to the container structure. (It should be kept in mind that the 
gradient across the wall is sensitive to the assumption made regarding internal 
and external convection coefficients). 
The effect of the variation of internal surface emissivity on internal heat trans-
fer was also investigated, with the results shown in Figure 33. The surface 
emissivity values of the inner face sheet, outer crush-up-material surface, and 
heat-shield outer surface were increased from O. 1 to 0.9. 
Cooling of the system was also investigated. Illustrated in Figure 34 is a 
typical cool-down history from the sterilization temperature to room tempera-
ture. Despite the fact that the time constant for the payload cool-down is IZO 
hours, the container itself is at handling temperatures within a few hours, and 
even the payload has cooled to lZSoF within 48 hours. Faster cool-down of the 
payload can be accomplished only by forced convection within the payload itself, 
which is difficult to achieve under sterile conditions; nor is it really required. 
Alternate heating techniques utilize nitrogen or helium pressurizing gas in the 
sterilization canister under free or forced convection, and controlled oven over-
shoot. A heat cycle with oven rise time of one hour between room temperature 
and 14So C was used to determine the effects of nitrogen and heliUIIl under free 
and forced convection 9. Figure 35 shows a comparison of component response 
for the various heating techniques. Under free convection with nitrogen in the 
sterilization canister the internal heat transfer coefficient is 0.9 Btu/hr-ftZ-OF. 
The component with the slowest response time (Item ZZ) requires 6.3 hours to 
reach soak temperature (curve 5). Under force.p convection with nitrogen in 
the sterilization container and a heat transfer coefficient of 4.6 Btu/hr-ftZ-OF 
the same component requires 3 hours to reach soak temperature (curve Z). 
Using helium in the sterilization container under free convection, item ZZ re-
quires 4.5 hours to stabilize (curve 3), and under forced convection it requires 
3 hours to stabilize (curve 1). 
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In the controlled oven-overshoot heat-sterilization cycle, temperature levels 
in certain areas were allowed to exceed the specified sterilization temperature 
level (l450C, 293 OF) in order to investigate the pos sibility of shortening the 
eat-up time of the slower responding items. 9 The oven temperature was in-
creased from room temperature to l7l o C in 1 hour, held at 171 0 C for 1 hour, 
and then decreased to l45 0 C in 0.5 hour. The results of this temperature cycle 
are shown in curve 4, Figure 35. The slowest response item lItem 22) stabi-
lized in 4. 5 hours with nitrogen pres surizing gas under free convection in the 
sterilization container. Under the same conditions, but with no oven overshoot, 
this item required 6.3 hours to reach the stabilization temperature. Only the 
exterior metallic surfaces and support structure exceeded the l45 0 C heat 
sterilization cycle. This overshoot should have little effect on the performance 
of the assembly. 
The most effective means of reducing the heat-sterilization time cycle is, 
therefore, the addition of internal heaters to the thermally most remote 
components, forced convection, although potentially capable of producing 
similar results, requires the use of active mechanical elements (blowers) 
within the capsule/canister system, which therefore have to be sterilizable and 
highly reliable and tend to be heavier than a number of small heaters distributed 
to the most thermally remote points, so that this approach appears to be less 
desirable at this time. 
5.2 VERIFICATION OF KILL EFFECTIVENESS 
The kill effectiveness of the cycle is verified by two independent complementary 
approaches. One is the measurement of temperatures inside the capsule and 
on the sterilization canister, to verify that the prescribed temperature cycle 
was followed. The second is the direct measurement of the biological kill by 
means of biological monitors mounted on the outside of the canister. 
As part of the extensive thermal-control test program to which the capsule will 
have to be subjected, it will be established what the temperature response to a 
thermal sterilization heat cycle is at many points (up to 1000) of the capsule, 
first with an engineering model and then (probably with less instrumentation) 
on each flight article. From the measurements on the engineering test unit, 
it will be possible to select the best locations and the appropriate power inputs 
for heaters to be placed inside the capsule to reduce the heat-up time at the 
thermally remote points inside the capsule. The correctness of this selection 
should then be verified in a repeat of the thermal tests with heaters installed 
and operating. Also, tests on the engineering test unit will indicate which 
relatively few points of the many used in the engineering test program should 
be monitored on the flight articles to obtain the required definition of the 
thermal situation with the least instrumentation. The temperature sensors 
installed at these points of the flight articles will then furnish the desired 
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information during the terminal-sterilization cycle (as well as other phases of 
the mission where internal temperature information is of interest). 
The biological monitors used for the direct determination of the biological kill 
are located on the outside of the sterilization canister and are assayed after the 
sterilization cycle. They should contain organisms which are resistant to dry 
heat in order to generate conservative data and they should contain numbers of 
organisms from 106 to 1014 in steps of one decade, in order to furnish a quanti-
tative measure of killing effectiveness. In order to avoid ambiguities stemming 
fronl. the improper performance of the m.onitors, they should be used in repli-
cates of five. Therefore, the primary set of monitors should consist of 45 
containers of known burden. 
The effectiveness of the heat cycle for the thermally most remote elements can 
be ascertained by using a second set of 45 monitors also located on the outside 
of the sterilization canister, but thermally insulated in such a way as to simu-
late the response of the thermally most remote element. (Even with internal 
heaters, there will be some points in the interior which are relatively isolated, 
although in that case, the temperature profiles at these points may not differ 
enough from those elsewhere to warrant the use of a separate set of monitors). 
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6.0 STERILITY MAINTENANCE 
The sterility of the Probe/Lander must be maintained and monitored after 
terminal sterilization until the completion of its mission. For the following 
discussion, the post-sterilization portion of the life cycle of the capsule is 
divided into three phases: the prelaunch phase, the launch/cruise phase, and 
the. separation/deployment phase. 
6.1 PRELAUNCH OPERATIONS 
In the prelaunch phase, the capsule undergoes storage, shipping, systems 
integration, and check-out tests, and final mating and checkout. Insofar as 
sterilization considerations are concerned, the key requirements are for 
shipping and storage provisions, means of post- sterilization repair and re-
placement, means of calibrating some of the scientific instruments, and means 
of monitoring the sterility of the capsule. The first three items are discussed 
in this section, and monitoring is discussed in paragraph 6.4. 
6. 1. 1 Storage and Shipping 
It is desirable to store the capsule/sterilization canister system after 
sterilization in a special chamber with metallic walls, with electrical 
connectors on its interior and exterior surfaces,to allow checkout of the 
capsule without removal from the chamber. Provisions should be made 
for flushing the inside of the chamber with ETO, for reduction of the 
external surface burden of the capsule. 
If the sterilization facility is not adjacent to the assembly building where 
the launch vehicle is erected and where the flight spacecraft is mated to 
it, so that the capsule/canister system has to be transported for some 
distance, it may be advisable to furnish a combination shipping and stor-
age container along the lines indicated in the preceding paragraph, with 
the additional requirements that the chamber now be portable and that it 
incorporate shock-isolation and other provisions to protect the capsule / 
canister system against any adverse transportation environment. 
6. 1. 2 Post-Sterilization Repair and Addition of Equipment 
The most serious problem of post-sterilization handling is that concerned 
with replacement or addition of components. If any element fails, the 
entire flight capsule can be replaced with a backup unit. The faulty com-
ponent in the prime capsule can then be replaced, and this unit can serve 
asa backup. On the other hand, if a radioisotope thermal electric gen-
erator (RTG) is used, it will be necessary to insert the unit in the flight 
capsule shortly before launch to reduce personnel hazard and to minimize 
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the loss of available energy through decay of the radiation source. Simi-
larly, if a critical component is characteristically incapable of withstanding 
heat sterilization, it must be sterilized by some other approved technique, 
and provisions must be made to add it to the assembly after vehicle steri-
lization. 
Four methods of aseptic entry into the sterilization canister and the Flight 
Capsule are possible in principle, although all still require detailed study. 
First, general access could be achieved in an ETO chamber large enough 
to accommodate the component replacement operation. The capsule would 
be installed in the chamber in such a way as to provide working area be-
tween itself and the floor of the chamber; all necessary tools and compo-
nents would also be brought into the chamber. ETO would then be intro-
duced. Technicians in clean isolated atmosphere suits, slightly pressurized 
for personnel safety, would enter through air locks. Special handling 
equipment would, of course, be required to install an RTG in order to 
ensure personnel protection. 
As another approach, the flight capsule could incorporate sealed compart-
ments which isolate payload elements in replaceable modules. After in-
stallation of the pre sterilized component( s), the hatch would be sealed, 
flushed with ETO and pressurized through appropriate hatch valves. (This 
procedure requires a waiver to the present policy of accepting only heat 
as a means for final sterilization, because in this instance ETO would be 
the means of resterilizing the previously sterilized inside surfaces of the 
compartments, the outside of the capsule, and the inside of the canister. ) 
In the case of an R TG unit, the required remote handling capabilities or 
special per sonnel protection would complicate the de sign and the mechanic s 
of this operation. 
As a third approach, access to small hatch covers could be provided by a 
suitable plastic or metal enclosure sealed around the hatch opening and 
equipped with work-through gloves. 
A fourth alternative would be the use of tunnel suits, which are large 
flexible plastic enclosures mounted in openings in the walls of the chamber, 
which would permit personnel located in the outside of the enclosures to 
enter the chamber and work on the capsule through the flexible plastic 
built-in arm! glove extensions. In practice, this particular method might 
pr'ove cumbersome because of the large suits, and the difficulty of achiev-
ing a good compromise between flexibility and assurance against rupture. 
Nonetheless, it combines some of the advantages of the first and second 
approaches, and may turn out to be the most practical alternative. 
In all of these approaches, the required fixutres, remote handling equip-
ment, tools, and ETO decontamination equipment have to be located in the 
sterile chamber, i. e., the working area. 
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6.1.3 Instrument Calibration 
The requirement to calibrate instruments after sterilization creates an-
other very difficult problem. For some measurements it is pos sible to 
enclose calibrating devices, say radiation sources, within the canister 
but external to the capsule. For others, such as temperature measure-
ments, it is relatively simple to apply a stimulus inside the canister but 
difficult to measure its intensity by a means more accurate than the basic 
instrument itself. For still others, such as pressure measurements, 
even the application of a stimulus represents a non-trivial problem. All 
devices used to apply stimuli or to measure them must themselves be 
qualified to the sterilization environment and installed either in the can-
ister (in such a way that they do not interfere with the deployment of the 
capsule), or within the capsule itself. 
Very little work appears to have been done in this area (none as a part of 
this study) so that it represents one of the most significant essentially 
unresolved problem areas associated with the development of a planetary 
lander. 
6.2 LAUNCH AND CRUISE 
During the launch and cruise phase, the capsule/canister system is subjected 
to a number of environments which may cause a break of sterility - - launch 
loads and vibration, separation shock, meteoroid impact, etc. At this stage, 
no means for remedial action is available, but the monitoring system must be 
capable of detecting any actual or potential break of sterility. 
6.3 CANISTER OPENING AND VEHICLE DEPLOYMENT 
The final critical phase where a capsule can become recontaminated is during 
sterilization canister opening and Probe/Lander deployment, which includes 
the depressurization of the canister, the opening of the canister lid, and then 
the deployment of the Probe /Lander. 
Although the external surfaces of the spacecraft and sterilization container may 
have been decontaminated prior to launch, viable organisms may still be on 
the system. During attitude control or during canister opening and venting, 
for example, additional organisms could be released with the gases expelled 
from the rockets and actuating devices, respectively. Also, gas plumes im-
pinging on external surfaces, structural loads, and vibrations can all shake 
loose any viable organisms present on the various unsterile surfaces into the 
surrounding space, from where they could be attracted to the Probe/Lander 
by electrostatic or electromagnetic fields, mass attraction, or as a result of 
simple random collision, solar wind and pressure, or van der Waals forces. 
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The probability of recontamination depends on the presence of viable organisms 
and their behavior in these environments. Additional work in this area must 
be performed to determine the magnitude of the problem and, if necessary, 
develop means for avoiding it. Also, techniques should be developed for flight-
qualifying the relevant subsystems specifically against these conditions, i. e. , 
for demonstrating that no recontamination via the above-mentioned mechanisms 
can occur. 
6.4 STERILIZATION MONITORING 
A monitoring system will be required to indicate whether flight-capsule sterility 
has been violated. Probably the most practical method of doing this during 
most of the mission is to use an indicator to show if pressure within the can-
ister has been maintained above ambient at all times. If pressure is lost, it 
must be assumed that sterilization has been violated. 
During flight-vehicle storage there are two possible approaches to maintain 
pressure above ambient. One is to pressurize the sterilization canister initially 
to a high enough pressure that for a specified storage life with nominal leakage 
rates the internal pressure will always remain above ambient. The other is to 
supply a reservoir of sterile gas that will maintain the internal pressure at a 
prescribed level above ambinet. For the first approach, with an external surface 
area of the sterilization canister of 1165 ft2 , with a volume of 3700 ft 3, and with 
an assumed molecular leakage area of 2. 5 x 10 -15 in. 2 lin. 2 of surface area, 
the initial pressure required in the sterilization container for 300 days storage 
would be 19.7 psia for nitrogen, 37.1 psia for helium. These amounts would 
also be sufficient to monitor the assembly subsequently through a 300 day flight 
time to the planet. For the other approach, if the differential pressure across 
the sterilization container were maintained at 1 psi through 300 days of storage 
and a 300 day flight to Mars, 43 pounds of nitrogen or 16 pounds of helium 
would be required as make-up gas. 
There are a number of approaches for detecting leaks in the system. In the 
case of the pressurized sterilization container with replenishable tank supply, 
the pressure decay itself is a measure of the leakage. Other means which can 
be used with either of the two approaches, depending on the gas used, are 
halogen and helium leak detectors, and gas analyzers. * (Such simple tests as 
detection of bubbles formed either from a soap film or as a result of immersion, 
are appropriate only for the prelaunch phase and not very reliable nor practical 
even then) . 
• It should ~ .pointed out that no off-the-shelf systems are available today for pressurization nor for leak detection 
under condluons comparable to those encountered during the sterilization cycle sO that these systems would have to 
be developed for this application. ' 
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After the venting process which precedes canister opening and capsule deploy-
TI1ent, pressure loss ceases to be an indication of possible recontaTI1ination. 
It would therefore be de sirable to have another TI1eans available to detect any 
iTI1pingeTI1ent of particles on the capsule. Although the iTI1pingeTI1ent of a single 
organisTI1 would clearly not be detected, sensitive iTI1pact sensors can detect 
the iTI1pingeTI1ent of relatively sTI1all aTI10unts of TI1atter at relatively low speeds, 
and any such iTI1pact could be construed to represent a potential recontaTI1ination 
situation. At present, however, it appears unlikely that TI1uch is to be gained 
by any concerted effort in this area, and that this effort could be spent TI10re 
fruitfully to deterTI1ine the likelihood of recontaTI1ination and, if necessary, 
devise TI1eans of avoiding it. 
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7.0 TRAINING 
The requirement for sterilization and burden control adds a new dimension to 
the design and manufacture of high reliability systems. To arrive at this new 
performance objective it will be necessary to reorient and train personnel, so 
that burden control and sterilization requirements can be satisfied in all phases 
of design, manufacturing, inspection, check-out, and test assembly. 
The inherent capability for sterilization must be designed into the system. The 
designers are responsible for selecting materials, components, finishes, and 
specifying processes which are compatible with the sterilization objectives. 
A study of the design manuals and the recommended-part/material lists will 
be part of the overall training, as will preferred processes recommended by 
sterilization and manufacturing specialists. The safety implications of the 
sterilization requirement must also be recognized during design phases. (For 
instance, pyrotechnic devices and rocket engines will have to be installed at 
the last moment to permit safe access to the system until the latest possible 
time. ) 
A Sterilization Control Board consisting of high-level management personnel 
with Government participation, must be established to evaluate and rule in 
matters associated with burden control and sterilization. It must approve 
allocated burden levels, assay routines, all procedures related to burden, as 
well as disposition of burden discrepancies and the necessary corrective actions 
associated with them. The personnel of this board will have to undergo a brief 
indoctrination program to acquire a proper understanding of the sterilization 
requirement and its implications. 
Quality control personnel must be educated to understand that burden control 
is another vital function which has a bearing on the inherent ability of a com-
ponent or system to satisfy its intended purpose. They must monitor the 
necessary documentation and the performance of individuals for adherence to 
methods and procedures, as they would for any other vital characteristic. New 
controls will have to be devised for monitoring any degradation in performance 
through the sterilization environments. A separate group of personnel will 
probably be charged solely with the responsibility for burden control. Sterili-
zation-control personnel will presumably be skilled in the biological sciences 
and techniques, but will have to be indoctrinated briefly into the other aspects 
of the program. The duties of the two groups will have to be defined clearly 
and explained to them. 
Manufacturing will require an unusually clear definition of detailed procedures, 
and a strict compliance with these procedures to ensure that they are not de-
viated from, with a potential increase in the allocated burden. Design of tool-
ing and handling fixtures must have as objectives the minimization and control 
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of burden. Handling methods must be regulated to ensure that material flow 
and storage is so arranged as to minimize burden accumulations. All this will 
require indoctrination of all personnel involved in these procedures. Clean-
room assembly and handling, where required, will necessitate a new area of 
procedures development, extensive training, and continuing reindoctrination 
in order to realize the maximum benefit from this expensive process. 
Vendors will have, in some instances, to be instructed in the need and methods 
for burden control. Assistance and training must be provided so that they will 
recognize the importance of contamination and be capable of monitoring burden 
contributing factors. They must also be educated to the required documentation. 
As a rule, however, it will be desirable to design the system and shape the 
program in such a way as to minimize and, if possible, eliminate all unique 
requirements on piece-part vendors (other than normal aerospace high-
reliability requirements with which the vendors are already familiar). 
The assembly and test process represent major sources of contamination. The 
personnel in assembly and test will therefore have to be instructed in the manner 
of handling material with a minimum of contamination to the equipment. This 
will include development of techniques for providing equipment exposure of 
minimum duration, and for the development of OSE that will reduce contact 
with the system during test to a minimum. Personnel must be instructed in 
the importance of documenting every handling experience and recording as sem-
bly and other exposure times in various areas. 
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8. ° OUTLINE OF STERILIZATION AND IMPLEMENTA TION PLAN FOR 
A PROBE (DESIGNED FOR ENTRY FROM ORBIT) 
Various alternative sterilization procedures and controls and the associated 
considerations have been considered earlier (see Sections 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, and 
5.0). The recommended sterilization plan for the probe designed for the EFO 
case is outlined in the following. 
8. 1 SYSTEM 
The Mars probe considered here is intended to collect and transmit scientific 
and engineering data concerning the Mars atmosphere down to impact after en-
tering from planetary orbit. A drawing of the probe, shown in Figure 36, can 
serve as a reference for the following discussion. The instrumentation and power 
supply, together with the associated telecommunications equipment, the inertial 
reference subsystem, the television cameras, and the parachute system, are 
mounted on an eight-truss spider payload structure and covered with an afterbOdy 
heat shield which protects the mounted payload during entry. This entire as sem-
bly is identified as the suspended capsule and is shown mounted on the inside of 
the entry shell. The entry shell is a I5-foot diameter cone-sphere consisting 
of a honeycomb core faced on the inner and outer surfaces with an aluminum 
skin. The forward exterior surface of the entry shell is covered with a protec-
tive ablation heat shield. 
Attitude and thrust-vector control systems are shown mounted on the entry shell 
and are connected electrically to the suspended capsule. This entire assembly, 
together with a system to permit separation of the entry shell and the suspended 
capsule, are identified as the entry vehicle. The entry vehicle, then, together 
with the necessary propellants and with its sterilization canister, comprise the 
flight capsule. (Since the landed capsule is nonsurvivable, there is no need for 
the impact-attenuation nor self-:r-ighting features which are part of the Probe/Lander 
designed for the EF AT case (see Section 9.0)). 
8.2 FACTORY OPERATIONS 
All fabrication and assembly can be conducted in conventional factory areas, with 
the exception of the parachute, which should be subjected to ETO during its pack-
aging. All components should undergo complete flight acceptance tests, including 
all mission-experienced environments, as well as ETO-cleaning and thermal-
sterilization environments, in accordance with the requirements of JPL specifi-
cation VOL-50503-ETS IO . Since the heat cycle is the most severe environment, 
this will be conducted first, eliminating marginal parts at the earliest possible 
opportunity. The remaining tests are then conducted, and ETO cleaning is per-
formed last. 
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The complete suspended capsule is as sembled as shown in Figure 37. Cabling 
harnesses are installed on the payload structure; the three major modules are 
assembled separately and concurrently, and are subsequently assembled to the 
structure. After all componentry is mounted and interconnected, the modules 
are subjected to ETO and sealed. Since the individual components had been 
sterilized previously by the flight acceptance test, the internal burden of the 
sealed module will be extremely low. 
Table XX details the processes shown in Figure 37, and also shows the accumu-
lated burden corresponding to each significant assembly level and the time re-
quired for each acti,rit":,r (vv'"hich includes associated subsyster.r-i testillg irlspection, 
etc.). The cure cycle of the entry-shell heat shield, which is quite severe 
(equivalent to a kill of up to 22D), series as the heat cycle for flight acceptance 
of that component. 
The completed flight capsule is subjected to the following_factory acceptance tests. 
Test 
Mass Parameter Determinatio 
Vibration 
Thermal Vacuum Functional (Space Simulation) 
RFI, Safety and Coznpatibility 
8.3 FIELD OPERA TIONS 
Time 
(weeks) 
3.0 
4.0 
3.5 
Subsequent to as sembly and factory acceptance, the flight capsule is shipped to 
the field, where validation checks are conducted at the receiving inspection site 
to ensure that no performance degradation has occurred since factory testing. 
The flight capsule now undergoes its final acceptance tests in the following se-
quence: 
Test 
Mass Parameter Determination (Flight Capsule) 
Thermal Vacuum Functional Check (Space Simulation) 
ETO - Ste17ilization 
Vibration 
Thermal Vacuum Functional Check (Space Simulation) 
RFI, Safety, Compatibility Check 
Total 
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Time 
(weeks) 
2.0 
4.0 
3.5 
3.0 
4.0 
3.5 
20.0 
1 
j 
I 
I 
1 
I 
" 
MODULE NO.1 
MODULE NO.2 
MODULE NO.3 
S 
E 
A 
L 
I 
N 
G 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
---------------~ 
BAYNO. 1 
MODULE NO.1 
DOPPLER ANTENNA 
UHF ANTENNA 
TRANSMITTER 
DIAGNOSTIC SENSOR 
SMOKE POTS 
SUSPENDED CAPSULE 
STRUCTURE, CABLING 
& BRACKETRY 
BAY NO.2 
PENETROfv1ETERS 
BAY NO.3 
MODULE NO.2 
RADAR ALTIMETER 
BETA SCATTER 
H20 DETECTOR 
BAY NO.4 
PENETROME:TERS 
DIAGNOSTIC SENSORS 
86-1287 
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BAY NO.5 
MODULE NO.3 
DOPPLER ANTENNA 
UHF ANTENNA 
TRANSMITTER 
SMOKE POTS 
BAY NO.6 
PENETROMETER 
DIAGNOSTIC SENSORS 
BAY NO.7 
PARACHUTE 
CENTER BAY 
TV AND ELECTRONICS 
ACS SUBSYSTEM 
FLI GHT SPACECRAFT 
ADAPTER ASSEMBLY 
PRESSURE SYSTEM 
ROCKET ENGINE 
BAY NO.8 
PENETROMETERS 
HEATSHIELD 
ADAPTER RING 
FLSC BACK 
UP RING 
STERILIZATION 
CANISTER LID 
UMBILICAL CONNECTION 
ACCESS POOR 
STERILIZATION 
CANISTER BASE 
FUNCTIONAL 
TESTING 
-ENTRY SHELL ) CURE AND MACHINE » > , 
STRUCTURE 
NOSE CAP 
ASSEMBLY 
SPIN ROCKETS 
PRESSURE TANKS 
REGULATOR 
S & I ASSEMBLY 
TRANSDUCER 
Figure 37 PROBE-ENTRY FROM ORBiT - FACTORY-TO-LAUNCH FLOW SEQUENCE 
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TABLE XX 
FACTORy...TO-LAUNCH FLOW SEOUENCE FOR PROBE 
'unctions Time-Weeks 
Per 
Title Assembly Test Activity Cumulative 
Payload Structure Installation of bracket :i Visual, dimensional, 2. 0 2. 0 
Cabling & Bracket snaking, forming and continuity and 
ing clamping of cables isolation 
Similar for all module ;1 · Visual dimensional 
Module 1 · Mechanical mounting · Continuity &. isolation 1.5 2. 0 
of electronic compon · Functional (per 
Module 2 ents · Vibration Module) 
· cabling and inter- · Thermal cycle 
Module 3 conn~cting Functional 
.ETO compatibility 
· Module sealing (Simulation) 
Doppler antenna Visual 
Bay 1 VHF antenna · Continuity & isolation 1.0 3.0 
Transmitter cabling · Functional 
Diagnostic Sensors · Compatibility 
Module -smoke pots · Pattern 
· Dimensional 
· Vibration 
· Compatibility 
Penetrometer cabling · Visual 
Bay 2 & bracketry · Continuity & isolation 0.25 3. 0 
· Functional 
· Dimensional 
Radar altimeter · Visual 
Bay 3 Beta scatter · Continuity &. isolation l.0 4. 0 
H20 detector · Functional 
Module 2 · Vibration 
Penetromete r cabling · Visual 
Bay 4 and bracketry · Continuity & isolation O. 25 4.0 
Diagnostic sensor s · Dimensional 
· Functional 
.-
Doppler antenna · Visual 
Bay 5 VHF antenna transmit! er · Dimensional 
cabling smoke pots · Continuity & isolation l.0 5. 0 
Module 3 · Functional 
· Pattern 
· Vibration 
-
Penetrometer cabling · Visual 
Bay 6 and brackets · Dimensional 
... -diagnosrt~ !l'l!n!lt'l1'S'" «_ ·;-Continutty &: isolarton . ....... O. Z5 - ----!t;l]--
· Functional 
Bay 7 Parachute assembly · Visual 1 6. 0 
· Continuity & isolation 
Center bay T. V. ACS subsystem Alignment check 
continuity &. isolation 1 7. 0 
functional simulation 
Penetrometer cabling · Visual 
Bay 8 and bracketry · Continuity & isolation O. 25 7. 0 
· Functional 
Rocket Engine · Visual 
Umbilical cabling · Alignment 
· Continuity & isolation 0.5 7.0 
System vibration mass 
Complete payload parameters space simu- 8-15 15-22 
lation functional 
R. F. I. safety 
, 
Mechanical fastening · Mating & Alignment 
cabling & bracketry · Dimensional 
Payload adapter disconnect umbilical · Functional continuity O. 5 15-22 
lanyard & separation · Pressure checks 
assy. · Compatability 
· Mass parameters 
Mechanical fastening · Functional 
Entry body cabling and bracketry · Continuity and 2 17-22 
suspended capsule to compatibility 
entry shell · Mass parameters 
Pyrotechnic s · Visual 
Ste rili zation Mechanical fastening · Pressure O. 8 17-22 
canister lid cabling and bracketry · Dimensional 
· Continuity & isolation 
Ste rilization ring Weld · Visual 1.0 18-23 
'Assembly to · Dimensional 
I canister lid 
ISterilization can- Mechanical installat ior, 
,ister base shell weld cabling 
· Visual 
· Dimensional l.0 19-24 
land door · Pressure 
F'inal burden ETO · Visual 
configuration · Continuity & isolation 19-30 38-54 
· System 
· Vibration 
· Mass parameters 
· R. F. I. and safety 
· Space simulation 
I Sterilize, see note :I 
I 
· Functional 
_L-. 
Note 1 - After ETO application 
Note 2 - After curing of heatshield -4 
Note 3 - Zero burden shown is considered as a probability of O. 3 x 10 
• 
Cumulativ~8 
Burden XIO 
Surface Occluded 
0.311 O. 005 
0.20 O. 015 
O. 20 O. 010 
O. 20 0.013 
See 
Note 1 
O. 345 O. 034 
0.371 O. 038 
0.371 O. 054 
0.412 O. 061 
0.465 0.090 
U. 1J91r .. - .. U.1)'1S· 
O. 520 O. 124 
see 
note 1 
O. 530 O. 127 
O. 555 O. 133 
0.581 0.136 
0.691 O. 150 
1. 116 O. 302 
(See note (See note 2) 
2) 
--
--
--
i 
0 0.314 
I 
see I 
note 3 
0 0 
8.4 BURDEN CONTROL 
Sufficient assays will be conducted early in the program in accordance with the 
established criteria to verify that the component burden allocations are not ex-
ceeded. Subsequently, burden control is accomplished by monitoring the manu-
facturing and handling environments to assure that they do not deteriorate to the 
point where they lead to exce s sive burden accumulation (see Sections 3.0 and 
4.0). Burden control during and after terminal sterilization will be effected in 
the manner described in Section 5.0 and 6.0. 
8. 5 FACILITY, TIME, AND MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS 
The facility and manpower requirements are summarized in Tables XXI, XXII, 
and XXIII. (In keeping with the study ground rule s, the facility requirements 
have been treated in somewhat more detail for the probe/lander designed for 
the EFAT case; the discussion in paragraph 9.3 of the type of unique facilities 
required is equally valid for the probe (designed for the EFO case). 
TABl E XXI 
FACILITY AND fv'ANPOWER SUfv'MARY FOR PROBE 
SPACE 
Area 
Location ~ 
----
Factory 162,000 
Field 43, 800 
total 205, 800 
NUMBER OF ASSEMBLY LINES':' 
£:actory Quantity Field Quantity 
Suspended capsule assen_bly and test 7 Disasserrtbly and test -
Flight capsule assembly and test 3 Assembly and test -
Entry shell assembly and test 3 Acceptance testing 3 
OVERALL TIME MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS 
TiTTle 
Location (weeks) Location Man Years 
Factory 33.5 Factory 253 
Field -~ Field -~ 
total 59.0 total 315 
------
~:(For assumed delivery requireITIents of one capsule per month for a total of 12 units. 
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TABLE XXII 
FACILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR PROBE 
FACTORY FIELD 
Area Area 
Activity (sq tt) Activity (sq tt) 
Receiving and stores 42,000. Receiving inspection and verification 10,000. 
Receiving inspection 33,000. Testing 
Suspended capsule asseIIlbly 38,600. ETO and sterilization 4,000. 
Flight capsule asseIIlbly 15,600. Acceptance testing 27,800. 
Entry shell asseIIlbly 5,000. Assay laboratory 2,000. 
COIIlbined test area 27,800. 
Total 162,000. Total 43,800. 
Note: 1. EnvironInental conditions are conventional unless otherwise specified. 
2. Fabrication areas not included. 
TABLE Y_'CIII 
• 
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS FOR PROBE 
FACTORY FIELD 
Activity Quantity Activity Quantity 
Receiving and stores 20 Receiving inspection and 
Receiving inspection 70 verification testing 25 
Suspended capsule asseIIlbly 140 ETO and sterilize 5 
Flight capsule asseIIlbly 35 Acceptance testing 65 
Entry shell assembly 20 Assay laboratory 
...M. 
COIIlbined test area 2.i 
Total 360 Total 115 
-12~-
9. 0 OUTLINE OF STERILIZA TION AND IMPLEMENTATION ·PLAN FOR 
A PROBE/LANDER DESIGNED FOR ENTRY FROM THE 
APPROACH TRAJECTORY 
9. 1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The Probe/ Lander (Flight Capsule) shown in Figure 38 is intended to land a pay-
load on the surface of Mars after entering the atITlosphere froITl an approach tra-
jectory. Scientific and engineering observations are ITlade during descent and 
on the surface. 
The landed asseITlbly consists of a payload housed in an iITlpact attenuator that 
perITlits the payload to survive landing forces. The landed capsule, the para-
chute systeITl, the electronics, and the associated structure ITlake up what is 
defined as the suspended capsule. This as seITlbly is ITlounted on an entry shell 
consisting of a berylliuITl-faced honeycoITlb structure covered by an ablative 
shield for protection against entry heating; SOITle eleITlents of the attitude-control 
systeITl are also ITlounted on the shell. The entire asseITlbly with a !':J.v propulsion 
systeITl is encapsulated in a sterilization canister to ITlake up the flight capsule. 
9.2 BASIC ASSEMBLY/TEST CYCLE 
The sterilization plan provides for suspended capsule asseITlbly and test in a 
Class 100 CleanRoom. All other operations are conducted in conventional faci-
lities with norITlal environITlents. After final asseITlbly operations at the field 
site, the flight capsule surfaces are decontaITlinated with ETO, and it is then 
subjected to therITlal sterilization (dry heat). The flow of activities is described 
by Figure 39. All suspended capsule cOITlponents are decontaminated by ETO 
following receiving inspection, prior to introduction into the Class 100 Clean-
Room. After asseITlbly and test, the landed capsule is subjected to another ETO 
cleaning prior to sealing. 
The long-duration high-teITlperature cure cycle required to ITlanufacture the entry 
shell substantially exceeds sterilization requireITlents and serves to decontaminate 
its interior. Only surface burden will accuITlulate on this unit during the instal-
lation of auxiliary equipITlent of the attitude-control and spin-rocket systeITls and 
during handli~g and shipITlent to the final-asseITlbly site in the field. 
At the field site all systeITls are subjected to rigiorous environITlental testing as 
part of the receiving inspection. After as seITlbly, the cOITlpleted capsule is 
cleaned with ETO, sealed. sterilized in the prescribed ITlanner, subjected to 
systeITl acceptance tests. and is then ready for launch-integration activities. 
A block diagraITl of the details of the suspended capsule as seITlbly is shown by 
Figure 40. Table XXIV lists the asseITlbly and test functions and presents an 
estiITlate of the tiITle required to perforITl theITl. 
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Figure 39 PROBE/LANDER-ENTRY tROM THE APPROACH TRAJECTORY-
FACTORY - TO - LAUNCH FLOW SEOUENCE 
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TABLE XXIV 
APPROACH TRAJECTORY--ASSEMBL Y AND TEST SEQUENCE FOR PROBE/LANDER 
Functions 
Level of Assembly Assembly Test 
All components and structures are subjected 
to ETO cycle prior to introduction into 
assemblv area 
1. 
Central control and sequencer · Mechanical mtg. of electronic · Visual 
equipment. · Dimensional 
· Cabling · Continuity lit isolation 
· Functional 
D. 1. 4. 6 
· Vibration 
2.. 
Internal science payload · Mechanical mtg. of electronic · Visual 
equipment · Dimensional 
· Mechanical mtg. of scientific · Continuity lit isolation 
equipment · Functional 
· Mtg. of Mechanical equipment 
· Plumbing 
B. 1. 4. 7 · Cabling 
3. 
Power and cont:rol subsystem · Mechanical mtg. of electronic · Visual 
equipment · Continuity lit isolation 
B. 1. 4. 8 · Cabling · Functional 
4. 
Time and data a.utomation · Mechanical mtg. of electronic · Visual 
equipment · Continuity lit isolation 
· Cable · Functional 
B. 1. 4. 9 
· Compatibility 
5. 
Communication!, subsystem · Mechanical mtg. of electronic · Visual 
equipment 
· Continuity lit isolation 
· Cabling · Functional 
B. 1. 4. 10 
· Compatibility 
6. 
Antenna assembly · Mechanical mtg. of electronic 
· Visual 
equipment 
· Continuity lit isolation 
· Cabling · Compatibility 
B.1.4.ll 
· Pattern 
7. 
Lander payload assembly {structure, · Mechanical mtg. 
· Visual 
instrumentation, power supply and · Cabling · Continuity lit isolation 
~,~-....18]cu:gwmluJiCi:.i~g:tlll ... ~-''''''''~'''~'«';"", '-'''''' .... -_._.# -- · Phu~R~.~", ·~<"1 .. ·¥'~~m.u.M 
. ,"--· ETO (after testing) · Compatibility 
· Vibration 
B. 1. 4 
· Mass Parameters 
8. 
Impact attenuator 
· Bonding · Visual 
· Cabling · Continuity lit isolation 
B. 1. 2 
· Pyrotechnics · Bond Integrity 
9. 
Flotation subsystem Mechanical mtg. Visual continuity 
bonding pressure check 
plumbing 
B. 1. 3 cabling 
TOT AL LANDED CAPSU LE 
External science payload 
· Mechanical Mtg. of scientific · Visual, Dimensional 
electronic equipment 
· Continuity lit isolation 
B. 1. 1.5 
· Cabling · Limited functional 
Propulsion and attitude 
· Mounting of mechanical parts · Visual, Dimensional 
· Mechanical mtg. of electronic · Continuity 
components 
· Pressure 
· Cabling · Vibration 
· Plumbing · Functional 
B. 1. 1.6 
· Alignment 
Descent retardation system (parachute) · Mechanical mounting 
· Visual 
Bl. 1.7 · Cabling · Continuity lit isolation 
External payload assembly · Mechanical 
· Visual dimensional 
· Plumbing 
· Continuity lit isolation 
· Cabling 
· Limited functional 
· Mechanical mtg. of electronic 
B. I; 1 parts 
1-' 
SUIJpended capsula 
· All assembly completed in prior • Visual 
operations • Continuity 
· After testing. ETO, WRAP 
· System 
· Fixture and crate • Vibration 
• Mass parameters 
· RFI lit safety 
B.l 
• Thermal vacuum 
• Functional 
*BIJrden with Speeial Handling of Parachute 
Time - Weeks 
Per Activity Cumulative 
1.0 1.0 
1.0 2. 0 
1.0 3. 0 
1.0 3. 0 
1.0 3. 0 
1.0 3. 0 
6. 0 9. 0 
~-.'" 
O. 5 9. 5 
O. 5 10.0 
1.0 11. 0 
1.5 11. 0 
O. 5 11. 5 
2. 0 13.5 
8. 0 21. 5 
• 
9. 3 FA CILITY REQUIREMENTS 
A summary of estimates made of the space, number of assembly lines, duration 
of assembly. and the man years required to assemble the Probe/ Lander system 
is given in Table XXV. 
Extensive facilities are required for the fabrication, assembly, inspection, test 
and acceptance of the sterilization canister. entry shell, and other major com-
ponents. They are generally available at qualified sources for these items. 
A pilot plant is required at some location (not necessarily the basic fabrication! 
assembly site, nor the final-assembly field site) to provide environmental con-
ditions suitable for conducting experiments to 1) establish detailed specifications 
to define the conditions for conducting assembly (including testing) of hardware 
which requires microbial burden control, 2) devise methods and procedures for 
controlling the assembly and test procedures to reduce and control microbial 
burden. 3) validate the assumptions used in burden allocations, including the 
values used for handling and fallout rates, 4) determine the amount of handling 
required and the assembly cycle times for processing hardware in a clean-room 
environment, and 5) develope methods of post-sterilization reworking of com-
ponents without violating their sterility. 
These objectives can be met by conducting a series of controlled experiments 
and operations that will simulate the methods that are planned for actual assem-
blies under various environmental conditions. This will permit the complete 
evaluation of all variables affecting the assembly operation, will furnish realistic 
values of burden accumulation, and permit accurate identification of the role 
.that assembly environment contributes to burden. It will result in criteria for 
facility designs and for the development of assembly and test procedures to 
furnish the required degree of burden control with minimum cost and schedule 
penalties. 
An assay laboratory will be required to support all activities conducted during 
assembly of operational capsules. It can serve to evaluate the process, includ-
ing the controls imposed on it, by continual assays. The laboratory must be 
staffed with personnel skilled in the biological monitoring of fabrication/ assembly 
activities and the environments in which they take place. and equipped with all 
necessary means for conducting assays. Typical major items of special equip-
ment types include Royco airborne particle counters and digital printers. Ander-
son Air' Samplers, and Velometers. A similar laboratory will be required at 
the final-assembly site. 
The special facilities required at the assembly and field sites are listed in Table 
XXVI. 
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SPACE 
Factory 
Field 
Total 
OVERALL TIME 
Factory 
Field 
Total 
TABLE XXV 
FACILITY AND MANPOWER SUMMARY FOR 
PROBE/lANDER 
NUMBER OF ASSEMBLY LINES** 
88, 000 sq ft Factory 6 
104, 000 sq ft Field 3 
192, 000 sq ft* 
MANPOWER REQUIREMENT 
13.5 weeks Factory 112.5 ITlan years 
19.0 weeks Field 60.0 ITlan years 
32.5 weeks Total 172. 5 ITlan year s 
* Including 49, 200 sq ft of clas s 100 area. 
** AssuITling delivery requireITlents of one capsule per ITlonth for a total of 12 . 
e • 
Item 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
-
12. 
13. 
Notes: 
TABLE XXVI 
SPECIAL FACILITIES 
Description Factory Field 
Rate tables and associated instru-
mentation to support component 
acceptance. X 
Vibration facility (sinusoidal and 
random) to support component 
acceptance. X 
Vibration facility to test assemblies 
to support sizes up to flight capsule. X 
Mas s parameter facility (Pelton lOB 
or equivalent). X 
Space simulator. X 
ETO chamber. X 
NTD equipment. X 
RF screen room. X 
As say laboratory. X 
Data reduction facilities to analyze 
system test results. X 
Manufacturing process laboratory. X 
Quality verification laboratory X 
Rework and post-sterilization 
Aseptic entry facility. 
--
Assembly of suspended r.apsule to be conducted in 
Class_lOO Clean-Room. 
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X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
--
--
X 
9.4 SPACE, MANPQWER,AND TIME REQUIREMENTS 
Estimates of space and manpower requirements are listed in Table XXVII and 
XXVIII. The total field assembly time is shown in Table XXIX, and it may be seen 
that the major portion of this time is due to the tests that have to be conducted 
on the systems involved. 
TABLE XXVII 
SPACE REQUIREMENTS FOR PROBE/LANDER 
Factory 
Receiving inspection and stores 
Suspended capsule assembly and test 
Assay Laboratory 
total 
Area - sq. ft. 
28,400 
52,400 
88,800 
Field Final As sembly 
Activity 
Receiving and stores 
Receiving inspection and test 
Flight capsule assembly and test 
ETO and sterilization 
Assay Laboratory (Class 100 
Clean-Room) 
Area - sq.ft. 
14,400 
18,400 
67,200 
2, 000 
2,000 
total 104,000 
This facility is designed to support assembly lines In parallel. Environmental conditions are conven·· 
tional except for 39, 200 sq. ft. of assembly area and in the assay laboratory which are class 100 
clean rooms. Fabrication areas not included. 
TABLE XXVIII 
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS FOR PROBE/LANDER 
Factory (Suspended Capsule Assembly) 
Activity 
Receiving inspection and stores 
Assembly and inspection 
Test 
Assay laboratory 
total 
Quantity 
88 
192 
56 
60 
396 
Field (Final Capsule Assembly) 
Activity 
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Receiving inspection and stores 
Assembly and inspection 
Test 
Assay laboratory 
total 
Quantity 
24 
70 
40 
~ 
150 
-----------------
TABLE XXIX 
FIELD ASSEMBLY TIME FOR PROBE/LANDER 
Activity 
Receiving inspection 
Entry shell and suspended capsule 
assernbly 
Mass parameter check 
Add sterilization canister and after-
body heat shields 
Mass parameter check 
Therrnal vacuum functional check 
(space sirnulation) 
ETO - Sterilization 
Vibration 
Therrnal vacuum functional check 
(space sirnulation) 
R. F. 1. safety. cornpatibility check 
total 
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Tirne 
(weeks) 
1.5 
2.5 
2.0 
3.5 
2.0 
4.0 
3.5 
3.0 
4.0 
3.5 
29.5 
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APPENDIX A 
EFFECTS OF THE STERILIZATION PROCESS 
ON MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS 
The sterilization requirements serve to add two hostile environments. ETO and 
dry heat to all the others which the system has to resist and/or under which it 
has to perform. A considerable amount of work has been done on the ETO- and 
heat-susceptibility of parts and components for planetary-probe applications. 
most of it by Jet Propulsion Laboratory or under its sponsorship. Much work 
remains to be done along these lines before all the required elements are quali-
fied before a list of preferred parts. materials and processes can be generated. 
and before a set of design guide lines covering fastening. sealing. tolerances. 
lubrication. etc.. can be formulated. 
Some of the more fundamental implications of ETO- and heat-exposure are 
summarized in this appendix. 
1. 0 ETHYLENE OXIDE 
An ethylene oxide (ETO) mixture containing IZ percent ethylene oxide and 88 
percent Freon IZ or Genetron IZ. by weight. has been defined as the deconta-
minating gas for planetary/probe applications in the applicable specification. 11 
The mechanism by which ethylene oxide kills micro-organisms has been linked 
to its chemical activity as an alkylating agent. lZ It replaces labile hydrogen 
atoms present in carboxyl. ameno. sulfhydryl and hydoryl groups with hydroxy-
. ethyl (-CHZCHZOH) groups. thereby blocking many reactive groups participat-
ing in es sentially metabolic reactions. 
1. I Plastic Materials 
The ability of ethylene oxide to react with labile hydrogen makes it a poten-
tially hazardous material for prolonged contact with polymers such as ep-
oxys. Amine. which are commonly used as curing agents in epoxy systems, 
are vulnerable to attack by ETO. ETO can also participate in a nu:mber of 
reactions with compounds com.monly found in other commercial materials. 
such as fillers. plasticizers. and residual processing solvents. Other 
rna,terials, such as metal and metallic oxides, serve to catalyze the poly-
merization of ETO. 
Reaction with ETO can greatly modify the physical characteristics of a mate-
rial. The overall change in properties of materials which are reactive or 
contain reactive constituents depends on the amount of reactive material 
available and the permeability of the material to ETO • 
. A-3 
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NQI FILMED, 
Freon 12. the commonly used ETO diluent. does not react chemically with 
the silicones nor epoxys tested so far. It does have solvent properties. l3 
and a sma1l amount of swelling or crazing may be experienced with some 
materials. especially after extended exposure at 104 0 F. Elastometers ex-
perience pronounced swelling after prolonged contact with liquid Freon 12. 
and in a series of exposures performed by DuPont 14 Viton A showed 10 per-
cent linear swell. and Viton B a 9 percent linear swell. Other materials. 
such as neoprene. showed a shrinkage which is probably because of leach-
ing of the plasticizers by Freon solvent action. Neither the materials test-
ed nor the test conditions should decompose the Freon; therefore. reactive 
decomposition products should not have been present to react with the tested 
materials. 
In general. there are many significant variables involved in the compatibil-
ity of some materials with ETO. so that a determination of this compatibil-
ity is difficult and time consuming. One report describing JPL-sponsored 
testing. 15 points out how mechanical data fails to establish a clear pattern 
of behavior for epoxy and phenolic laminates as a result of gas and heat 
exposure; while laminate NS (phenolic) gains 34 percent in flexural strength. 
micarta 238 (another phenolic material) loses 5.5 percent. This informa-
tion is summarized in Table A-I. which is reproduced from this report. 
Property changes may apparently be because of other than a direct inter-
action of the sterilant gas with the base polymer. such as: (1) state-of-
cure because the dry heat cycle may serve as a further cure for test mate-
rials and increase their mechanical strength. (2) plasticizer effect. be-
cause the sterilant gas may diffuse into the test materials and act as a 
plasticizing agent. and (3) impurity reactions. because physical and/ or 
chemical reactions of sterilant gas with impurities in the materials may 
produce property changes. 
An Avco- sponsored program 16 to determine properties of heat-shield mate-
rials exposed to ETO and heat sterilization revealed changes that could 
significantly affect the thermal and structural effectiveness of the entry 
shell (see paragraph 2. 1). 
1. 2 Lubricants 
The need for lubricants or low-friction films in any of the components re-
qui'res careful attention. because the reaction with the chemical sterilant 
must now be considered. in addition to the severity of space environments 
imposed on any lubricant. Many lubricants. by their nature. are suscepti-
ble to such reactions. although no specific data appears to be available. 
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U1 
Material 
FG 9ILD 
Fiberglass -Phenolic 
Laminate NS 
Phenolic 
Laminate 500-J 
Epoxy 
Micarta LE221 
Micarta 238 
Phenolic 
Micarta GX 
Epoxy 
Miearta H-5834 
Phenolic 
Micarta 8457 G-D 
XP-206 
Epoxy 
------ ----- -----
• 
TABLE A-I 
MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF MATERIALS EXPOSED TO 
STERILANT GAS AND HEAT CYCLING 
Change 
Exposure Tensile Tensile FLexural 
Strength Strength Strength 
(psi x 10 3) (percent) (psixl03) 
As received 32.0 55.4 
Gas exposure':' 35. 1 +9.6 61. 0 
Gas exposure + heat cycle 29.8 -7.0 54.1 
As received 6.39 8. 70 
Gas exposure + heat cycle 6.70 +4.8 11.80 
As received 47.5 79.4 
Gas exposure + heat cycle 47.4 .. 2.1 91. 0 
As received 8.6 16.5 
Gas exposure + heat cycle 9.3 + 8.1 15.0 
As received 10.8 18.0 
Gas exposure + heat cycle 11.5 + 6.5 17.9 
As received 55.1 96.0 
Gas exposure + heat cycle 58.0 + 5.2 94.6 
As received 52.1 64.3 
Gas exposure + heat cycle 51. 3 - 1. 54 68.5 
As received 45.0 62.8 
Gas exposure + heat cycle 46.0 + 2.22 60.2 
As received 42.2 12. 1 
Gas exposure + heat cycle 47.5 + 5.1 11. 2 
--------
':' Gas Exposure: 12 percent ETO, 88 percent Freon 12,-24 hours at 74 OF + 24 hours at 104°F 
• 
Change Change 
Flexural Elastic Elastic 
Strength Modulus Modulus 
(percent) (percent) 
+ 10. 1 2.90 
--
-
2.5 2.79 
0.260 
+ 34.4 0.405 + 56 
3.48 
I + 14.6 3. 54 + 1. 7Z 
0.755 
-
9 0.781 + 3.45 
I 
0.905 
I 
-
5.5 0.933 + 3. 1 
3.05 
- 1.45 2.64 -13.4 
3. 29 
+ 6.5 3. 16 -3.98 
2.81 
-
4.1 2.94 + 4.6 
2.27 
-
7.4 2.36 + 4 
I 
. 
1. 3 Metals 
ETO effects on metals can be determined more easily, because metals are 
not so process-sensitive, and their physical properties are more readily 
controlled, leading to more uniform products than is the case with plastics. 
Only relatively few metals and coatings may have questionable performance 
in ETO exposure; these include copper, brass, bronze (some alloys), mer-
cury alloys, magnesium alloys, and phosphate and anodic coatings':'. 
In general, if ETO exposure becomes a problem with these materials, suffi-
cient exposure protection can be provided, or the relatively minor perform-
ance degradation at presently proposed chemical sterilant concentrations 
and temperatures can be accepted or taken into account by means of in-
creased design factors. The surface of the metal must, however, be in 
the proper condition; certain contaminants such as dirt, rust or other for-
eign coatings which include chemical traces from prior processing could 
result in reactions ranging from increased property degradation to explo-
sion. 
1.4 Processes 
The processes utilized in cleaning, plating, painting and chemical prepara-
tion of adhesives, etc., have a significant bearing on the ETO-susceptibility 
of the given component. Not only can traces of certain impurities create 
conditions of incompatibility with ETO, but in some cases these impurities 
could even create an explosive situation. This is particularly true if acety-
lene from prior processing is allowed to remain as a residual trace at the 
time of ETO cleaning. Many conventional manufacturing processes, such 
as soldering, particle- and leak-detection inspection, tend to leave some 
residue. 
Another problem is that certain agents, such as copper sulfate or sodium 
chloride salts which may be deposited through hand contacts, will tend to 
crystalize if permitted to remain on the surface, creating an ETO-imper-
meable encapsulation of any spores which happen to be on the surface. 
These processes and the subsequent cleaning and treatment cannot be left 
to standard manufacturing practice, but must be developed and evaluated in 
actual operation with ETO decontamination and be detailed as part of the 
de sign definition . 
Caution is advised in utilizing some existing compatibility summaries which include inappropriate early test results not 
based on pertinent ETO mixtutes or exposutes; use of this information could cause unfounded rejection of an otherwise 
suitable candidate material. 
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1. 5 Packaging Design 
Designs must provide for ETO access to all areas requiring chemical clean-
ing. This access may be by direct exposure or through the use of mate-
rials permeable to ETO. Care must be employed to avoid the entrapment 
of the chemical sterilant that would result in local areas (pockets) of pro-
longed exposure to or even retention of the ETO. The total amount of ETO 
retained by structures and components and subsequently released during 
the heat sterilization cycle could be appreciable; it must be held down to 
an irreducible minimum, and its continuing corrosive or debilitating effects 
must be taken into consideration or provision must be made for its evacua-
tion. 
The use of integrated monolithic circuits represents one form of packaging 
that will protect many parts from a chemical exposure that they might not 
otherwise survive. 
The parachute is inherently a major contributor to flight capsule contamina-
tion if conventional packing techniques are used. The use of ETO cleaning 
during the packing process can reduce the burden by a factor of about 
la, 000. In the final stages of parachute packing, handfolding is supplement-
ed by machine ramming for compacting. A housing can be provided which 
covers the partially folded parachute and the mechanical ram. This hous-
ing would accoIl1Il1odate an ETO environment for chemical cleaning and 
would include glove ports and transparent areas to permit the necessary 
visual and manual access. The ETO shield would be 3 feet in diameter and 
50 to 100 feet long, terminating in a 6-foot cube at the machine end. 
2.0 HEAT 
The heat sterilization requirement not only places a severe demand on the mate-
rials and components of the flight capsule individually, but also leads to a strin-
gent requirement for thermal compatibility of materials in contact with each 
other. These factors are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
2. I Plastic Materials 
Many encapsulating and potting materials will be used in the flight capsule. 
Prpper formulations must be developed to result in the required thermal 
compatibility of these materials with the encapsulated or potted parts to 
ensure that the parts are not crushed during the heat cycle. 
Heat shield and heat-shield bond performance is also influenced to some 
extent by the sterilization exposure, despite the fact that curing tempera-
tures are expected to be considerably more severe. Six heat- shield mate-
rials were examined in an Avco-sponsored study, 16 Armstrong 2755 Cork, 
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Avcoat 8021, Delrin 150, Thw-Corning Silicone 2048, Flexible Epoxy 
291 - 59 -12 and NASA Purple Blend, which were chosen because they have 
desirable properties for use on planetary probes and landers. The objec-
tive was to evaluate the materials after exposure to both the chemical and 
heat environments. Each material was exposed to one ETO and three heat 
cycles. The ETO cycle involved the exposure of the materials to an at-
mosphere at 1040 F and a 35 percent relative humidity containing 500 mg/ 
liter of ethylene oxide. Each heat cycle involved heating from ambient at 
the rate of 10F per minute up to 293°F, maintaining this temperature for 
40 hours, and cooling at the rate of 10 F per minute down to ambient. 
The results are summarized in Table A-2. It may be observed that five 
of these materials had significant changes in properties that could affect 
the composite properties of the entry shell. The weight loss reported for 
Armstrong 2755 cork could have a significant effect on the mass-parameter 
characteristic s of the entry vehicle. The other property changes would have 
to be taken into account in the design to avoid the possibility of mission im-
pairment. The weight loss is believed to be because of the loss of a polyol 
plasticizer which is reported to be 10 percent by weight of the material, 
and of some residual moisture in the cork. A modification of the material 
could possibly be made by either eliminating the plasticizer or replacing 
it with a less volatile substitute that will minimize the weight loss. The 
changes in the other propertie s of Armstrong 2755 cork are significant but 
may not be detrimental to the mechanical performance of the material; 
they may actually increase the thermal compatibility with structural 
materials. 
The improvement in properties exhibited by Dow-Corning Silicone 2048 and 
NASA Purple Blend was attributed to the fact that the materials involved 
were insufficiently cured prior to dry-heat sterilization at 293 0 F, so that 
the sterilization cycle served to complete the curing process. The Dow-
Corning Silicone 2048 was cured by the vendor prior to shipment to Avco 
and the Purple Blend was cured per NASA I S recommendations at Avco. 
These tests serve as an illustration of the need for further attention in this 
area, specifically to the standardization of fabrication processes, methods 
and controls, in order to furnish predictable repeatable physical charac-
teristics after heat sterilization. 
2.2 Metals 
Metals are not likely to represent a problem; there is extensive data on 
the physical characteristics under elevated temperatures, although hot- or 
cold-worked alloys with residual stresses may require attention, depend-
ing on the magnitude and location of the stresses; whenever possible, these 
should be relieved before final sterilization. Some light-metal alloys may 
experience metallurgic changes, with an attendant change in properties, 
which are not necessarily always reversible. 
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TABLE A-2 
HEAT-SHIELD MATERIAL EVALUATION SUMMARY 
Annstrong 2755 Cork 
Avcoat 8021 
Delrin 150 
Dow Corning Silicone 2048 
Flexible Epoxy 691-59-12 
NASA Purple Blend 
a. Significant changes in tensile 
properties and thermal strain. 
b. Weight loss. of 14.7 percent. 
a. Significant loss in tensile properties. 
b. Specific heat increased 20 percent. 
a. Total strain to failure decreased 
96 percent at 300 0 F. 
b. Therznal conductivity increased 
15 percent at 250 0 F. 
Iznproved tensile properties at -100 and 
75°F. 
No significant changes. 
a. 
b. 
c. 
,~ 
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Itnproved tensile properties. 
Increased thertnal strain. 
Decreased therznal conductivity 
14 percent at 250 0 F. 
The primary consideration associated with metal usage relates to relative 
expansion rates which, if not compatible, can result in buckling, cracking, 
warping or other temporary or even permanent distortion. This is parti-
cularly important in the cases where relative movement of parts is re-
quired, as in a deployment device, or where precise alignment reference 
must be maintained to satisfy mission objectives. 
2.3 Processes 
The major impact of heat sterilization on processes is in the necessity for 
strict compliance with all special requirements. Cure cycles for plastic 
materials and bonds must be adequate and properly executed to assure 
strength and uniformity, and to minimize the amount of contamination and 
deposition resulting from excessive outgassing during sterilization. Stress-
relieving on structural elements must be complete, to ensure against 
cracks or fractures during the heat cycle, as indicated previously. 
2.4 Packaging Design 
The requirement for heat sterilization complicates the existing packaging 
problems considerably and also adds new ones. The parachute, for ex-
ample, requires transmission of heat through the compacted parachute 
material, which has very low conductivity; to ensure complete thermal 
saturation within a reasonable time, and to prevent other flight-capsule 
items from being overexposed, the parachute package may have to be de-
signed to permit thermal access to the package interior, or an internal 
heater inside the parachute may have to be used. This must not interfere 
with the extraction and deployment of the parachute, however. Similar con-
siderations apply to other poor thermal conductors. 
The flight capsule consists of a great many sealed and pressurized units, 
the biggest one of which is the sterilization canister itself, and the need 
to protect some parts and components from ETO tends to increase the 
number of sealed containers beyond that which would be used without this 
requirement. During the heating cycle every container becomes a pres-
sure vessel and requires appropriate packaging to handle the pressure 
differences. 
Propellants, squibs, and other explosive materials need protection against 
the degrading effects of elevated temperatures. The packaging of these 
and other devices, which normally involves"O" rings, gaskets and flexible 
bellow devices must be examined to determine its adequacy at elevated 
temperatures, particularly when these devices have been subjected pre-
viously to an ETO cleaning cycle. 
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2.5 Interaction Between Components 
In developing components care should be exercised that individual elements 
found to have acceptable tolerance to heat, or ETO, do not have degrading 
effects on each other when exposed in combination. Typical of this pos-
sibility is: (l) the combining of gases released from plastics wiL'llubri-
cants to cause corrosive conditions, (2) swelling of parts restricting mo-
tions, and (3) fogging of lenses. 
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APPENDIX B 
BURDEN CALCULATION TECHNIQUES 
The purpose of this appendix is to furnish additional details of the burden cal-
culations discussed in Section 3.0; both in general terms, and specifically 
oriented to the two flight capsules considered herein. The relevant physical 
characteristics of these two capsules are summarized herein for ready 
reference. 
1. 0 MANUAL BURDEN CALCULATION 
A manual calculation of the burden was performed for the probe /lander In 
Part I of the study, using the following approach: 
1) All parts and components initially used in the assembly of the flight 
capsule are identified with respect to surface area, material, and volume. 
2) Based on what is known of the manufacturing techniques and materials 
used, an estimate is made of the burden on each of the parts and compo-
nents, prior to the time that assembly of the parts into larger elements is 
started. This burden may take the form of internal burden (where it is 
within the material which makes up a part), occluded burden (where it is 
trapped between mating surfaces or enclosed in a container), or surface 
burden (where the burden is exposed to surface decontamination techniques). 
3) A chart is developed which shows the sequence of assembly of all the 
parts and components into the completed system (see, for instance, Figure 
B-1). 
4) At each point of the assembly where a distinct process takes place, 
the burden added as a function of the process is estimated. As this series 
of estimates continues, a final burden estimate is reached at the last step 
of assembly (where the capsule is sealed within its sterilization canister), 
which includes the initial burden which was on each part before the assem-
bly process started, as well as that which was added during assembly. 
Listed in Table B-1 are the assumptions used for the burden estimates for 
this case. In addition to these general assumptions, it has been assumed 
that the burden on the surfaces and interior of certain common parts are as 
shown in Table B-2, in order to simplify repetitive type calculations. These 
values are based on data obtained from experimentation, and are considered as 
the best data available at the time of the analysis for purposes of generating 
an over -all burden count. 
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TABLE B-1 
ASSUMPTIONS FOR MANUAL BURDEN ESTIMATE 
1. Nonclean-Room Environment 
1. The settling rate of microorganisms is 200 PCI square foot per hour durlng 
normal shop activity. (Table Y of reference 1, Number of Microorganisms 
settling per square foot per hour in Test Area, indicates microbial fallout rate 
under several conditions, including general factory area. Total values of fallout 
here ranged from 81 to 418 organiI!Jms per square foot per hour, with lower 
value. predominating. Estimated average value. are the following (per/ftl/hrl: 
Bacteria 
Mold. 
Anerobes 
150 
10 
25 
T8s 
This total of 185 was rounded to a value of 200, and is the primary bash for this 
a!l8Umption. ) 
2. A part of the typical size of a capacitor, reeistor, or diode will be consi.dered 
to accumulate on its surface the amount of fallout incident on a square foot of work 
area. (This assumption was arbitrarily made as a means to simplify calculations 
of fallout on small parts; since most of these types of parts have small surface 
areas, it is considered a conlervative assumption.) 
3. Three hours are required to manufacture a part. (Th\8 assumption waa made 
to provide an average number for convenient calculations without resorting to the 
gfmeration of individual estimates for the many parts involved, which is not justi-
fied for the preliminary estimate objective. I 
4. Parts with nonmetal exteriors will accumulate an additional burden because 
of the electrostatic properties of these materials. The surface burden added by 
electrostatic attraction will be considered 5 times that accumulated as fallout. 
S. Handling, including manipulation and packaging, will aud an additional 20 per-
cent to the total because of fallout and electrostatic attraction. (Recognizing that 
handling of in-process equipment would add to the burden, and in the absence of 
any test data, a 20 percent judgment factor was establish~d arbitrarily. 
6. Die-off of the accumulated surface burden is 90 percE'nt of the total accumu-
lated as fallout. electrootatic attraction, and in handling. (J I, (17) ('rable VI of 
reference 17 indicates very low levels of microbial contaminalidt 11 items selected 
from an industrial manufacturing area, in which fallout is expeucd to be as 
assumed in assumption 2, above. Table VI of reference 1 indicatea microbial 
contamination on stainless steel exposed to air in a factory during a 52 week period. j 
These levels average about 6000 microorganisms per squRt'e foot in spite of fallout . 
during the same year in the same area of about 200 microurganisms per square 
foot per hour. U no die-off had occurred during this time, microbial accumulation 
would have been on the order of 1.7 x 106/ft2 /yr; Since only about 6000 were ob-
served, it becomes obvious that only a small percentage survived. Recognizing 
that manufacturing and assembly periods are of long durations, a conservative 
survival factor of 10 percent was assumed.) 
n. Clean-Room Environment 
1. Components are made under normal factory conditions and are considered 
to he sealed units containing the accumulated lurrace burden on all internal 
parts. 
2. ComponenLs are surface-decontaminated to zero external !lurface burden 
before entering the Clean-Room. 
3. Air velocity in the CIa •• 100 Clean-Room will be 100 linear ft/mln. 
4. Air Flow over the surfaces of parts, components, etc., is assumed to be 
100 ft3/ m in/ft2. 
5. Suspended payload take I place in a Class 100 Clean Room. IS 
6. Assume 1 spore/fL2 of ambient clean-room air. (It is understood in tests 
performed at JPL under Class 100 conditions, no organisms were recovered. 
In the belief that Borne inefficienciE~1!I in filtration sY.3tem will exist, one spore 
will be assumed to be present in eHch cubic foot of ambient Clean-Room air. 
No contamination from working pel'sonnel is expectf2'd because of gowning and 
other precautiona, and because of the prevailing hi.gh-velocity air conditions.) 
7. Handling and die-off factors ale assumed to be zero. (ThiB assumption is 
based on the fact that personnel are protected to the extent that they do not con-
tribute to the burden, and die-off i'l considered zero since the only burden 
assumed in the Clean Room are spores, which do not readily die in a nonhostile 
environment. ) 
8. Parts, components, etc., collect 0.1 to I percent of the spores that im-
pinge on each square foot of Burfac·e. (Because the air flow rates in the room 
are high, and since only a very small portion of the air in a given cubic foot 
actually contacts the surface of a hardware item in the room, it is arbitrarily 
assumed that only 0.1 to 1 percent of the atmospheri.c burden actually adhere 
to the working surface.) 
9. Because of the Significant air flow, the electrostatic factor is included in 
the fallout factor. (The electrostatic forces of attraction are small compared 
to the force of the moving air. ThE!refore, this effect is disregarded in the 
Clean Room. I 
lO. All components are conslderec. to have a minimum of a square foot of 
surface area. (This is a simplifyirlg, conservative estimate.) 
TABLE B-2 
PROBE/LANDER--ENTRY FROM APPROACH TRAJECTORY--
PART AND MATERIAL BURDEN RANGES 
Estimated Internal Estimated Surface 
Item Burden Range Burden Range 
Balsa wood 1 to 10/in3 100 to 1000/ft2 
Battery cell 0 800 to 3600 
Capacitor 10 to 100 100 to 450 
Coaxial cable o to 100/ft 450/in 
Connector 100 to 10,000 200 to 900 
Crystal o to 10 100 to 450 
Diode 0 100 to 450 
Duplexer 0 500 to 2250 
Evacuating bellows 0 1 to 10 
Explosive 10/in. 3 --
Explosive Tra:ins o to 200/ft 900/in 
Fiberglass 0 500 to 5000/ft2 
Foam l/ml 500 to 5000/ ft2 
G-Mtube 0 100 to 450 
Inductor 1000 to 10,000 100 to 450 
Magnetic core 0 o to 1 
Magnetron o to 10 500 to 2250 
Metal 0 100 to 1000/ft2 
Nylon, Dacron 0 500 to 5000/ft2 
Optical system 10 to 100 100 to 450 
PbS detector 0 10 to 100 
Photomultube 0 100 to 450 
Relay 100 to 1000 100 to 450 
Resistor o to 10 100 to 450 
Silicone Integ. Circuit o to 10 100 to 450 
Silicone oil l/ml 
--
Silicone rubber 0 500 to 5000/ft2 
Teflon insulation 0 10 to 100/in 
Thermal control 0 1000 to 10,000 
Transformer 10,000 to 100,000 400 to 1800 
Transistor 0 100 to 450 
TWT 0 500 to 2250 
B-4 
The initial burden estimates of parts before they are assembled, and of com-
ponents which are completed before being assembled as part of the capsule 
(such as black boxes, for example,) are then generated using the estimates of 
part and component makeup. These burdens are used as the values of initial 
burden prior to the start of assembly into major flight capsule modules. With 
the exception of the assembly of the suspended payload, all assembly operations 
are assumed to be carried on under normal factory conditions. The suspended 
payload, however, is assembled in a Class 100 Clean Room, following a sur-
face sterilization of all unassembled elements. 
A specific example is carried through below to illustrate how the calculations 
of initial burden and burden added during assembly are carried out. The 
item considered is the radiometer, code Bl. 1. 5. 1 in Figure B-1. Figure B-2 
identifies the makeup of the basic unit, including the identification and numbers 
of constituent parts. The total internal surface area, internal burden and in-
ternal surface burdens are calculated from this information. Figure B-3 indi-
cates the burden added to the radiometer as it is assembled in a normal assem-
bly environment. Each line of the form, except for lines J, L and N, indicates 
the calculation used to arrive at the value indicated on that line; for line J, the 
surface burden value in the right column of Figure B-2 is used, - for line L 
the internal burden value is used, and the value for line N is calculated by 
factoring the total surface burden (line K) as a function of the occluded area 
(line M/line A). 
In this example the assembled radiometer has the following burden: 
Internal 12,220 to 122,760 (line L) 
Occluded 11,250 to 49,204 (line N + line P) 
Surface 50 to 169 (Line R) 
When the radiometer is introduced into the Class 100 Clean Room to be assem-
bled onto the external science payload its surface is sterilized, but its inter-
nal and occluded burdens become contributors to lines H and K of Figure B-4, 
respectively. This form is used to calculate the burden added during Clean 
Room assembly (not only for the radiometer, but all the other external pay-
load elements as well). The completed external science payload burden is the 
follow~ng: 
Internal 156,810 to 1,570,820 (line I) 
Occluded 54,677 to 239,217 (line L) 
Surface 53 to 530 (line D) 
B-5 
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Area Total Internal Burden Range 
Part No. in. 2 Area 
in. 2 Each Part Total Parts 
Resistor* 56 1.0 56 0-10 0-560 
Capacitor* 12 1.0 12 10-100 120-1200 
Diode * 6 0.5 3 0 0 
Transistor* 26 0.5 13 0 0 
Relay 6.0 100-1000 
Crystal 0.5 0-10 
Silo Int. Cct. * 20 0-10 
Inductor 2 1.0 2 1000-10,000 2,000-20,000 
Transformer 1 100 100 10,000-100,000 10,000-100,000 
TWT 40 0 
Magnetron 30 0-10 
Duplexer 35 0 
Battery Cell* 325 0 
Sig /Pwr Cntr. * 1 10 10 100-1000 100-1000 
Magnetic Core 0.01 0 
Coaxial Cable O-lOO/ft. 
Metal 1 44 0 0 
Pbs Detector 1 
~~ __ L--
Total 240 12,220-122,760 
Total area of electrostatic (*) Parts 94 
Figure B-2 PROBE/LANDER-ENTRY FROM APPROACH TRAJECTORY-
PART AREAS AND BURDEN 
e 
Surface Burden Range 
Each Part Total Parts 
100 - 450 5600 - 25, 200 
100 - 450 1200 - 5400 
100 - 450 600 - 2700 
100 - 450 2600 - 11,700 
100 - 450 
100 - 450 
100 - 450 
100 - 450 200 - 900 
400 - 1800 400 - 1800 
500 - 2250 
I 
500 - 2250 
500 - 2250 
800 - 3600 
200 - 900 200 - 900 
0-1 
450/in 
100 - 100/ft2 30 - 300 
I 
10,830 - 48,900 
e 
Code: Bl. 1. 5. 1 
Component: Radiometer' 
A. Total Surface Area of Parts (in2) 
B. Assembly Time (hr.) 
C. Fallout During Assembly (200/ft2/hr.) 
(200) (A/144) (B) 
D. Total Surface Area of Electrostatic Parts (in2) 
E. Fallout of Electrostatic Parts (D/A) (C) 
F. Burden Added in Electrostatic Attraction (E) (5) 
G. Burden Added in Handling (C + F) (0.20) 
H. Subtotal Burden (C + F + G) 
1. Viable Added Burden Assuming Die -off (H) (O. 1) 
J. Total Initial Surface Burden Range of Parts 
K. Total Surface Burden Range of Completed 
Component I + J 
L. Total Internal Burden Range of Parts 
M. Total Occluded Surface Area Within Black 
Box (in2) 
N. Total Occluded Surface Burden Range 
O. Total Mating Surface Area (in2) 
P. Total Mating Surface Burden Range (0/144) 
(range 100-1000) 
Q. Total Exposed Surface Area (in2 ) A - {M + O} 
R. Total Exposed Surfa,ce Burden Range (Q/144) 
(range 100 - 1000) 
S. Total Component Burden K + L 
Refe rence : Figure B-1 
Mating Code: Bl. 1.5 
240 
4 
1,328 
94 
518 
2,590 
784 
4,702 
470 
10,830 - 48,900 
11,300 - 49,370 
12,220 - 122, 760 
218 
11,242 - 49, 177 
3 
2 - 21 
19 
l3 - l32 
23,520 - 172, l30 
Figure B.3 PROBE/LANDER· ENTRY FROM APPROACH TRAJECTORY·FACTORY AREA ASSEMBLY CALCULATION 
B-7 
Code: Bl.l.5 
Component: Exter. Science Payload 
A. Exposed Black Box Surface Area (in2) 
B. Re sidence Time in Cle an Room (hr) 
C. Exposed Surface Burden of Assembly Entering 
Clean Room 
D. Accumulated Surface Burden Range 50-500/ft2 / 
8-hr. day (range 50-500) (A/144) (B/8) 
E. Mating Surface Area (in2) 
F. Mating Surface Burden Range (E / A) (D) 
G. Internal Burden Range Exclusive of Mating 
Items 
H. Total Internal Burden Range of Mating Items 
1. Total Internal Burden Range at this Level of 
Assembly G + H 
J. Occluded Burden Range Exclusive of Mating 
Items 
K. Total Occluded Burden Range of Mating Items 
L. Total Occluded Burden Range at this Level of 
Assembly J + K 
M. Total Burden at this Level of Assembly D+l+L 
Mating Code B 1. 1 
306 
4 hours 
o 
53 - 530 
55 
9 - 95 
o 
156,910 - 1,570,820 
156,810 - 1,570,820 
o 
54, 677 - 239, 217 
54,677 - 239, 217 
211,640 - 1,810,564 
Figure B-4 PROBE/LANDER-ENTRY FROM APPROACH TRAJECTORY-
CLASS 100 CLEAN-ROOM ASSEMBLY CALCULATIONS 
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Each element of the entire capsule is considered in the above manner, taking 
into account the burden initially on the elements before they are assembled, 
as well as that added during their assembly. 
2.0 COMPUTER PROGRAM FOR BURDEN CALCULATIONS 
The computer program used for burden calculations operates in essentially the 
same manner as the manual calculation. Burden contributors are identified, 
the capsule system and as sembly processes are defined, and burden calcula-
tions are made on the basis of the assembly operation, as affected by the bur-
den contributors. There are, however, some differences in technique between 
the manual and computer methods which are the results of lessons learned in 
using the manual approach. 
The manual approach used an indentured components list to define the assem-
bly flow sequence,and while this chart shows generally the sequence in which 
the constituent elements are assembled, it does not specifically identify each 
assembly process, as does an assembly flow chart of the type shown in Figure 
B -5. Basing the computer program on the more specific chart assures that 
each operation is taken into account in the correct sequence. 
The other significant difference between the manual and computer estimates 
is the manner in which the handling of parts and components is taken into 
account. In the manual calculations the burden added by handling was taken as 
a constant 20 percent of the burden accumulated by fallout. For the computer 
program each assembly process is analyzed separately to determine handling 
requirements for both physical assembly and for such quality-control testing 
as is carried on during assembly. This handling is measured in terms of the 
number of times a part or assembly is handled or touched, and the estimated 
number of square inches of contact which occur during each handling. 
The general sequence of calculations of the program is shown in Figure 9 of the 
main body. The basic information for each part and assembly process (part 
areas and volumes, time of exposure, expected handling, etc., as detailed in 
the following) represents the input. The program is designed to cycle com-
pletely for each assembly process, during which new parts may be added, or 
two or more assemblies may be put together without the addition of new parts. 
During each cycle, both burden contributors (such as fallout and handling) and 
decontaminating factors (such as die-off, ETO application and heat application) 
are calculated. At each assembly point a calculation is made of the number of 
biological assays that are required to ascertain that the burden is less than a 
predetermined maximum limit. 
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2. I Program Input 
Table B-3 indicates the inputs which are required to operate the computer 
program in conjunction with an assembly flow chart. There are five 
general types of inputs to the computer program. Part/Component inputs 
are required for each such element shown as a new addition in the assem-
bly plan; in addition. where these elements are electronic components. 
such as resistors, diodes, etc., a separate card (as shown in the second 
column) is required for each type of part in the component. For any 
given run, the data in the third and fourth columns identify the parameters 
which characterize the basic assembly approach and are to be fixed for 
that run; these values are then used the same way at each point in the 
assembly process. The fifth column contains information used in the cal-
culation of the required numbers of assays at each assembly point. 
In the Part/Component column an input is required for each of two or 
more elements being joined at anyone assembly process. If a new part 
is being added. for example. each of the inputs shown in Table B-4 is re-
quired for both the new part and the existing assembly to which the part is 
being added. with some exceptions as noted. In the event that two existing 
assemblies are being put together and no new parts are being added, the 
inputs are still required in order to identify the assembly process and to 
define the burden being added during the particular operation. 
In the Electronic Part Input/Part column. the level. control point. and 
part number associated with electronic parts are defined, in the same 
manner as described in the preceding paragraph and Table B-4. Where 
the element being assembled happens to be an electronic component, the 
computer program has the capability of taking into account the various 
types of parts (such as resistors, diodes and so forth) which go to make 
up the electronic component. In substance, the program identifies the 
numbers and types of such parts from the component definition and takes 
into account the burden contribution of each. Thus, for each electronic 
component a separate card is prepared for each type of part. The re-
quired inputs are indicated in Table B-S. 
In the Constants for Given Run column information is introduced which 
characterizes the basic assembly approach, and is therefore constant for 
any given run. This information is defined in Table B-6. 
The information required in the columns As say Requirements and General 
Inputs pertains to the number of assays required to achieve a desired 
confidence level that the burden, as assayed, does not exceed, a given con-
trol value. This information is described in Table B-7. 
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(1) 
Part/CoIllponent 
Inputs 
Level 
Control point 
Part nUIllber 
Facility code 
Pe rcent plastic 
Initial surface 
area 
Initial occluded 
area 
Initial voluIlle 
AsseIllbly Illated 
area 
No. personal 
contacts 
Area contacted 
ETO "D" value 
Heat "D" value 
Assay technique 
(2) 
Electronic Part 
Input/Part 
Level 
Control point 
Part nUIllber 
Facility code 
Part area 
No. parts 
Internal burden 
Percent plastic 
TABLE B-3 
COMPUTER PROGRAM INPUTS 
(3) (4) ( 5) 
Constants for Given Run Assay General Inputs 
RequireIllents 
I 
, 
Subroutine s: No. of assay types Table of assay 
, 
Black box Upper burden liIllit types and 
Assay Confidence level code accuracies 
Die- off Assay accuracy for Table of "t" 
ETO use subasseIllblies Distribution values 
Heat application Confidence level for different 
Die- Off rate required confidence levels 
Heat subroutine: 
Growth rate 
Death rate 
ETO subroutine: 
Growth rate 
Death rate 
Initial burden levels 
Metal, surface 
Metal, occluded 
Plastic, surface 
Plastic, occluded 
Plastic, internal 
Electrostatic factor 
Personnel contaIllination rate 
Fallout rate 
Duration exposed factor I Master facility code 
e e 
e 
ttl 
I 
...... 
I.>.l 
• 
TABLE B-4 
INPUTS FOR PARTS AND COMPONENTS 
Level 
On the a •• embly flow chart, each distinct assembly prace .. 1.8 identified in three 
ways: level, control point and part number (See Figure B.6). The level of ... embly 
decreases by one each time a procen takes place. The input to the program .imply 
require. a one or two digit number (or the process involved. 
Control Polnt 
A second set of two digits i. used to di.tinguhh between two or more assembly 
operations which happen to have the same level in the al!llembly now chart. In 
Figure B~6, for example, there are two .eparate as.embly operation. for leveh 03 
and OZ. 
Part Number 
A one or two digit part number is used to distinguish between the element. being 
8uembled at a given a8sembly point. In the calle of an exhting allsembly the number 
is alwaYIl one digit, and for new elements it is always two digits. 
FacUlty Code 
This input identifies the type of facility in which any assembly process is per!o1':med. 
For any given run, a general value for bi.ological Callout rate i. used to define the 
normal. or uncontrolled environment. The facility code. imprinted on a processwby. 
process basis, serves to identify whether or not the process is being done in a Clean 
Room and, if ao, how clean the room is. A one-digit number indicates the relative 
cleanlinelU of the room compared with normal, f!',g., "2." indicates a room which is 
cleaner by two orders of magnitude than normal. 
Percent Plastic 
In order to define the effect of electrostatic attraction on the total fall-out. it is 
necessary to know how much, if any, nonmetals are f'xposed on the surfaces of 
elements. The input is in percent, from 0 to 100. 
Initial Surface Ar~a 
This input identifies the total surface area as receh;f'd into final assembly for each 
element added to the capsule. 
Initial Occluded Area 
Although many elements in this ca.tegory are !llmply metallic structures and brackets, 
many others are nonelectronic functioning parts, such as pyrotechnic devices, cable 
harnelses, and switches. For thl1'se elements, which are received in an allembled 
state, thll input indicatel the amount of occluded surface area contained in the com· 
ponent. 
Initial Volume 
For those elements compand wholly or partly of nonmetah, this volume input allows 
calculation of internal burden, baled on the burden pe r unit volume uled for that 
material. 
Anembly Mated Area 
At any given atselnbly point where two ot more elements are- being joined, such as 
the case where a neW element ia betn. added, or two or mor~ exilting 8ubalaem-
bUes are beln. put together, it is nece ..... ry to know how much mutual area will be 
mated in the auembly process, trappinR some bioloRleal bUI'den which is then no 
longer acceuible to ETO decontamination. Thi. input identlfl.ea the area which ia 
mated during assembly, and is inputted aa the same value for all elementl being 
assembled at any given level and control polnt. 
Number of Personal Contacts 
During each assembly proce.,. the elemellts being assembled. are handled by the 
personnel performi.ng the auembly. Fo]' this input an estimate mUlt be made based 
on the lize and configuration of the elemf!nta being a.sembled, of the number of 
time. that they would be handled by the allembling peTlonnel in order to accomplish 
the balic alsembly, and the number of h-eUng and checkout procelses which may be 
carried on at that assembly point. The information to be inputted here ia a number 
which i.ndicates the estimated number of times that a human hand actually touche. 
either the element being added or the assembly to which it 1.&1 being added. 
Area Contacted 
This input is made in conjunction with thl~ preceding one and represents a term for 
the average number of square inches contacted each time a I:ontact la made. For 
small partA, the area contacted is usually very small. at th~! mo.t one or two square 
inches, For large f'lements, 8uch as the basic 8tructure and heat "hield. on the 
other hand, ('onta('t tnsy be made sirnultf·.neously by more than One person and over 
a contact area of several square inches per hand. (These two inputs together, 
number of personal contact8 and area contacted. lerve to id~ntify the total aurface 
of any element which IS contacted during an a.sembly procells; they are then used to 
calculate the burden deposited on the vehicle by human contact, uling in addition the 
personnel contamination rate dilcualed in Table 8·6). 
ETO lIO't Value 
In the event that ETO is to be used al a Ilurface decontaminsnt at any particular 
asaembly level and control point, it is nl!cessary to know thl~ expected effect of the 
ETO on the biological burden, whi.ch is a function of the dur;ltion of the exposure, 
concentration of thf" ETO, etc. Thil ef£(~ctivenels ia defined by the number of 
decades (orders of magnitude) by which the burden is reducf'd. Thus a HOlt value of 
three means that the burden of viable orHanllml on expoled lurfaces i8 reduced to 
0.001 (1. e., 0.1 percent) of the initial olle. This implies that 99.9 percent of 0.11 
viable organiams were killed (asluming an initial population 8ufficientiy large for 
this .taternent to be meaningful). 
Heat lt~,, Value 
The definition of 'lOll value for this input 18 the lame al that for ETO decontamina~ 
tion. 1£ an element is subjected to a nlght.aeceptanee cycl~ with a kill capability of 
120, this means that the burden in and on the element being heated i.a reduced by Il 
decades. 
A.eay Techni.que 
It ts necealary to identify for each part or component the auay technique which 
would be uled on that type of element to determine the biological burden. The lur-
face of metal, (or instance, would probBbly be alsayed by Iwabbing, whereas the 
interior of a plastic element would be allayed by drilling or fracturing, etc. The 
input required (or the program at thi. pl)int 11 a code numb~r which identifies the 
a.aay techniquI!! against a table of as •• y types and aecurach·. which are dillcu.lled 
in Table B-7, 
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TABII B-5 
INPUTS FOR ll1CTRONIC PARTS 
Facility Code 
A facility code input i8 established (or each electl'onic pal't card in the same manner 
as for each nonelectrDnic part in order to identify the quality of the facility in which 
.. n electronic component is assembled. 
This input identifies the extel'nal surface area Df the type of electronic parts to which 
the pal'ticulal' card pertain.. For example, if this card were used fQr resistors. 
the pal't area mputted WQuld be the area on a typical resistor. 
Number of Parts 
This mput identifies the number of parts crt a given type used in a given electronic 
component. For example, If 500,000 memory cores are utilized in a data stol'age 
umt, the input ~rtaining to memol'Y core. would be 500,000. 
Internal Burden 
A great many electronic parts are internally sterile because of the heat proces.e. 
used d~ng their manufacture. Dr because of a prolonged burn-in process which 
may be required before a part can be considered acceptable. For otber types of 
electronic parts, however, .uch as transformers, the internal burden may reach 
very high levela. In the input card for !iluch parts this input idem1Iies the average 
iui.eLU.o.l burden ior that type oi part. 
Percent Plastlc 
In order to Incorporate the effects of electrostahc attraction, it is necessary to 
identify whether Ol' not cel'tain types crt electl'onic parts have sUl'facel conslsting 
entIrely, or in part, of plaShcs. Therefore, the pel'centage of the .urface of th~ 
givf'n electl'onic pal't which is plastic is ldenhfled In thiS Input. 
TABLI B-6 
PARAMETERS !)[fINING THE BAS Ie ASSEMBLY APPROACH 
Thf' program has f:ve basic subroutines. Each of these subroutines can be exer-
cised by inserting on the constant card a "1" in place of a blank. The I wlll indicate 
that the subroutinf' is to he !,lIed as the program is run and >wi.1l therefore take into 
account all Input inform.ation which l'elates to the particular sub-routine as the pro-
gram UI run. 
Die-Off Rate 
For any given run a die-off rate is conl1dered to apply. Typical values used here 
range from 30 to 99 percent, and in the program are considered to apply only to that 
biological burden which has been added as a function of fallout and handling dUl'ina 
finiil assembly, but not to burdens a •• umed to be On the elements initially (prior to 
fInal asseTl'lbly), since thDse burdens are by definition assumed to be the survivors 
of higher burdens resulting from expo5ure and die off in stol'age priDr to final assem-
bly. 
Heat Subroutine 
Where heat is belng applied du.nng final assf'mbly either as a flight-acceptance 
cycle, or a cure cycle. or for lIome other reason which may involve using lower 
h .. ?! yal'~f"5, !h... ~a};es It in~o account tr.ro'lg.h spenfied ~ro ..... th rates or death 
::-::tcs :,;. r" <,a.dJ, the Input icientlile.r. the pen:entaRe of bUTd~n 
lncrease or decrease. Thus, fol' a lD value of heat, the death rate input is 90 per-
cent ami the gro"'th rate input is O. 
The nlt'chanl'5 of this I!'Ubroutlne al'e the same as for the heat, and Can be used to 
add or 5ubtl'act microorgamsms. Again. for an ETO application of iD the death 
rate lnput would be 90 percent, and the growth rate, 
InitIal Burden Leveh 
ThJl:i part of a constant card fol' a given l'un requires five inputs; two {ol' metal and 
three for plastic surfaces. Fol' metal surfaces the inputs are: (1) burden pel' square 
lOch of metal surface area, and (2) burden per squarf' inch of metal surface al'ea 
which is occluded prior to thf' start of final assembly. For example, if an explOSive 
bolt "'ere considered to have an occluded surface of 5 square inches, then the oc-
cluded burden In that part prior to final assembly would be 5 square inches times the 
Dccluded burden rate on metab. Input values for plastics are treated in tm: same 
manner, with the addition that an input is added for internal burden a. well as sur-
face and OCcluded burden. For all inputs of initial burden level the value is in terms 
of burden per square inch where surfaces al'e involved, and burden per cubic inch 
where plastic Internal burden is involved. 
Electrostatic Factor 
For any given run an electrostattc factor {rom I to 99 may be specified. The pro-
gram use5 this lnput to multiply the sUl'face burden on that portion of surface area 
of a part or element in final assembly which is plastiC rather than metal. 
Personnel Contamination Rate 
Thi. input takes Into account the rate of biDlogical conta.mination per .quare inch 
pel' contact by the pel'sonnel performtng the final assembly. A value of 1900 
organisms pel' square inch per contact has been used in th18 study (See paragrapb 
3.1.Z). 
For a given run a basic fallout rate is assumed to define the normal environment 
for final assembly activities in that run, and IS here specifted in terms of organ-
isms per liquare Inch per day. In conjunction with the facility code fol' any given 
assembly point (which identifies the quahty of facility in which that pal'ticular as-
sembly process is belng carl'led out relative to the basic fallout rate. all well ~ 
the number of square inches and duration of the assembly process specified el.e-
where), this basic fallout rate permitll a calculation of hurd en accu.mulation because 
of iallout on ;::ny ipven ?a.rt dclnng a~y g1ven pDlnt ~n the a!tsembly process. 
DuratIon Exposed Factor 
To IdentIfy conslStent exposure tlmes during ""hlCh assembly pl'ocesses are carried 
out ana subassemblIes rnay be out on the floor in assembly areal!, the "duration 
exposed" factor IS an average fat:tor 'Which relates expo!lure time to assembly 
activity level. ThUll, elements wluch are assembled early In the assembly process 
ar!" ex?"sed for longel' periods of time than tholie \lo-hH.h are assembled late in the 
process. By relating the highest level of assembly to the total number of days ex-
pected to be consumed in final assembly, it is pOSSIble to idenhiy the average 
number of days pel' level (e.g., the total numbel' of days of expo.ure of any element 
being mtl'ociuced into the fInal aSllembly at a given level). The input required hel'e 
is a I or Z digit number defining this number of days. 
Master Facility Code 
If it is desil'ed to vary the qualtiy of the facility in which final as.embly takes place 
for a parametric study, the master facility code input can be used. The input re-
quil'ed here is a 1 or 2 digit number identifying the quality of facility desired by 
spectfymg the number of decades by which the fallout rate is less than the basic 
fallout rate. Thu., the input 03 indicates that all assembly proces.es previously 
carried out in a normal area would now be carried out in a clean room with 0.001 
of the fallout rate in the normal area (and all processes preV10usly carried out in 
clean rooms would now be pel'fol'med in higher-grade clean room. with a fallout 
rate 0.001 of that in the other clean l'ooms). 
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TABLE B-7 
PARAMETERS DEFINING ASSAY REQUIREMENTS 
Number of Assay Types 
The program is designed to handle as many as 40 different assay types with the 
accuracies of each stored in a table. The two-digit number introduced here is 
merely a control number identifying the number of different assay types which 
happen to be in the table during any particular run or set of runs. 
Upper Burden Limit (Control Value) 
The upper burden limit is stated in terms of the exponent of ten (to save space), 
defines the burden limit against which calculated burdens are to be tested. 
Confidence Level Code 
This code identifies which level of confidence, of several stored in the machine, 
(see below) is to be used for a particular run. 
Assay Accuracy for Subassemblies 
Because in-process subassemblies are handled in a manner different from newly 
added elements internal to the program, this particular accuracy percentage is 
identified separately. 
Confidence Level Required 
and 
For any given run in which the assay subroutine is used, it is necessary to identify 
the codidence level with which the estimated or assayed value is below the control 
value. This value, 99.99 percent, for instance, is identified in this input. 
e 
I 
Table of Assay Types and Accuracies 
A table such as the following one is stored in the memory, so that assays can be 
selected by code number, as described above. 
ASSAY TYPE PERCENT ACCURACY CODE 
Swab (See Table XVllI) 
Rinse (See Table XVllI) 
Agitation (See T able XVIII) 
Immersion (See Table XVIII) 4 
Rodac (See Table XVIII) 
Filtration (See T able XVIII) 6 
Internal (See Table XVIII) 7 
Black boxes (See Table XVIII) 8 
Table of "t" Values 
In order to calculate the number of assays required, a table of Student's litH 
values must be stored in the memory for each confidence level to be used, so that 
the proper calculation can be made. 
e 
2. 2 Output Format 
The values which are printed out following a computer run are indicated 
in Table B-B. For each assembly process the level, control point and 
part number are printed to allow identification against the final assembly 
flow chart used to develop the definition of assembly processes. The other 
entries are as follows: 
The total burden is the combined burden of the elements which have been 
assembled at any given level and control point; it includes surface, 
occluded, rnated and internal burden (each of which are separately printed 
out). The burden/part entry represents the total burden for each element 
at a given assernbly point, printed out separately. In each case, the surn 
of the values in the column equals the total values discussed in the pre-
ceding paragraph. The external burden indicates the burden on exposed 
surfaces of the assernbly, both before and after rnating of the elements 
as sernbled at this point. The within burden is also printed out separately, 
in order to identify easily that burden which is not accessible to ETO. It 
consists of the occluded, mated and internal burden on the elernents 
as sernbled at any given point. The internal burden indicates the burden 
within the substance of which nonmetallic elernents are rnade. The 
occluded burden is that which in this particular step has been rnade in-
accessible to ETO by enclosing it; such as in the case of a sealed electronic 
cornponent. The rnated burden is that which is trapped between rnating 
surfaces; it is calculated as a function of the burden on surface prior to 
as sernbly and the arnount of area mated after assernbly. 
The area/part entry defines the surface area of elernents being added, and 
the values shown as being those of the exposed surface before rnating •. 
This inforrnation is included to aid in understanding the size of the surface 
area exposed at any given point in the assernbly process. The total surface 
area is the surface area exposed on the assembly after being rnated with 
another ele rnent or as sernbly • 
The process added burden indicates the burden added at any assernbly step 
as a function of fallout and handling, including the effects of electrostatic 
factor, and Clean-Roorns, if used. 
The nurnber of assays required/part is the nurnber of assays which are 
required to dernonstrate and assign burden to each type of elernent (trans-
rnitter, for exarnple) used in the capsule (See Section 4.0). The code 
printed in the entry assay type required is defined as follows: 
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TABLE B-8 
COMPUTER PROGRAM OUTPUT FORMAT 
The following printed for each assembly process, involving either 
addition of new parts / components or joining of subas s emblies 
Level 
Control point 
Part number 
Total burden 
Burden/ part 
External burden 
Within burden 
Internal burden 
Occluded burden 
Mated burden 
Area/part 
Total surface area 
Process added burden 
Number of assays required/part 
Assay type required 
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Table B-9. A parts list showing all major assemblies and components of 
the probe is shown in Table B-IO; it indicates the quantities of each item 
in the probe, the total area of each item, and identified those areas that 
are occluded and mated. An electronic piece parts summary is shown in 
Table B-ll. 
The extensive engineering and scientific equipment, with the necessary 
power sources, is housed in a structure which provides mounting accommo-
dations and serves to transmit loads experienced throughout the mission 
to the entry shell and the spacecraft adapter. It is attached through a 
mounting ring to the inner surface of a IS-foot diameter blunt entry shell 
which consists of an aluminum honeycomb structure with a Purple Blend 
heat shield applied to its exterior (front) surface. The payload attached 
to the entry shell mounting ring is encased by a sheet metal truncated 
afterbody coated with an ablative material. The probe is encapsulated in 
a canister which provides the necessary biological isolation during all 
mission events after thermal sterilization, until probe deployment. 
3.2 Probe/Lander (Designed for Entry from the Approach Trajectory) 
The probe/lander capsule is designed to measure Mars atmospheric pro-
perties during descent, and also to survive landing on the surface for a 
few days, during which time chemical and physical measurements are made 
of the surface and the atmosphere. An in-board profile of the capsule is 
shown in Figure B-8. Its weight before separation from the spacecraft 
which carries it to the vicinity of the planet is 2500 pounds, and it con-
sists of over 165 major components made from more than 30,000 parts. 
It has a diameter of 15 feet and houses an 85 pound scientific payload. A 
weight summary of the capsule is given in Table B-12, and a detailed block 
diagram is shown in Figure B-1. (The Alpha numeric identification codes 
shown correspond to reference points used in analyzing physical charac-
teristics and assembly-activity information to identify a flow sequence for 
the assembly and, thus, to furnish the information for a biological burden 
analysis.) A detailed electronic parts count is given in Table B-13; 
Table B-14 defines the surface areas of these part types, and Table B-15 
groups components by function and descril:es their physical characteristics. 
The landed payload is protected by a shock-attenuation system to permit 
survival of the landing impact. The lenticular shape of the landed payload 
as sures proper orientation for deployment of the scientific instrumentation 
and for commUnication. This payload structure is attached through a 
mounting ring to the inner surface of the IS-foot diameter blunt entry 
shell, which is constructed from a stainless steel honeycomb core with 
bonded beryllium face sheets. The heat shield (Purple Blend) is applied 
to the exterior (front) surface of the entry shell. A sheet-metal after-
body faced with ablative heat shield material encloses the payload and is 
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attached to the entry shell at its periphery. This entire asseIT1bly is en-
capsulated within a canister to provide biological isolation froIT1 external 
environITlents after terIT1inal sterilization (i. e., through subsequent testing, 
IT1ating, launch and space flight) to the tiIT1e of sterilization-canister de-
ployIT1e n t. 
All payload as seIT1bly operations are conducted in a Federal Standard 209 
Clas s 100 Clean-RooIT1. After ETO cleaning, cOIT1ponents are brought 
into the area as required and incorporated into the asseIT1bly. 
The final asseIT1bly of the flight capsule is conducted in conventional en-
vironIT1ental conditions. The cOIT1pleted flight capsule is processed 
through an ETO cycle and then sterilized by the application of heat. A 
cOIT1plete series of systeIT1 tests is conducted to deIT10nstrate systeIT1 
acceptability. 
TABLE B-9 
FLIGHT CAPSULE WEIGHT SUMMARY FOR PROBE (EFO CASE) 
FLIGHT CAPSULE 
Fe /FS adapter 
Sterilization cani ste r 
SEPARATED VEHICLE 
/}. V propUlsion 
ACS gas expelled 
TVC gas expelled 
ENTRY VEHICLE 
Thermal protection 
Entry structure 
Thermal control 
ACS nozzles, tanks, etc. 
TVC nozzles, tanks, etc. 
Miscellaneous 
2967.0* 
125.0 
383.4 
2458.6 
400.0 
1.0 
17.6 
2040.0 
370. 7 
343.0 
30.0 
36.0 
27.0 
208.3 
SUSPENDED CAPSULE 1025.0 
Instrumentation 
Telecommunications 
Altimeters, doppler 
Power 
Parachute 
Support structure and thermal protection 
Inertial reference system 
Propulsion shell, hdwe., cables, etc. 
*All weights in pounds 
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196.1 
111.8 
54.4 
160.0 
84. 0 
186.0 
21.6 
210. 1 
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TABLE B-10 
COMPONENT PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PROBE (EFO CASE) 
Title 
Quantity 
PAYLOAD ASSEMBLY 
PAYLOAD STRUCTURE 
(BAY 1) 
Module 
Module platform 1 
Diagnostic data handling 1 
Power control 1 
Delay data and data storage 1 
Battery 1 
RF load I 
Ferrite circulator 1 
Calibrator I 
Transmitter 1 
Directional coupler 1 
Power switch 1 
Bottom cover 1 
Top cover 1 
Doppler radar antenna 1 
Diagnostic sensors ZO 
Cabling 1 
VHF antenna 1 
Transmitter 1 
Cabling 1 
(BAY 2) 
Penetrometer 1 
Bracket 1 
Cabling 1 
(BAY 3) 
Beta scatter bracket 1 
Beta scatter 1 
Radar altimeter 1 
H20 bracket 1 
H20 detector 1 
The rmocoup1e s 2 
Module Z 
Mod~l}e pIa Ho rro. , 1 
Radar altimeter electronics 1 
Penetrometer receiver 1 
Radiation detector 1 
Pre s sure sensor 2 
Temperature amplifier Z 
Programmer 1 
Acoustic densometer 1 
Mass spectrometer 1 
Gas chromatograph 1 
Bottom cover 1 
Top cover 1 
Engineering data handling Z 
Diagnostic sensor s ZO 
Cabling 1 
(BAY 4) 
(Same as bay Z) 
(BAY 5) 
(Same as bay 1) 
Central computer and sequencer 1 
(BAY 6) 
(Same as bay Z) 
(BAY 7) 
Diagnostic sensors 
Cabling 
Container 
Mortar 
S and I device 
Parachute 
Pilot chute 
Capacitor switch 
(CENTER BA Y) 
Smoke bombs 
TV camera assembly 
*'~~"ACS electronics subsystem 
3-Axis accelerometers 
,~ Plastic 
':":' Balsawood 
,:,,~,:, Inertial reference system 
Sentry gyro package 
ACS electronics package 
Pressure transducer 
ZO 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
1 
1 
1 
Area (_ in2) 
Mated 
Percent Initial After 
Total Plastic Occluded Assembly 
3Z,500 1000 
1325 
300 300 50 
450 450 75 
500 500 83 
600 10,000 100 
ZOO 300 30 
100 300 15 
300 500 50 
100 100 15 
10 ZO Z 
100 ZOO 15 
1050 50 
1200 50 
5Z0 5Z0 100 
50 50 ZO 
lZ00 95 45, 000 100 
750 750 100 
ZOO ZOO 30 
400 95 15,000 35 
1500 4000 100 
40 10 
400 15,000 35 
ZO 5 
Z5 25 5 
300 300 50 
10 2 
20 ZO 3 
10 30 2 
_____ . .1.3,Z,.5 
150 150 Z5 
150 150 25 
100 100 15 
25 75 5 
50 50 8 
100 100 15 
100 100 15 
400 400 60 
400 400 60 
1050 50 
1200 50 
400 400 60 
50 50 ZO 
400 95 15,000 35 
300 300 
50 50 ZO 
400 95 15,000 35 
7500 100 
1300 600 
150 400 30 
1500 100 2,300,000 1000 
700 100 360,000 400 
ZO 1Z0 5 
100 600 15 
900 1400 100 
700 700 10 
60 60 10 
• 
Volume 
Non-
Metallic 
Materials 
(- in3) 
150"~ 
50* 
3000*':' 
50~' 
50* 
50* 
11,500 
3600 
1000 
ttl 
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TABLE B-1O (Concl'd) 
Title Area ( - in2 ) 
Quantity Percent Initial 
PAYLOAD ASSEMBLY Total Plastic Occluded 
(BAY 8) 
(Same as bay 2) 
Support ring 1 310 
Rocket engine 1 4000 3500 
Separation mechanism 1 200 200 
Internal accelerometer 1 40 40 
S and I device 1 150 400 
Separation Switch 1 10 50 
Capacitor / switch 1 20 120 
Umbilical cable 1 500 95 15,000 
Umbilical connection 1 30 75 
ADAPTER ASSEMBLY 
Adapter forward section 1 30,000 
Adapter aft section 1 900 
Canister pressure tank 1 1500 1500 
Refill valve 1 20 20 
Solenoid 1 20 20 
Drift pressure sensor 1 20 40 
Depressurization valve 1 20 30 
Relief valve 1 20 20 
S and I device 1 150 400 
Relay receiving antenna 1 1500 1500 
Disconnect umbilical 1 20 40 
Lanyard 1 20 
Separation clamp assembly 1 160 
ENTR Y SHELL ASSEMBLY 
Honeycomb section 1 265, 000 
Adhesive 2 120, 000 100 
Aluminum face sheets 2 120,000 
Adhesive 1 9000 100 
Doubler splice plates 12 9000 
C10 se -out ring 1 17, 000 
Mounting ring 1 2200 
Fiberglass liner 1 60,000 100 
Adhesive 1 60, 000 100 
Heat shield 1 60, 000 100 
Backup plate 1 32, 000 100 
Nose cap structure 1 900 100 
Foam 1 900 100 
Nose cap 1 900 
Atmosphere manifold 1 20 20 
Thruster bolts 4 
Tubing 1 400 400 
S and I device 1 150 400 
Diagnostic sensors 20 50 50 
Flip-flop valves 2 120 20 
Diagnostic sensors 20 50 50 
Pressure tanks 2 3000 3000 
Valves - shutoff 2 20 40 
Plumbing 1 1800 1800 
Valve nozzles 8 40 40 
Manifolds 2 20 20 
Filters 4 80 100 
Regulators 2 30 30 
S and I device 1 150 400 
Capacitor switch 1 20 120 
Pressure transducers 3 75 150 
Separator clamp assembly 1 150 
Plumbing connectors 1 150 
Cab1mg 1 400 15, 000 
THRUST VECTOR CONTROL SYSTEM 
Tubing 1 600 600 
Solenoid valves and nozzle 4 175 125 
Gas generators 4 460 95 460 
STERLIZATION CANISTER LID 
Aluminum inner shell 1 60,000 
Adhesive 1 20,000 100 
Foam segment 1 20,000 100 
Adhesive 1 20,000 100 
Aluminum oute r shell 1 60,000 
Adhesive 1 1500 100 
Foam bearing pads 1 1500 100 
Adapter ring 1 5600 
FLSC backup ring 1 7200 
FLSC 1 900 100 450 
STERLIZATION CANISTER BASE 
Aluminum base 1 60,000 
Checkout antenna 1 60 
RF absorbers 2 100 400 
Cabling 1 400 95 15,000 
Plumbing 1 400 400 
Landyard umbilical disconnet 1 10 
Main umbilical disconnect 1 25 
O-ring gasket 1 40 100 
Access door 1 800 
Volume 
Mated Non-
After Metallic 
Assembly Material 
( _ in3) 
50 
100 12,000 
20 30* 
6 
30 
2 
4 
100 50* 
5 
450 
450 
50 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
30 
100 70 
10 
3 
80 
200 
200 1200 
60, 000 
4500 90 
4500 
800 
1000 
30, 000 6000 
30, 000 600 
30, 000 12, 000 
14, 000 
100 
450 1350 
200 
2 
4 
30 
20 
40 
4 
100 
5 
20 
10 
5 
10 
5 
30 
4 
10 
10 
10 
50 
30 
15 
75 
10,000 
10,000 100 
10,000 1000 
10,000 100 
10,500 
750 15 
750 750 
1000 
450 
450 900 
30 
30 
50 
35 50* 
4 
2 
10 
20 10 
100 
TABtE B-11 
EL.£CTRONICS PARTS COUNT FOR PROBE (EFO CASn 
I ::: " "- ., B " E ~ .. ... .~ 2 ::: ;.. 0 " B ..c:: u 
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B ., CD ~ 
" 
" 
u 
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~ ;; ~ -0 u 0: 0: ~ 
'" ~ 0 -5 '" 0: 6 ... . 0 .. 0 f-< c:: u E f-< U 
Doppler radar and antenna 2 200 1000 1200 200 200 8 8 
:',iass spectrometer I 60 120 60 60 5 2 
Radiation detector 
I 
I 12 24 12 12 1 1 
Accelerometers 3 30 60 60 30 6 
Acoustic densitometer I 2 5 5 5 1 1 
Gas chromatograph 1 50 30 30 10 15 2 
Press ure sensor 2 2 2 
Beta scatter I 6 10 2 2 1 1 
Temperature sensor 1 I 1 
Radar altimeter 1 100 500 600 100 00 4 4 
Penetrometer 4 40 80 48 40 12 4 4 
Penetrometer receiver 1 15 ZO 30 10" 10 1 3 
VI ater detector I 2 I 
Central computer and 
sequencer ~ I 5 10 30 5 2 I 
Directional coupler 2 4 4 2 
Transmitter 2 80 240 640 80 240 40 8 
Engrg. data handling 2 20 30 40 20 4 4 
Diagno~tic data handling 2 20 30 40 20 4 4 
Data storage 2. 300 bOO 900 300 6 6 
Delay ~ta storage 2 100 ZOO 300 100 2 2 
ACS electronic package I 75 155 90 75 9 4 3 
Pressure transducer 4 8 8 4 
Inertldl reference system I 50 70 42 25 17 2 
Sentry gyro package I 17 70 25 28 2 4 I 
DiagnostiC sensors 100 100 
Television I 150 900 150 75 30 2 9 
Power converter 2 60 300 80 60 40 8 12 
.. 
Total 1'3 1382 4570 '1384 126c 701 75 94 
:~ Crystals. relays. RF chokes, switches, nlagnetron, duplexer. thermistors. 
:;::;: Parts 15,341 + 8 x 10 5 magnetic cores includes both data and delay data storage. 
::~:::~~ Equivalent to 64, oeo conventional parts. 
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UMBILICAL CABLE 
CRUSH -UP LAYERS 
FIBERGLASS SHELLS 
BALSA WOOD 
S-BAND ANTENNA 
ANTENNA CAVITY 
76-0021P 
STERILIZATION CANISTER 
LANDED 
PAYLOAD 
180.01N 
DIA. 
ENTRY SHELL 
Figure B-8 PROBE/LANDER-ENTRY FROM APPROACH TRAJECTORY-
INBOARD PROFILE 
e 
VHF ANTENNA 
1:1 V PROPULS ION 
MOTOR 
ACS 
CAPSULE/SPACECRAFT 
ADAPTER 
e 
TABLE B-12 
WEIGHT SUMMARY FOR PROBE/LANDER (EFAT CASE) 
FLIGHT CAPSULE 
FC/FS adapter 
Elec /Mech connectors 
Sterilization canister 
SEPARATED VEHICLE 
I'1V propulsion 
ACS electronics 
Spin rocket propellants 
Propulsion support structure 
Mis cellaneous 
2500.0* 
100.0 
50.0 
366.9 
1983.1 
98.5 
10.0 
2.1 
10.0 
12.5 
ENTRY VEHICLE 1850.0 
TherItlal protection 
Primary structure 
TherItlal control 
Elec/Mech connectors 
ACS nozzles, tanks, etc. 
Spin rockets and supports 
Contingency 
SUSPENDED CAPSULE 
Science 
Telecommunications 
Power 
Mis cellaneous 
Contingency (25"/0 of payload) 
Main chute, pilot, mortar 
Support structure 
Afterbody 
LANDED CAPSULE 
Impact attenuator 
Elec /Mech connectors 
INTERNAL WEIGHT 
Science 
Telecommunications 
Power 
Miscellaneous 
Contingency (25"/0 of payload) 
Thermal control 
Internal structure 
*All weights in pounds 
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290.0 
451. 2 
25.0 
55.5 
69.3 
10.0 
25.0 
924.0 
36.9 
20.6 
31. 1 
3.4 
22.0 
74.0 
65.0 
76.0 
595.0 
215.0 
15.5 
364.5 
48.0 
98.7 
70.1 
2.0 
54.7 
15.0 
76.0 
TABLE B-13 
ELECTRONICS PARTS SUMMARY FOR PROBE/LANDER (EFAT CASE) 
" . 
w ~ w " " -0 .~ " " " E )i • .~ ~ -B 0 ~ § ~ "5 ;: " u ~ " " S. -0 " U '" U • ~ 0 " • " a ~ .~ ~ 
" ,:; • 6 -0 e: 0 a f-< u oS u Ul~U 0 
Antenna subsystem 
Relay link transmitter 10 30 80 10 30 
Direct link power amplifier 
Direct link exciter 20 30 10 15 
Command receiver /decoder 20 30 10 15 
Central computer and sequencer 10 30 30 
Telemetry subsystem 10 30 50 
Data automation subsystem 10 30 50 
Data storage 100 200 300 100 500 
Power conditioning 15 15 10 
Battery 
Radar altimeter 30 50 60 20 40 10 
Ac ce leromc te r -impact 10 10 
VSWR monitor 
Gamma scatter 10 
Pressure 
Mass spectrometer 60 120 60 60 
Argon detector 4 
H20 detector 
03 detector 
02 detector 
CO2 detector 
Anemometer 14 40 10 
Alpha scatter 10 
Microphone 
Audio amplifIer 
Resistance thermometer 12 12 
Resistance therrrlOm.eter bridge 12 12 
Linear triaXlal accelerometer 24 54 30 27 
Surface radiation 12 24 12 12 
Penetrometer 
Radiometer 26 56 12 
Beta scatter 10 
Atmospheric pressure 
Atmospheric teITlperature 
Langmuir probe 31 19 
lOOOV power supply 13 30 14 10 
Trapped radlation 12 24 12 12 
Gyro-trlaxial 17 70 25 28 
Control electronic s 24 54 30 27 
Total 413 947 862 448 893 31 64 638 
t,<Crystals, relays, RF chokes, switches, magnetron, duplexer. thermistors, TWT. 
':"n 0 5 magnetic cores 
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TABLE B-14 
. ELECTRONICS PARTS CONFIGURATION OF PROBE/LANDER (EFAT CASE) 
Part Area (in. 2) Part Area (in. 2) 
Resistor 1.0 Transformer 100.0 
Capacitor 1.0 TWT 40.0 
Diode 0.5 Magnetron 30.0 
Transistor 0.5 Duplexer 35.0 
Relay 6.0 Battery cell 325.0 
Silo Int. Cct 20.0 Sig/pwr cntr 10.0 
Inductor 1.0 Coaxial cntr 2.0 
Magnetic cores 0.01 
Note: All wire is assumed to be 20 gage and the insulation as 0.02 in. 
Teflon. The copper- Teflon interface is considered sterilized 
when the Teflon coating is applied. 
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Code 
A 
-
Al 
-
AI.I 
AI.2 
AI.3 
AI.4 
AI.5 
AI.6 
A2 
-
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TABLE B-15 
COMPONENT PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS FOR PROBE/LANDER (EFA T CASE) 
Title Description 
Sterilization canister 
assembir 
Sterilization canister lid 
Face sheet Fiberglass-200 inch diameter; Surface area: 2 x 4900 = I 
80,000 in. 2; thickness: 0.125 inch; mating surface based on 
seal flange (AI. 5). 
Foam Cold setting plastic - 200 inch diameter. Surface area: 
2 x 40,000 = 80,000 in. 2 . Thickness: 0.5 inch; bubble diame-
ter = 0.5 Cm.; no. of bubbles = 125 per cc. Bubble surfaces 
are occluded areas. 
Aft face sheet Same as for AI. 1 
Support Continuous resilient pad, silicone rubber. Surface area = 
7000 in.2. Other dimensions estimated. 
I 
Seal flange Fiberglass - 1. 5 x 600 inch. Surface area = 2,000 in. 2. 
I 
Parasitic antenna Metal rod 6 in. long, 0.25 in. diameter, with 1 in. 2 mating 
area. 
Ste rili z ati on c ani s te r Same as for Al except omit AI. 6. 
base 
--
-- --- - -
- _._-- - - -_._-
-- - -
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Vol 
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e 
Code 
A3 
A3.1 
A3.2 
A3.3 
A3.4 
A3.5 
A4 
A4.1 
A4.2 
A4.3 
A4.4 
• • 
TABLE B-15 (Cont'd) 
Title Description 
Pressurization assembly 
! 
Tanks Thin steel sphere 1 foot in diameter containing a gas such as 
I nitrogen. 
Tank support Aluminum bracket with 1 ft2 of surface area. 
Plumbing Stainless steel tubing 0.25 inch diameter, 2 feet long. 
Pressure indicator Simple mech, metal valve. Surface area :: 1 in. 2 
Depressurizing valve Pyrotechnic squib (tube). Surface area = 2 in. 2, 1 cc explosive. 
Sterilization mechanism 
seEaration 
Spring Metal Belleville washers (1 x 3inches). Surface area= 100 in2 
each. 3 required. 
Clamp Metal tube to retain the spring (l x 3 inchE~s). 
Explosi ve latch Total surface area = 300 in. 2 • With 3 cc of explosive. 
Sterilization canister Metal (0.25 x 700 inches), 200 in. diameter. Total surface 
cutting charge area = 300 in. 2 ; 20 grains of explosive per foot. 
-----_ L.--- - - -- - --------- ---.-- ... -----~ 
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Code 
B 
B2 
B2.1 
B2.1.1 
B2.1.2 
B2.l.3 
B2. 1.4 
B2. 1. 5 
B2. 1. 6 
B2. 1. 7 
Title 
Separated vehicle 
Entry vehicle 
Entry vehicle body 
Fiberglas s cap 
Honeycomb fairing 
Fiber optics bundle 
Fiberglass skirt 
Compression ring 
Radiometer window 
Attachment strap 
TABLE B-15 (Cont'd) 
Description 
Total surface area:: 2 (625 x Pi) :: 4000 in. 2. Thickness 
:: 0.125 inch. 
Fiberglass - 2 foot wide having a triangular cross- section 
varying from 6 to 0 inch. 90-inch radius, 550 inches long. 
Vol:: 40,000 in. 3. Total surface area:: 2 (24 x 550) :: 
28,000 in. 2 • 
5,000 glass fibers (0.5 x 100 inches) with 0.125 inch thick 
plastic casing. Fiber diameter:: 0.0428 inch. 
Tension shell structure. Total surface area:: 2 x 38,000 
in. 2 :: 76,000 in. 2 (Backing material for heat shield). Thick-
ness:: 0.125 inch. 
Metal tube - 6 inch O.D.; 700 in. long, with 200 in. 
diameter. 
Quartz - 0.5 inch diameter, 0.5 inch long. Metal flange 
0.5 inch diameter. Bracket surface area:: 4 in.2. 
To hold shield on sphere. Metal (1 x 50 in.) each. 8 re-
quired. Total surface area:: 8 (1 x 50 x 2) :: 800 in. 2 • 
e e 
tit 
b:I 
I 
W 
W 
Code 
B2.1. 8 
B2.2 
B2.2.1 
B2.2.2 
B2.2.3 
B2.2.4 
B2.2.S 
B2.2.6 
Bl 
B1.l 
B1.l.l 
B1.1. 1.1 
Title 
Heat shield 
Entrx: vehicle sensors 
Pressure transducers 
Plumbing 
Cable 
Resistance thermometer 
Radar antenna 
Langmiur probe 
Suseended caesule 
External eax:load assem-
E!Y. 
Cable assembly 
Cable cutter 
e • 
TABLE B-15 (Cont'd) 
Description 
Thickness = 0.1875 inch. Total surface area = 80, 000 in. 2. 
Curing at 300°F for 16 hours to fiberglass structure in 
sealed container. 
Metal pressurized bellows (2 in. 2 of brazed area). 3 re-
quired. Total surface area = 3 x 2 = 6 in. 2. (Wire-wound 
resistor acting as a voltage divider). 
3 metal tubes. Diameter = 0.1875 inch, 6 inches long. 
9 wire. 10 inches long. Total length = 9 x 100 = 900 inches. 
0.3 x 0.7 x 0.002 inch. (Ignore because of small dimensions.) 
Same as for AI. 6 
I 
Same as for Bl.1. 5. 3 
30 wires (15 twisted pairs). Tinned copper braid. Each 
wire = 4 feet long. Total length = 4 x 30 = 120 feet. Looks 
like octupus; has 10 connectors. 
Guillotine trre, movable blade and piston. Total surface 
area = 3 in. • I cc of explosive. 
TABLE B-15 (Cont'd) 
Code Title Description 
Bl.l. 2 Bolt cather Cup shape, metal. Each is 3 in. long, diameter = linch. 
3 required. 
Bl.1.2.l Capsule separation bolt 3 required. Total surface area - 3 x 1.5 = 4.5 in. 2. Each 
bolt with 0.5 cc of explosive. 
Bl.l. 3 Support ring structure Metal, cylinder shape. Diameter = 100 inches. Length 
= 24 inches. Total surface area = 2 (24x 150) = 7200 in. 2 • 
Bl.l.3.1 Cradle assembly Metal hemisphere, radius = 50 inches. Total surface area 
= 2 x 8000 = 1600 in. 2. Occlusion due to Fiberglass steril-
ization ball. 
tJj 
, 
VJ Bl.l. 4 Attachment strap Included in B2. l7 • 
*'" 
B.l.l.4.l Explosive bolt Total surface area = 8 x 2 = 16 in. 2. 0.5 cc of explosive re-
quired in each of 8 bolts. 
B1. 1. 5 Instrumentation I 
Bl.l.5.1 Radiometer ~ Black boxes. See Table B-13 and B-14. 
Bl.l. 5.2 Radar altimeter 
Bl.l.5.3 Langmuir probe ; Black boxe s. See Table B-13 and B-14. 
Bl.1.5.4 Beta scatter 
Bl.l.5.5 Resistance thermometer See B2. 2.4. 
Bl.1.5.6 Trapped radiation Black box. See Table B-13 andB-14. 
--' 
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Code 
Bl. 1. 6 
B1.l.6.l 
B1.1.6.2 
B1.1.6.3 
B1.l.6.4 
B.1.1.6.5 
Bl.1.6.6 
B1.1.6.7 
B1.1.6.8 
Bl.1.6.9 
B1.1. 6.10 
B1.1. 7 
Title 
Propulsion and attitude 
control electronic as-
sembly 
Fuel tank 
Oxidizer tank 
Pressure tank 
Propulsion nozzle 
Plumbing 
3 Axis gyro package 
control electronic s 
Pressure regulator 
Control valve 
ACS nozzle 
Parachute 
e • 
TABLE B-15 (Cont'd) 
Description 
(All items mounted on support ring) 
! 
, 
2 foot diameter metal sphere containing filtered fuel called 
Hydrazine. 
2 foot diameter metal sphere containing toed fuming nitric 
acid. 
0.5 foot diameter metal sphere containing dry nitrogen. 
Fiberglass (Refrasil). Maximum diameter = 4 inches. 
Throat diameter = 1 inch. Length = 1 foot. 
Stainless steel tubing (40 feet long. Diameter = 0.1875 inch) 
and (2 feet long. Diameter = 0.5 inch). 
Black boxes. See Table B-13 and B-14. I 
Metal spring loaded valve. Total surfac«~ area = 4 in. 2. I 
I 
Solenoid valve. Diameter = 0.75 inch 1. 5 inch long. 12 re-
quired. Total surface are a = 12 x 5 = 60 in. 2. 
12 required. Total surface area = 12 x Z = 24 in. 2 • 
t:d 
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Code 
Bl.l.7.1 
B1.1.7.2 
B1.1.7.3 
B1.1.7.4 
Bl.1.7.5 
B1.1.7.6 
B1.1.7.7 
Bl.l. 7.8 
Bl.l. 7.9 
Bl.l.7.l0 
B1.l.7.11.l 
Bl.1.7.l1.2 
Title 
Main pack chute 
assembly 
Cover 
Container 
Parachute 
Deployment mechanism 
Pyrotechnics 
Pilot pack chute 
assembly 
Cover 
Container 
Parachute 
Cable assembly 
Pyrotechnics 
TABLE B-15 (Cont'd) 
Description 
Nylon chute 100 foot diam.eter, with 20 shroud lines each 100 
feet long. Shroud line diameter = 0.125 inch. Parachute 
arrives at assembly area packed, ready to be placed in con-
tainer (Bl.l.7.3). 
Thin metal lid. Diameter = 1.5 feet. 
Thin metal cylinder. Diameter =1.5 feet, 1.5 feet long. 
Included in B 1. 1.7. 1 
Undefined. Assume piston 1. 5 ft. diameter. To be moved 
by gas charge. 
5cc of charge. 
Nylon chute 25 foot diameter with 10 nylon shroud lines. 
25 feet long each. Shroud line diameter = 0.125 inch. 
Thin metal lid 8 inches in diameter. 
Thin metal cylinder 8 inches long. Diameter = 8 inches. 
Included in Bl.l.7.7. 
4 wire s, each 6 feet long. 3 connectors. 
2 cc of charge. 
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Code 
BI.2 
BI. 2.1 
BI.2.2 
BI.2.3 
Bl. 2.4 
BI.3 
BI. 3. 1 
BI. 3.2 
BI.3.2.1 
BI.3.2.2 
BI. 3. 3 
Title 
Imeact attenuation 
Inner shell 
Cutting charge 
Crushup material 
Attachment and cables 
Floatation subs:lstem 
Attachments and cables 
Floatation shell 
Caging and umbilical 
Fill and vent mechanism 
Floatation liquid 
e • 
TABLE B-15 (Cont'd) 
Description 
Thin fiberglass sphere. Diameter = 36 inches. 
165 grains. 
Balsa wood, hollow sphere. 1.0. = 36 inches; 0.0. = 72 
inches. 
100 feet of 1 inch metal strap. Big net holding material 
together not yet conceived. 100 feet of 0.0625 inch diameter 
steel cable, braided. 
Included in Bl. 2.4. 
Fiberglass sphere (Diameter = 36 inches). 
100 contact electrical connector with metal collar. Con-
nector diameter = 3 inches. Connector surface area = 40 
. 2 In. • Collar 1.0. = 3 inches. Collar surface area = 31 in. 2. 
Pyrotechnics with 1.5 cc of charge. 
1 inch diameter metal pipe cap. Total surface area = 2 in.2. 
2 gallon of silicone oil (1 gallon = 3,780 mI.). 
-_ .. _----
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Code 
Bl.4 
Bl. 4. 1 
B1.4.1.1 
Bl. 4. 2 
Bl. 4. 3 
BI. 4. 4 
Bl. 4.5 
Bl. 4. 6 
Bl. 4. 6.1 
B1.4.6.2 
Title 
Landed caEsule 
Umbilical and caging 
Pyrotechnics 
Attenuation shell lower} 
Attenuation shell top 
Probe structure lower ~ 
Probe structure top 
Central control and 
sequencer 
Computer and sequencer~ 
Data storage 
TABLE B-15 (Cont'd) 
Description 
Same description as BI. 3. : 
1. 5 cc of charge 
Fiberglass hemispheres. Diameter = 36 inches. Each 
insulation shell goes inside of flotation shell. 
Welded aluminum sheet sphere (heat sink). Diameter = 36 
inches. Total surface area = 50,000 in. 2. Forms major 
portion of sphere except for antenna portion. All electronic 
hardware is mounted on this structur e. 
Electronic components. See Table B-13 and B-14.10 5 magnetic 
cores will come as a single packaged unit that can be plugged 
in. 
-
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Code 
Bl. 4. 7 
B1.4.7.1 
B1.4.7.Z 
Bl. 4. 7. 3 
B1.4.7.4 
Bl. 4. 7.4.1 
B1.4.7.5 
B1.4.7.6 
B1.4.7.7 
B1.4.7.8 
B1.4.7.9 
B1.4.7.l0 
Bl. 4. 7.11 
B1.4.7.l1.1 
B1.4.7.l1.2 
B1.4.7.l2 
B1.4.7.l3 
Bl. 4. 7.14 
Bl. 4. B 
B1.4.B.l 
B1.4.B.2 
Title 
Instrumentation 
Accelerometer \ 
Impact accelerometer 
Gamma scatter 
Microphone 
Amplifier 
Surface radiation 
Spectrometer 
HZO, 0Z, 03 detector 
pressure 
Transducer 
Penetrometer 
Alpha scatter 
Anemometer 
Deployment mechanical ~ 
Pyrotechnics 
Argon detector t Temperature sensor 
C 02 detector j 
Power sUEEll 
Power switch and con-
dition 
Battery assembly 
• • 
TABLE B-15 (Cont1d) 
Description 
Electronic components. See Table B-13 and B-14. 
Not described. Negligible. 
Electronic components. See Table B-13 and B-l4. 
See Table 13-13 and B-14. 
Table B-13 and B-14. As sumptions of .3 50 watts giving 50 
pounds and 400 cu in. Total surface area = 325 in. 2 • 
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Code 
B1.4.8.3 
Bl. 4. 9 
B1.4.9.l 
Bl.4.9.2 
Bl.4.10 
B1.4.10.1 
B1.4.10.2 
B1.4.10.3 
B1. 4.10.4 
B1. 4.10.4.1 
Bl.4.10.S 
B1. 4. 10.6 
B1.4.11 
B1. 4.11.1 
B1.4.11.2 
B1.4.11.3 
B1. 4.11. 4 
B1.4.11.S 
TABLE B-15 (Condld) 
Title Description 
Thermal control Coating outside of sphere. Black paint and gold sputtering 
(half and half). Black paint is baked on. 
T 1M and data automa-
tion 
--
Telemetry ~ See Table B-13 and B-l4. Data automation 
Telecommunic ations 
Direct exciter , 
Power amplifier 
Duplexer I See Table B-13 and B-14. 
Command receiver I 
and decoder 
Relay transmitter 
RF cable See Table B-13 and B-14. 
Antenna assembly 
Feed network } VSW R monitor See Table B-13 and B-14. Spiral antenna 
RF cable 10 feet of cable (e.g., RG142B). 
Balun Neglect • 
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